The causes and factors of the revolution were not complete in March 2011. Promises of reform were accelerating, and the regime seemed resistant to the American project and enjoyed reasonable support from the street, given the prevalence of a culture of conspiracy at the political, religious, and popular levels. Persuading the street to be patient with economic pressures and political freedoms was possible because of the deep-rooted culture of conspiracy, a culture that the regime mastered using with great skill.

But the explosion of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the rapid results it achieved, created an appropriate opportunity for calls for anger in the Syrian street. This was reinforced by the regime’s nervous and reckless behavior in dealing with Daraa’s anger, which quickly sparked the revolution throughout Syria. I can say without reservation that this is a revolution whose causes were not available before its outbreak, but it found these causes in its presence, strength, and influence after the regime began implementing the policies of a military and security solution and the absence of a political project.

In fact, the revolution that raged in the first months received great support at the internal, external and international levels, and this was strengthened after the harsh and oppressive practices practiced by the army. Within less than two years, 112 countries organized in Morocco supporting the Syrian movement and demanding the departure of the regime without reservation. I do not know of a revolution in the world that received this international support, which could have been built upon.

But this revolution did not have a leadership capable of uniting the movement, and it was fragmented between warring Islamic and secular trends. It did not succeed in launching an agreement leadership, nor did it present a unified project for the future of Syria. Rather, its philosophers continued to justify the difference philosophically and project it onto the burning ground. In addition to these fundamental reasons, the disaster occurred when demands for freedom and dignity turned into shouts of ideology and proposed religious revolution projects. The demands quickly turned into the Sunni religious revolution in the face of the partisan Iranian project, which could not at all hide its sectarian face.

Did religious discourse provide a service to the revolution? Or did he kill her? And sparked forms of revolution against revolution within the movement? And tragically ignited the secular Islamic conflict? This is a conflict that ended ten years later in the existence of two extremely contradictory trends, one Islamic and the other secular, who refuse to coexist even in the trenches of the revolution. The development of events in Syria during the years of the Syrian ordeal has led to very contradictory perceptions regarding the relationship of religion to life and the separation of religion from power.

In the background of this conflict, the secular position appears strict and decisive in the necessity of separating religion from the state, while the Islamic street insists on the phrase (Islam is a religion and a state).

This duality may be one of the most dangerous and explosive dualities in the Syrian political scene, despite the many known divisions in the Syrian street. It requires special awareness in the context of analysis and study, and it is impossible to jump over it or bypass it under any circumstances.

This distinction was rooted in that religious and sectarian background, and local players in Syria responded to it. Little by little, instead of focusing on the struggle to relieve the injustice and suffering of the Syrian people, the Islamists chose to raise the slogan of applying Sharia, while the secularists chose to struggle against Article 3 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the religion of the head of state is Islam, which in a purely legal sense is a clear discriminatory clause. To a great extent.

While this paper emphasizes that abolishing this article is considered a real national demand at the strategic level regarding the democratic transition in Syria, it emphasizes, at the same time, that entering into a debate regarding this article is futile at the present time, and will lead to further alignment and division. Among the Syrians, it will put those who carry this initiative in direct confrontation with the largest bloc of Sunnis, which now see that they have been subjected to direct sectarian targeting and a terrible demographic hollowing out with the aim of producing a new reality that will eliminate the traditional stable majority in Syria.

This can be inferred by several indicators:

Changing this article was not a goal of the movement seeking change in Syria, and the suffering of Syrians due to its presence was not a reason for the outbreak of violence inside Syria.

The Syrian bodies, at the current political moment, and not at the level of the expected transitional phase, do not have the powers to change a constitution of this magnitude, and it is natural for this to be postponed until reasonable stability in democratic life, as it is entirely possible that this article will be changed in an acceptable democratic reality.

Islamic countries usually use the term “state religion” Islam, which is a less discriminatory position. In fact, this slogan is nothing more than a description of the history of this country and the reality of the majority in it, and it has proven that its impact is very limited at the legislative level, as traditional jurisprudence has been transcended to modern laws in all other laws in most Islamic countries, and this change is widely considered to be colorism. From the renewal and development of Sharia law. (For example, the application of the Sharia Penal Code in its traditional form is no longer applicable in 52 out of 57 countries that have switched to modern penal laws.)

The stipulation that the state religion is Islam is an article found in 55 constitutions out of the 57 constitutions of the Islamic countries in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which are countries that embrace tens of millions of people of other religions and sects, and this description did not pose real dangers to minorities in those countries. As for persecution and injustice, it only occurred in turbulent countries and everyone suffered from it. It is not realistic to say that this persecution occurred as a result of constitutional articles, but rather was within the framework of a complete coup against the constitution, laws, and stability.

The irony is that religious sentiment was not limited to the internal parties in the conflict, but rather it infiltrated in an unprecedented way into the policies of the countries intervening in the Syrian affairs. It became customary to describe Iranian intervention as Shiite, and Turkish intervention as Sunni. The role of the Russian Church in providing moral support to Putin was also exaggerated, through church blessing workshops for Russian fighters as a protector of Orthodox Christianity in Syria.

Although the countries intervening in the Syrian affairs avoid referring to the sectarian and religious dimension in their policies, it is absolutely illogical to ignore this motive, which is considered extremely influential in shaping the policies of these countries.

In the Iranian case, the Iranians and Hezbollah publicly justified their intervention by saying that it was to preserve the holy shrines, and clear slogans were raised: Oh, the revenge of Hussein, and here you are, Abu Abdullah, and Zainab will not be taken captive twice. These slogans had a major role in the military mobilization of the Shiite warriors, and therefore had The worst impact on the armed factions’ sectarian orientation is direct and clear.

Also, protecting the Shiite minority was a direct goal to justify Iranian intervention, and these feelings intensified following the emergence of Salafist jihadist movements that maintain a huge heritage of takfiri fatwas against the Shiites and the sects that emerged from them historically.

Although the Iranian official discourse later avoided mentioning these motives, and instead practiced the slogan of resistance and opposition, what is certain is that they lie at the core of the strategic plans for Iranian intervention.

As for the Turkish case, Turkey’s historical role obligates it to maintain the Sunni presence, or at least that is how traditional Syrian religiosity views it. This is a historical role that began since the violent confrontations at the beginning of the sixteenth century between the Turks and the Safavids, and the resulting exchange of centers of power and influence within societies. The Middle East.

Turkey constantly tries to ignore mentioning the sectarian element in its intervention and support for the Syrians, and is satisfied with considering the regime unjust against the Syrians, but in reality it acts inspired by its awareness of the sectarian meaning of the authoritarian practices carried out by the regime, and it has been able to attract traditional Sunni leaders to the Syrian street, and has centered its role on the basis of leadership of the situation. Sunni Islam and protecting it from sectarian injustices against it, and it was unable to open any dialogue with Christians, Alawites, Druze, Shiites, or Ismailis, and thus it remained dealing with one party.

Turkey is acting tactically by identifying its national enemy in the SDF forces, and it prefers this to be the declared aspect of its policies to justify its presence in Syria, while the religious and sectarian aspect is completely absent from the media discourse.

What might be the position of the revolutionary society on these issues?

It is the responsibility of society to emphasize, for example, that protecting the Shiite shrines and presence in Syria is the concern of the entire Syrian society, and it has practiced it successfully throughout the past centuries, and has historically preserved the Shiite presence and these historical religious shrines as a common and sacred thing among the members of Islamic sects, as is the case. In the shrines of Sayyida Zainab, Ruqayya, Sakina, Ammar bin Yasser, and Uwais Al-Qarni, which are highly respected by all Syrians, with the exception of organizations that have been classified as extremist and terrorist. These organizations do not hide their rejection of every religious shrine, and they deliberately and intentionally destroyed Sunni and Shiite shrines without exception, as in the bombing of the Prophet Yunus Mosque in Nineveh, despite the great historical importance of this mosque and its Sunni symbolism.

As for Turkey, the largest role could be played by the Syrian Sunni leaders themselves, through their affirmation of the comprehensive national vision that was firmly established in the Syrian social fabric over the past decades, and even centuries, in a realistic way represented by a daily social life that they know and live. People, and without the need for political slogans related to the topic. This is an affirmation that these leaders can show to the Turkish government, through which they can consolidate their national orientation and remove any suspicions related to pure sectarian tendencies. In addition, it will help Turkey, practically, to mitigate the influence of the sectarian factor in its policies towards Syria and its revolution.

As for the Russian side, despite the absence of religious motivation in Russian policy strategies, the church intervened negatively and achieved direct communication with the religious leaders in Syria unilaterally, and provided the opportunity for people to believe that Russian armies were being baptized in churches to fight the Syrians and bomb Sunni gatherings. . In this context, the responsibility increases on Christian social leaders, who must play a fundamental role in neutralizing religious values ​​from the conflict, and preventing the Church from interfering in adding fuel to the fire.

The regime exerted great influence on patriarchies and churches to show a position supportive of the regime and traitorous to the revolutionaries. A number of Christian clerics photographed themselves in military clothing with rifles and cannons. The regime also supported the direct involvement of Christian youth in the National Defense factions. This strengthened the sectarian backgrounds of the Islamic armed factions, and caused direct attacks against Christian villages, especially in the countryside in Hama, Homs, and Idlib.

Protecting the Christian presence in Syria is a societal responsibility, and this has been done with great success throughout history. There is a unified discourse that should be the discourse of all political bodies in Syria, and it revolves around societal responsibility in protecting diversity and considering the Christian presence as an asset and wealth for Syrians.

The slogan (Defend yourselves) that the regime adopted in its speech to minorities was the objective equivalent of the speech of the military factions, which sums up the Syrian catastrophe with the dominance of minorities over the majority. In both cases, there was direct incitement to violence and the strengthening of sectarian alignment, until the country, in many of its manifestations, began to live… The reality of civil war.

Thus, these practices enhanced the opportunities for the growth of a fundamentalist Islamic discourse that confronted this direct exploitation of religious divisions, and thus provided an opportunity for the growth of jihadist discourse, which was directly exploited by extremist fundamentalist movements.

But the establishment and consolidation of this jihadi type of Islamic fundamentalism, in addition to the fact that it does not emerge from the establishment of authentic Islam, cannot gain any international or regional acceptance, because in the end it carries an anti-Western ideology, on a doctrinal basis. This hostility also extends automatically to all Arab regimes that are considered, from their point of view, loyal to the infidels, as well as secular regimes, including Turkey, which is considered, in their view, a corrupt country because it does not apply Sharia law and is allied with the enemies of the nation.

Perhaps, in this context, we do not need any other assumptions to understand why the world abandoned the Syrian revolution. The jihadist movement has become directed against everyone, and the regime has skillfully benefited from this transformation and succeeded in terrifying regional countries from the threat of terrorism with which it has stigmatized the Syrian revolution.

Thus, the transition to a democratic state and the abolition of all forms of discrimination must be considered a direct goal of the political movement, but interference in resolving the nation’s identity and history must be left until after the desired vital parliamentaryism is established, and a specific decision should not be imposed on that during the transitional period.

The revolutionary movement in Suwayda today may represent an important point for reforming the discourse of the revolution, abandoning the ideological projects that diverted it from its path, and returning to the first discourse that led the street to struggle for its freedom and independence, and returning to the comprehensive discourse with which everyone stands in solidarity, which is freedom, dignity, and the salvation of Syrians from oppression. injustice, and a return to the discourse of peace and dialogue.

“The opinions expressed in the materials published on the World Institute for Studies website express the opinion of their authors

Dr.. Muhammad Habash – World Institute for Studies