وطن نيوز
Trump failed to calm the markets in his address to the nation at dawn yesterday. After the speech, oil prices jumped by about 5 percent, reaching $105-$107 per barrel. Trump did not add anything new in his speech, and this time he appeared hesitant to define his intentions. The decision to continue the war in Iran remains in his hands, but it does not seem that he has promising options. In complete contradiction to his political orientations and what he has been calling for all these years, Trump may involve himself in a long and costly war in the Middle East. His threat to return Iran to the Stone Age suggests more frustration than security. Three days remain until the ultimatum he issued to the leadership in Tehran, which has already been extended twice. Then, if no settlement is reached, Trump will consider dramatically escalating the fighting and deploying ground-based special forces for the first time, to islands in the Persian Gulf and in the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps even to the shores of Iran itself. According to a report published by the Washington Post, he was presented with a complex plan to seize 440 kg of enriched uranium in an operation targeting three sites at the same time. His partners in Israel and a number of Gulf states urge him to continue the campaign until the regime collapses. Withdrawing now and seeking to end the war will enable the regime in Iran to declare victory. Entering a land and sea campaign will prolong the war and entail the risk of deepening involvement. Trump has spoken of “completing the mission” out of respect for the dead — that is, prolonging the war, based on principles. It is not surprising, then, that the repeated contradictions in his statements arouse profound confusion and diverse and strange interpretations. This is happening in light of a sharp decline in the level of experience in the American administration. Most of the senior officials and old generals have left or been dismissed, and the president surrounds himself with a group of sycophants with limited skills. Trump’s first term was crushed in 2020, hurting his chances of winning a second straight term in his fourth year in office. This coincided with his failure to manage the Corona epidemic, a crisis for which the president’s management style and personal qualities (his disdain for science and facts, his constant demands for praise, and the suppression of critical voices in the administration) were not appropriate. If no improvement occurs soon, the worsening global economic crisis resulting from the protracted war may cast a shadow over Trump’s second term and harm the Republicans’ chances in the midterm congressional elections next November. In his speeches, Trump is trying to direct public opinion in America in light of polls indicating a decline in his popularity, support for war, and fears of rising fuel prices. Trump promises that the rise in prices is temporary and will be corrected soon, that military achievements will increase, and that the war will end within two to three weeks after achieving all its goals (the Israeli military also agrees with the assessment of the timetable, but is less optimistic). As usual, Trump attacked his NATO partners yesterday (as well as Prime Minister Netanyahu, and the president will always look for a scapegoat for his failures). The long speech could not hide the growing signs of anxiety: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has given the Iranians a crucial leverage, the uranium threat remains unresolved, and the regime in Iran, despite its weakness, is stubborn and in control. Although Trump does not consider this to be his problem, the launching of missiles from Iran at Israel and the Gulf states continues as usual. Perhaps more importantly, the potential crisis is economic, as reports indicate that the insurance premium for oil tankers crossing the Gulf has jumped 10-40 times, and may reach $10 million, which is approximately equal to a tenth of the tanker’s price. The number of ships crossing the strait has decreased to approximately 90 percent, most of which are Indian and Chinese ships that have received special permission from Iran. About 15 percent of the world’s oil does not currently reach consumers. The crisis is expected to worsen in mid-April. The world is entering a new phase that it has never seen before. At the beginning of the second month of the war in Iran, Israeli intelligence described the leadership there as “tired, but determined.” The complex and bureaucratic decision-making process that balanced the centers of power and required intensive administrative work was abandoned. After the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the handover of power to his son Mojtaba, the government system remained decentralized, as decision-making “parties” faced great difficulty in communicating with each other in light of the pursuit operations launched by the Israeli Air Force. Khamenei Jr. was injured and avoided public appearances, and his voice has not been heard since the beginning of the war. During his reign, a conflict takes place between a group of survivors of the Revolutionary Guard (after most of its leaders were killed) and the political group led by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The politicians seem to be losing now. The second group is more concerned with Iran’s long suffering, the suffering of the people, and the future of the country. But the Revolutionary Guard veterans, most of whom participated in the big war with Iraq in the 1980s, refuse to submit to any pressure. They want to continue fighting and are currently rejecting settlement proposals, most notably the Pakistani proposal supported by China. The direct economic losses are estimated at tens of billions of dollars, a large portion of which is attributed to Israel’s systematic attacks on military and security installations. During the war, the Israeli army stopped even considering the possibility of forcefully changing the regime in Iran. He is now focused on stripping the regime of its military and economic capabilities, hoping that a ceasefire under difficult conditions will lead to a new, bolder wave of protests. The day before Trump’s speech, Netanyahu gave a long speech full of apologies. As usual, he refrained from asking any questions. By boasting about the war’s achievements and ignoring its failures, some saw his statements as a prelude to ending the war, with Trump expected to announce its end soon. So far this expectation has not been fulfilled. Meanwhile, Netanyahu is selling to the public the claim that thanks to him, Israel became a “regional, even almost global, power” during the war. Considering these matters, on the way to the shelter when the tenth alarm sounded in the “Haron” area on the eve of the holiday, it was difficult to believe this. The Iranians have only a limited destructive capacity, but they still possess a great ability to disturb, which they use with planning and cunning, and Hezbollah has also contributed in turn. A public relations campaign on the main fronts of the current round of fighting, which is still part of the October 7 War, the picture appears less optimistic than in previous rounds. If there is optimism about the army’s achievements in Iran, the picture in Lebanon looks completely different. The Israeli army is still praising its previous achievements that ended with a ceasefire with Hezbollah in November 2024, but the Lebanese organization seems to have woken up faster and absorbed the lessons of its previous failure. In the background is a problem that was explained in detail on the eve of Eid: directing most of the Air Force’s resources to attacks on Iran and leaving the forces in Lebanon with less air escort and air support. Two days ago, following the killing of four Nahal fighters in a battle in the village of Beit Lev in the western sector of southern Lebanon, dozens of families of the battalion’s soldiers signed an unusual letter to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, in which they demanded a reconsideration of the method of fighting in light of the lack of air power in the region. An Israeli army officer, familiar with the war in the north, gave a grim description of what is happening. He believes that the ground army excels in fighting there in three things: “bombing houses, quickly evacuating the wounded and rescuing people under fire, and public relations for commanders and units. But the problem is that all of this is nothing but useless propaganda. I do not believe the reports that talk about killing 700 or more terrorists in Lebanon in this round, perhaps in the southern suburb. In southern Lebanon, fewer are killed. There is great pressure on the leadership of the northern region from the residents of the front line and the government to solve the problem, but the nature of the current operation will not lead to that.” According to this same officer, “Hezbollah cannot be eliminated. It is deeply rooted in the Shiite community, and expectations of its complete dismantling are unfounded. Last time we were able to subdue it: we had accurate intelligence, so we killed its leaders and many of its members and destroyed its weapons. Even when Hezbollah returns to the fighting now, it is still very far from its previous strength.” However, Hezbollah has returned to guerrilla warfare, and is focusing on attempts to disrupt IDF movements on main roads and searching for its weak points. The Israeli army operation, on the other hand, is not sufficiently focused and organized. “Four of the best teams were sent to Lebanon, equipped with the best armored vehicles that the Israeli army possesses. But they arrived there in a limited manner, and in the midst of a struggle over air resources. The result was random rounds between villages, with a limited operational impact, and without a strategy that builds on and consolidates the achievements of the previous time.” The government is talking about controlling the area up to the Litani River, perhaps just for starters, and about completely disarming Hezbollah. As for the ambitions of the General Staff, they are more modest: a “dynamic grip” on the ground instead of a return to a wide security zone (the generals still remember that the “Ribbon” operation in the 1990s was not successful), the demilitarization of southern Lebanon, and not the complete disappearance of Hezbollah. Part of the disagreement is also due to a shortage of combat personnel. Maintaining a large security area after controlling it will require one or two divisions (this time without the help of the Lebanese army), in addition to the demands that burden the Israeli army, when it locates more than a hundred settlement outposts and farms that need protection throughout the West Bank. The army had hoped to call up reserves for an average of 45 days this year, and after Iran it rose to 85 days, and it may rise even more if the war is prolonged. The government doesn’t care; It treats reservists as regular, permanent soldiers, depriving them of most benefits. Contrary to initial estimates (including my own), there was no apparent imbalance in the formation of the reserve forces. Among many soldiers there is a firm belief in the importance of their mission and the justice of the campaign (this also relates to their political positions). However, wear is noticeable and will get worse over time. Yesterday, Colonel (res.) Udi Even wrote in the “X” network about “a foolish march in Lebanon. As happened 45 years ago, the government is once again throwing our best sons into the war in Lebanon without informing the people of their destination and without clear goals. Why is the Israeli army being called to this country again without a plan or date for withdrawal? To protect the settlements in the north? Most of the shooting is being done from the north of the Litani. To disarm Hezbollah? To keep the areas as a pressure card on the Lebanese government? Appreciation The Lebanese government is too weak to disarm Hezbollah. Controlling the region up to the Litani will not solve the problem in Lebanon. We have been in the security zone for 18 years, when Hezbollah was much less armed and entrenched than it is now. On the contrary, we are providing Hezbollah with an opportunity to wage a guerrilla war that will exhaust our forces on the ground. The War Machine One of the positive things in this equation is that the war machine developed by the Air Force was with the assistance of military intelligence and intelligence services. This development began under Air Force commanders Amir Eshel and Amikam Norkin, and is bearing great fruition under current commander Tomar Bar (whose service period will be extended for a few weeks this month due to the continuation of the war). In 2012, at the beginning of his term, Eshel set a goal for the Air Force that appeared to be very ambitious: the ability to attack 3,000 targets per day. In the current war, the Air Force was able, on some days, to reach this pace. What is astonishing is that these attacks were carried out 1,000-1,500 km away from Israel. It is a powerful operational force, the management of which requires a significant effort in industrial engineering and management. The duration of the sortie to Tehran or Isfahan and back may be up to 5 hours. At the beginning of the war, pilots made this flight twice a day. Senior Air Force leaders now believe that it is inevitable in the future to increase the ratio of pilots per aircraft, to achieve maximum benefit. The maximum age for operational pilots has been raised from 51 to 54 years, and the number of trainees in aviation courses is also expected to increase in the future. Amos Harel Haaretz 4/3/2026
