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South24 Center’s comprehensive annual report for the year 2025, a year between stillness and explosion: Yemen on the verge of transformation Yafa News – South24 Center – Aden. The comprehensive annual report for 2025 issued by the South24 Center for News and Studies (A Year Between Stillness and Explosion: Yemen on the Verge of Transformation) paints a picture of a country advancing on the brink of transformation under the weight of overlapping crises, where the paths of politics, security, economics, and humanity intersected, while the conflict remained managed with the logic of “containment” more than it was heading toward a comprehensive settlement. While most of the months of the year passed in a fragile calm, 2025 ended with what the report described as a “relatively explosive end” after Saudi Arabia’s intervention in southern Yemen, especially in Hadramaut and Al-Mahra, turning into a direct test of the limits of influence inside and outside the legitimacy camp, and opening the door to new political and security arrangements at the beginning of 2026. The annual report prepared by an elite team from the South24 Center is divided into four political, security, military and economic axes. Humanitarian, it deals with hundreds of documented events in the Yemeni scene during the year in a coherent analytical manner, providing an important reference for the scene of events in the country. The report also documents an overview and statistics about the activities of the South24 Center and the strategic, journalistic and training work of its team during the year. First: The political axis, according to the report, the political structure of the internationally recognized authority remained “fragile” throughout 2025, with the escalation of the imbalances in the Presidential Leadership Council and the decline in the government’s effectiveness in managing the service and economic files, which deepened the gap of trust with the street, and kept the scene open to successive crises instead of a stable reform path. On the other hand, the Southern Transitional Council – according to the report’s summary – gradually moved from a strategy of political pressure to “imposing facts,” with a special focus on Hadramaut and Al-Mahra, driven by a conviction of the erosion of the chances of a settlement within the post-2019 framework. At the level of the UN and international track, the report indicated that during 2025 the United Nations envoy to Yemen provided a total of 12 briefings to the Security Council, including 4 closed briefings, in an indication of the breadth of complexity and its relevance. With regional and international interactions that go beyond the Yemeni interior. The report also monitored international diplomatic activity, including – among its stations – a ministerial meeting in New York on January 21, 2025, in which Britain and more than 35 countries participated, ending with a joint statement that renewed support for the Presidential Leadership Council. Regarding the prisoners’ file, the report stated that negotiations hosted by Muscat led on December 23, 2025 to an exchange agreement stipulating the release of 1,700 Houthi detainees in exchange for 1,200 government forces, including 7 Saudis and 23 Sudanese. But the peak of the political transformation – as reflected in the report – came in December, when “political tension reached its peak” with the escalation of the conflict within the legitimacy camp and Hadramaut and Al-Mahra turned into a testing ground for the influence of the various parties, which led to narrowing the margin of the political movement of the Transitional Council and opening the door to a new path led by Saudi Arabia. The report concludes that the gap between the transitional calculations and Riyadh’s approach to managing the southern file widened by the end of the year, leading to direct Saudi intervention that reshaped the political and security landscape in the south, especially after the United Arab Emirates ended its presence there. Second: The security and military axis entered 2025 – according to the report – under the umbrella of an “unstable military truce”: no comprehensive war and no stable peace, with continued attrition on the internal fronts, and the escalation of the Houthis’ regional role in the maritime and air route against Israel and the United States, which necessitated the classification of the group as an international terrorist organization, and the launch of an unprecedented military air campaign and waves of violent raids, which had wide economic, humanitarian and security repercussions. In the line of raids related to the regional escalation, the report provided detailed figures for losses: it indicated that American raids on the Houthis during the year led to 212 deaths and 294 wounded, while Israeli raids resulted in 21 dead and 226 wounded. According to UN sources, the report mentioned two prominent examples within this path: a raid on Hodeidah on April 17, which led to 84 deaths and 150 injuries, and another on Saada on April 28, which resulted in 68 deaths and 47 injuries. On the other hand, the military scene inside Yemen during 2025 was characterized by a pattern of limited clashes along the fronts, whether between the southern armed forces and the Houthi militia, or on the northern fronts between the Houthis and forces loyal to the internationally recognized government. The report monitored the Houthi militia’s implementation, from the beginning of 2025 until December 15, of 58 attacks against the southern armed forces, distributed across several governorates. Al-Dhalea Governorate was the most affected with 33 attacks, followed by Lahj with 15 attacks, then Shabwa (4 attacks), Abyan (2 attacks), in addition to Hodeidah and Ma’rib with two attacks each against the southern forces deployed there. These attacks resulted in the death of 45 soldiers and the injury of 50 others, with Al-Dhalea recording the highest death toll of 30 dead and 23 wounded. Regarding the terrorism file, the report said that Al-Qaeda attacks during 2025 amounted to 31 attacks, causing 70 casualties, including one dead or wounded, with a clear concentration in the governorates of Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramaut. The report said that the organization relied mainly on direct clashes with firearms in 12 attacks, followed by explosive devices used in 11 attacks, and also used drones in 5 operations, in addition to car bombs, explosive belts, mortars, and snipers in limited attacks. With the withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates from the anti-terrorism file in Yemen on January 2, 2026, as a result of tension with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia and recent developments in the governorates of Hadramaut and Al-Mahra, the report said that the anti-terrorism file – which Abu Dhabi was adopting alongside the southern forces – is facing a dangerous stage of challenges, amid warnings of the possibility of the return of Al-Qaeda’s influence in the south. As for the southern turning point that concluded the year, it was – according to the report – the process of controlling the Hadhramaut Valley, the desert, and Al-Mahra in late 2025, which collided with “a decisive Saudi position that was translated into air strikes and direct intervention,” and ended with the repositioning and then withdrawal of the southern forces in early January 2026, and the start of new security arrangements in Aden and its environs. In this context, the report on the Southern Armed Forces stated that the Saudi Air Force carried out more than 350 raids from December 27, 2025 until January 7, 2026, resulting in 80 military deaths and 152 military injuries, in addition to 4 civilian deaths and 18 civilian injuries. Third: The economic axis. The report believes that 2025 was characterized by “unprecedented” economic turmoil, in which the monetary collapse coincided with flows of external support and development projects with “limited structural impact,” while the economy continued to suffer from revenue suffocation, the cessation of oil exports, and the expansion of the financial deficit. The report provides figures showing the course of the currency in government areas: the dollar exchange rate reached 2,058 riyals at the beginning of the year, then 2,336 in March, and 2,840 in July, before returning and entering a phase of “relative stability” in August at 1,617, conditional on external support and monetary measures. In terms of monetary policy tools, the report stated that the Central Bank in Aden implemented a total of 18 auctions for the sale of foreign currency during 2025, with a total value of about two billion dollars, to finance the import of basic goods. He also referred to regulatory decisions that affected exchange companies, which included suspending the licenses of 83 companies in Aden during the year. Regarding “external support,” the report cited figures for financing and aid, including the UAE’s announcement to support renewable energy projects with one billion US dollars, in addition to Saudi support worth 1.38 billion Saudi riyals to finance service and development projects in Yemen, in addition to British support of about 79 million dollars (to confront food deterioration), in addition to limited amounts from the European Union, the United States, Japan, and South Korea. On the other hand, the report pointed to additional burdens on the Yemeni economy linked to the maritime escalation, noting that the Houthis imposed on shipping companies amounts amounting to $180 million in royalties, in an indication of the increasing cost of the war economy on trade and transport movement. Fourth: The humanitarian axis. The report concludes that 2025 did not witness a tangible humanitarian improvement, but rather the circle of need expanded to include approximately 19.5 million people, with weak international funding considered the most influential factor in the decline in the quality of basic services. The report supports this picture with sectoral figures: 17.8 million lack health care, 17.4 million are at risk of contracting diseases, 4.5 million children are out of school, and 7.4 million are in need of protection services. In the context of violations, the report documented 21 violations against journalists during 2025. The report also indicated the continued threat of mines despite the decline in the toll compared to previous years, recording 31 victims during the year (including 22 dead and 9 wounded), which the report considered evidence that “the threat has not ended” despite the decline in numbers. In the file of natural disasters, the report stated that the torrents and floods that struck several governorates from August to September 2025 resulted – as a preliminary toll – in 82 deaths and affected 46,500 people. As for the file of African displacement and migration, the report indicated that the number of African migrants who arrived in Yemen during 2025 reached 151,500 migrants, with 100 deaths or missing people at sea or land routes recorded, according to UN data. Foresight for 2026 The report believes that 2026 is heading to be a “double test year”: either political and security containment that will rearrange balances, or the return of tension in new forms, while the economy and people remain the most fragile and affected by any path. Politically – The report is likely to push towards a format of dialogue or a “South-South” conference sponsored by Saudi Arabia to rearrange the representative map, but it may collide with an “angry street” if its long-term demands are not met. – The continued fragility of the institutions of legitimacy unless the mechanisms of partnership, decision-making, and the future of the South are resolved. – Any settlement remaining hostage to regional and international understandings rather than an internal consensus. Security and militarily – The report expects the continued restructuring of the security system in the south under direct Saudi supervision. – The possibility of Hadramaut and Al-Mahra to return to the forefront of the conflict due to the continued roots of the crisis (influence, multiple loyalties, smuggling). – The Houthis remaining a pressing regional factor, with the possibility of a return of naval or air escalation depending on developments in the region, especially related to the development of the American position on Iran. – A decline in counter-terrorism efforts as the risks of the return of al-Qaeda activity increase. Economically – continued reliance on external support to alleviate the services and energy crisis. – The currency remains vulnerable to deterioration with any political or security shock. – Escalation of resource conflicts, especially in the oil provinces, linking the economic file directly to the path of political and security arrangements. Humanitarian – The gradual deterioration will continue if international funding does not improve. – Humanitarian pressures will double with any new wave of security tension, especially in southern Yemen. – The humanitarian file will remain hostage to political and security stability more than it is linked to response capacity alone. The report concluded that, in all cases where the course of events in Yemen takes place, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will bear a major responsibility for the outcome of the scene, especially after it became alone in managing the Yemen file, following the final withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates from the country at the beginning of the year 2026, including from the south. Read more: https://south24.org/news/news.php?nid=5293
