اخبار السودان – وطن نيوز
اخر اخبار السودان اليوم – اخبار السودان العاجلة
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-06-22 13:02:00
Secrets and mysteries of negotiations and self-determination agreements for South Sudan (23-29): Abid Agreement. Salman Muhammad Ahmed Salman1 In the previous three articles of this series of articles, we discussed the continuation of negotiations between the Salvation Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on the outstanding issues in the peace agreement after their signing of the Machakos Protocol on July 20, 2002, according to which the Salvation Government recognized the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan. We explained that after the major and long stumbling that accompanied the negotiation process after the agreement and signing of the Machakos Protocol, a major breakthrough occurred that led to the agreement. The security arrangements agreement was signed on September 25, 2003, followed by the wealth-sharing agreement on January 7, 2004, then the power-sharing agreement on May 26, 2004. Also on May 26, 2004 was the signing of the agreement to resolve the conflict in the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which we discussed in some detail in the previous article. 2 In this article, we will move to the third agreement that was signed in On May 26, 2004, it was the agreement to resolve the Abyei Area dispute (Abyei Agreement). This is the sixth and final agreement in the series of comprehensive peace agreements that were signed on January 9, 2005, also under the name of the Naivasha Agreement. 3 The Abyei Area represented another dilemma for the two negotiating delegations from the beginning of the negotiations on it. The government of Sudan insisted on the sanctity of the 1956 borders between the north and the south, and thus the Abyei region was left off the negotiating table. On the other hand, the movement referred to the Addis Ababa Agreement, which was signed in 1972, between the government of President Numeiri and the South Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mr. Joseph Lagu – which included an explicit text about the Abyei region. The agreement, as we discussed before, defined the southern region as consisting of the three directorates of South Sudan (Upper Nile, Bahr el-Ghazal, and Equatoria), and any other areas that are culturally and geographically considered part of the southern entity, as may be decided by referendum. However, although the disputed Abyei region between the north and the south was not mentioned by name in the agreement, it was understood by both parties that the reference in that text was to the Abyei region. A presidential decree was then issued. In October 1974, he placed the administration of the Abyei Area under the presidency of the Republic, which confirmed that the text in the Addis Ababa Agreement refers to the Abyei Area. However, no practical measures were taken to implement that decision, or to put the referendum referred to in the Addis Ababa Agreement into effect. 4 The dispute over the Abyei Area became more complicated during the Naivasha negotiations due to the lack of agreement between the two parties on the borders and area of the Abyei Area. After the Salvation Government agreed to discuss the issue of Abyei, it insisted that the area is a small triangle whose area does not exceed 1,500 square kilometers located south of the Arabian Sea in the state of South Kordofan. This situation makes the Arabian Sea the border separator between north and south in that region. On the other hand, the movement was insisting that the Abyei region include this triangle, in addition to an area of about 30,000 square kilometers in the state of South Kordofan, north of the Arabian Sea, extending from Lake Kilak to the city of Muglad. 5 It is necessary to remember the other side of the conflict between the Misseriya tribe, which spends part of the year in this region in pursuit of water and pasture, and the Dinka tribe. Ngok, which resides in the area, is a branch of the main Dinka tribe. The discovery of oil in the Abyei region added another dimension to the conflict, and made it more complex. Thus, the disputes over the Abyei region became a sharp conflict between the Salvation Government and the Misseriya tribe on the one hand, and the SPLM and the Ngok Dinka tribe on the other hand, and over land, water and oil. These factors made the conflict more intertwined and complex. 6 Relations between the Misseriya and Dinka were good and friendly throughout the period of dual rule until independence. The leaders of the two tribes succeeded in resolving the disputes that arose between members of the two tribes over land and water. However, the situation changed after the outbreak of civil war at the end of the 1950s. Then the situation in the Abyei region became more complicated after the establishment of the SPLM in 1983, and the return of the civil war after President Numeiri tore up the Addis Ababa Agreement, which he had signed with the South Sudan Liberation Movement in 1972. The Misseriya tribe sided with the government and its members fought alongside the Sudanese army. On the other hand, the Ngok Dinka tribe sided with the South Sudan Liberation Movement, and later with the SPLM. Members of both tribes fought within the military groups of each of these groups. A group of educated members of the Ngok Dinka tribe also emerged among the leadership of the popular movement, and played an active role in directing and managing the course of the conflict. Observers attributed the emergence of a large group of educated Ngok Dinka people to the connection of the Abyei region to the north and its educational system.7 The Abyei dilemma continued to loom at the forefront of the negotiations, especially after the signing of the Machakos Protocol on July 20, 2002. It remained without a glimmer of hope for a solution, starting with the area and borders of the region. Mr. John Danforth, the American special envoy to Sudan, intervened in March 2004 and offered both parties a group Proposals that were accepted by both parties and became the basic articles of the Abyei Agreement. The agreement was signed two months later, on May 26, 2004, and nearly two years after the signing of the Machakos Protocol on July 20, 2002.8 A footnote on the first page of the Abyei Agreement indicates that the agreement is the full text of the proposal entitled “Principles of the Agreement on Abyei” presented by the US Special Envoy, Senator John Danforth, to the First Representative, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, and to Dr. John Garang, head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in March 19, 2004.” The footnote adds that the two parties’ acceptance of these principles is a basis for resolving the dispute over Abyei.9 This intervention by Mr. Danforth, and the visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell to the negotiating headquarters in Naivasha, was evidence of the growing American role in the Sudanese peace negotiations, and the extent of the internationalization that Sudan’s problems have reached. It must also be remembered that the mediators who stood with the Salvation Government in the dispute over the two regions – Kordofan and the Blue Nile – supported the SPLM’s position in the Abyei conflict. These two positions, which gave the mediators a degree of credibility and impartiality, must have contributed to pressuring the Salvation Government to accept the American proposal.10 The Abyei Agreement opened with an optimistic text indicating that Abyei is “a bridge between the north and the south, connecting the people of Sudan.” The agreement defined the Abyei Area as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms that were transferred to Kordofan in 1905. The agreement indicated that the Misseriya and other nomads retained their traditional rights to graze their livestock and move through the Abyei Area. Other articles of the agreement affirmed the basic rights of the Ngok Dinka by defining the population of the Abyei Area as consisting of members of the Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area, without mentioning Misseriya tribe by name. This article gave the Abyei Referendum Committee, which would be appointed by the Presidency, the powers to set residency standards in the region.11 The agreement made it clear that upon signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Abyei would be granted a special administrative status under the auspices of the Presidency, under which the residents of Abyei would be citizens of both the states of West Kordofan and Bahr al-Ghazal, with representation in the legislative bodies of both states. Abyei is administered by a local executive council elected by the residents of Abyei. Until the election of the Executive Council, the presidency appoints the members of the first Executive Council. 12 The agreement divided the net oil revenues from Abyei during the transitional period into six sections as follows: the National Government 50%, the Government of South Sudan 42%, Bahr El Ghazal State 2%, West Kordofan State 2%, the Ngok Dinka 2%, and the Misseriya 2%. The agreement established, under the auspices of the Executive Council, the Abyei Resettlement, Reconstruction and Development Fund to implement relief programs and return the displaced, Resettlement, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in the region, and the Fund may establish specialized agencies. 13 The agreement obligated the Presidency to establish the Abyei Boundary Commission to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms that were transferred to Kordofan in 1905. The Presidency determines the composition of the Abyei Boundary Commission and the time frame available to it. The Commission includes experts, representatives of local communities and the local administration. The Commission completes its work during the first two years of the transitional period and submits its final report to the Presidency once it is completed. When the final report is presented to it, the Presidency shall take the necessary measures directly to bring the special administrative status of the Abyei Area into effect. 14 The agreement included procedures for a referendum to decide the future of the Abyei Area, and it was decided that the referendum be conducted simultaneously with the referendum in South Sudan. The people of Abyei cast their votes separately in this referendum, and the proposal that is being voted on gives the people of Abyei the following two options, regardless of the outcome of the southern referendum: for Abyei to retain its special administrative status in the north, or for Abyei to be part of Bahr el Ghazal State in South Sudan. The agreement stipulated the deployment of international observers in Abyei to ensure the full implementation of these agreements. geographically by a commission with experts from outside Sudan, and secondly: holding a referendum coinciding with the referendum in southern Sudan, whereby the residents of Abyei determine their choice to remain under a special status in northern Sudan, or to join Bahr al-Ghazal state in southern Sudan.16 However, as we discussed before, both methods faced a set of problems due to the ambiguous wording of a number of articles of the agreement, and due to the Misseriya tribe’s extremism regarding the issues of Abyei’s borders and the referendum. Its insistence that it has the right, like the Ngok Dinka tribe, to participate in the referendum. We will discuss in a later article (Article No. 28 of this series of articles) the sharp differences that arose between the Salvation Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on a range of issues. The Abyei conflict was one of the most important issues of the conflict. The Anaqad government rejected the Abyei Border Commission report, which was accepted by the SPLM and demanded that the government accept it and begin implementation procedures. This dispute continued and became more complicated and reached the stage of litigation before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (an international court), as we will discuss in Article No. 28 of this series of articles. In fact, the Abyei Agreement remained, and remains the only agreement between the Salvation Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement whose texts, as well as the report and ruling issued pursuant to it, await implementation by both parties, as we will discuss in an upcoming article. 17 Thus, the two parties completed work on the six agreements that together formed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and they were signed. On each of them separately. The mediators breathed a sigh of relief, after two full years of negotiation, punctuated by the conflict between despair and hope, failure and success. 18 Ten days after signing the last three agreements, the two parties signed on June 5, 2004, the “Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in Sudan.” The declaration confirmed the six agreements reached by the two parties, and the declaration was signed by Mr. Ali Othman Muhammad Taha and Dr. John Garang. This was an attempt by the mediators to close any way for retreat by one of the parties, especially the Salvation Government. This procedure was similar to the initialing of the Machakos Protocol on the morning of July 20, 2002, before its final and formal signing on the evening of that day at the presidential palace in Nairobi.19 Less than a week after signing the Nairobi Declaration, the Security Council issued a presidential statement on June 11, 2004 in which it welcomed the Nairobi Declaration, And the agreements reached, especially the Machakos Protocol. The Council urged the two parties to complete the negotiation and final signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement before the end of the year. This was the second Security Council statement on the Sudanese peace negotiations. As we mentioned in a previous article, the Security Council issued a presidential statement on July 24, 2002 in which it welcomed the Machakos Protocol, describing it as an important breakthrough on fundamental issues, and a major step towards reaching a just and lasting peace in Sudan. In its first statement, the Council appealed to the two parties The negotiators continue to work hard to reach a comprehensive and final agreement on all outstanding issues during the year 2002.20 Thus, after signing the Machakos Protocol on July 20, 2002, and after issuing its first presidential statement on July 24, 2002, and its second presidential statement on June 11, 2004, the Security Council became closely following and supervising the Sudanese negotiation process in Kenya.21As we will discuss in the next article, this follow-up led him to hold one of his meetings in Nairobi to discuss the problems of negotiating the South Sudan issue between the two parties to the conflict. This was a case with few precedents in the history of the Security Council, completing the internationalization of the South Sudan issue. The next article will also discuss the resolutions issued by the Security Council on the issue of the South, and linking them to the resolutions on the Darfur issue, which rose to the surface of the increasingly complex events of Sudan every dawn of a new day, shortly after the signing of the Machakos Protocol.22 The next article will also address the agreement on the annexes of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement regarding implementation, as well as the inception of the agreement, and then the final signing of the agreement (which Also known as the Naivasha Agreement) on January 9, 2005.Salmanmasalman@gmail.com The writer
