اخبار السودان – وطن نيوز
اخر اخبار السودان اليوم – اخبار السودان العاجلة
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-05-03 13:33:00
Correcting the compass of civil debate in Sudan: “critical mass” or “anabolic front”? Resetting the Compass of Civil Debate in Sudan: “Critical Mass” or “Ibtina Front” Professor Makki Madani Al-Shibli, Executive Director of Al-Daryah Center for Strategic Studies, during the month of April 2026, the leading intellectual platform Sudanile witnessed an important discussion between Dr. Ibrahim Al-Badawi and Dr. Al-Wathiq Kamir about the concept of the “Critical Civil Bloc” and the “National Bloc” as an entry point to leading the transitional phase after the war. It is a discussion that is credited with restoring consideration to the role of civil forces after a period of marginalization and isolation. However, this debate, despite its importance, still needs a deeper conceptual reframing, so that it does not turn into a mere reproduction of previous formulas, the limitations of which experience has proven, revolving around “who assembles with whom,” instead of “about what do they assemble?” The discussion sparked by Dr. Ibrahim Al-Badawi’s article on the transition from the “Critical Civil Bloc to the National Bloc,” and Dr. Al-Wathiq Kamir’s comment on it, raised a fundamental question at a pivotal moment in Sudan’s history: How do we move from vision to action? Al-Badawi made a serious attempt to control concepts and link them to a gradual political path, while Al-Wathiq’s comment came to demand more terminological precision and procedural clarity. In my opinion, this is not a disagreement as much as it is a distribution of roles within a discussion that has not yet been completed, which we previously launched in our articles published in Sudanile on February 5 and 7, 2026, about the anabolic civil forces and the anabolic social contract, and also our expanded study published through the Al-Daryah Center for Strategic Studies in February 2026 entitled “The Anabolic Social Contract Brochure and its Executive Appendices,” considering these contributions a qualitative shift from the logic of the “bloc” to the logic of the “project.” First: What happened to Dr. Al-Badawi? The value of Dr. Al-Badawi’s proposal lies in three important additions: 1. Reconsidering the idea of the “bloc” as a threshold for action, since, as he explains, it is no longer sufficient to have dispersed civil forces; Rather, it must reach a minimum level of cohesion and consensus that enables it to influence the course of the war. 2. Linking the concept and the path, as Al-Badawi presented a phased concept: a preliminary nucleus. Charter. National bloc. Political activation. It is an important contribution to moving beyond the abstract nature of the discussion. 3. Introducing the institutional dimension, where it was emphasized that the cluster is not an assembly, but rather: a structure capable of carrying the transition in a turbulent environment. Second: What happened to Dr. Al-Wathiq? Dr. Al-Wathiq’s comment does not reject the proposal, but rather pushes it forward through three decisive observations: 1. The necessity of controlling concepts, as he asked to clarify the difference between “critical mass” and “national bloc”? 2. Expanding the concept of civil forces by pointing out that “civil forces” should not be reduced to urban elites, but rather include: the broader civil society with all its components. 3. The centrality of the practical path, as he proposed that the crucial question is how do we move from a conference or an idea… to an actual political formation? But the dilemma is that we continue to improve the definition of the concept, as Dr. Al-Badawi did, while the concept itself is not the center of the solution. The answer is not to control the term “national bloc,” but rather to depart from it. Third: Where do the two propositions meet? When looking deeply, it becomes clear that the two proposals intersect at four main points: The need for a comprehensive national project. The centrality of the charter and the social contract. The necessity of a phased path. The importance of the organized civil actor. Meaning that the discrepancy between the two proposals is not in direction, but rather in: the level of framing. Fourth: Where does the gap lie? Despite this intersection, a subtle but crucial gap remains: the focus on the “mass” as the actor… without specifying the project that gives it meaning. The mass, even if it reaches the “critical threshold,” may: consolidate temporarily. But it falls apart on the first test. If it is not built around a clear reference and a specific project. Fifth: Limits of the concept of “critical mass and national bloc” The concept of “critical mass and national bloc” stems from the assumption that gathering a sufficient number of civilian forces can produce political weight capable of influencing the balance of power. But the Sudanese experience, especially since the December Revolution, has proven that: The failure to manage the sequence in addressing the secondary contradictions between the components of the revolution, and the fundamental contradictions between those components and the supporters of the rescue regime, led to failure in achieving the goals of the revolution. Numerical abundance does not mean political effectiveness. Broad alliances may be more fragile. The absence of a joint project empties any bloc of its content. Indeed, the civil division, as we indicated previously, was not just an organizational defect, but rather a decisive factor in prolonging the war and weakening the ability to present a convincing national alternative. The problem with the idea of the “bloc,” in its critical and national forms, is that it is based on grouping, not sorting. Here lies the danger. In the absence of a clear criterion: the mass may expand, but it loses direction. It may seem “patriotic,” but it carries within it contradictions that explode later. A mass that is not defined by what it excludes is not defined by what it brings together. On the other hand, the transition from “critical” to “national” is not an automatic transition. The assumption that the “civil bloc” can automatically develop into a “national bloc” is analytically comfortable, but practically unrealistic. The intended transition requires: resolving fundamental contradictions. Don’t just expand the base. Hence, Dr. Al-Badawi’s proposal about the transition from the Berlin Conference, to a bloc, to a charter, and to a social contract, suggests a smooth path from one event to another, but in reality it is a transition from one structure to another, the occurrence of which requires the fulfillment of a set of gradual stages that include: a civil front (that defines itself normatively). Charter (defines the project). Delegation (produces legitimacy). Constitutional reference. Social contract. elections. That is, the realistic path is built “structurally”… and does not “agglomerate.” Therefore, reproducing formulas such as the Forces of Freedom and Change is no longer sufficient to confront the complexities of the current war, which has transformed from a struggle for power into an integrated system that combines weapons, economics, and ideological alliances. The civil forces’ preoccupation with their secondary contradictions has led to a shrinkage of their role and the loss of broad social sectors, at a time when the international community is no longer looking for loose political alliances, but rather for a civil partner capable of thinking about rebuilding the state. Hence the need for a different framework emerges: a civil front to rebuild Sudan, based not on numerical gathering, but on a clear project that re-arranges priorities, by magnifying the main contradiction with the war system, freezing secondary disputes between civilians, and moving towards rebuilding the state on civil and contractual foundations. Sixth: From the “bloc” to the “constructive front.” Therefore, the challenge is no longer in building a “critical bloc or national bloc,” but rather in moving to: a civil front to build Sudan. This transformation is not formal, but rather conceptual and strategic. The bloc, whether critical or national, is built around balances. It is managed through consensus. It falls apart with the first test. As for the anabolic front: it is built around a project. It is governed by a charter. It is managed according to clear interim priorities. It is based on a fundamental realization: that the main contradiction in Sudan today is not between civilians, but rather between society and the war system. Seventh: April 2019 Lesson – How is the anabolic front formed? In April 2019: We have not begun to “build critical mass.” We did not go through the stage of a “national bloc” in the theoretical sense. Rather, something simpler and deeper happened: the main contradiction with the rescue system was magnified, and the secondary contradictions between the components of the revolution were postponed. And the result? A broad front was formed, moved effectively, and brought down the regime. That is, the action did not come from the mass… but from the arrangement of contradictions. The recent Sudanese experience, especially the moment of April 2019, also shows a very important lesson. The civil forces succeeded, despite their differences, in postponing addressing the secondary contradictions, in exchange for accelerating the resolution of the main contradiction with the rescue system, which led to the formation of a broad civil front that was able to overthrow the regime. This experience confirms that: building an effective front does not begin with achieving a “critical mass,” but rather with rearranging priorities between contradictions. When the conflict is redefined as a conflict between society and the system of tyranny and war, and secondary disputes are temporarily frozen, a constructive civil front capable of action is formed, almost automatically. In this sense, the transition from the “critical mass” to the “national bloc” is not necessarily an independent path, but rather a direct result of the success of civil forces in: maximizing the main contradiction. And postpone the sub-contradictions. And building a minimum consensus around a national project. From another angle, this understanding implicitly answers the questions of controlling terminology, which preoccupied Dr. Al-Wathiq, as the mechanism of forming the front itself defines its boundaries. The forces that adhere to the reference of the December Revolution, accept the civil state and the withdrawal of weapons from politics, and engage in the dismantling of the war economy, are considered part of this constructive civil framework. As for the forces that seek to reproduce the kidnapped state or employ war to impose their project, they fall outside this formation, not on the basis of identity, but rather on the basis of the position on the state project. More precisely terminologically: the main contradiction is the line that defines the anabolic civil front. The crucial point that much of the discussion avoids is this: a civil front cannot be built without clearly defining the political enemy. In the current Sudanese case, the main contradiction is with: the war system, its economy, and the remnants of the rescue system that seeks to reproduce itself through chaos. Therefore: Any civil framework whose position on this system is not resolved is a fragile framework, no matter how broad it is. This is not related to identity, but rather to the position: on the civil state, on the removal of weapons from politics, and on the dismantling of the war economy. Eighth: What distinguishes this anabolic proposal? What the concept of “construction” proposes is not a linguistic alternative, but rather a reversal in approach: Who: Who does it meet? To: What are they meeting about? From: How many are we? To: What is our project? From: How do we grow? To: How do we build? The fundamental difference lies in three points: The standard: Not everyone who joins is accepted, but rather according to a clear reference. Project: Not just an alliance to negotiate, but to rebuild the state. Legitimacy: It is not derived from numbers, but from charter and mandate. Ninth: The question of legitimacy – who rules and by what right? One of the most important problems that the “critical mass” proposal overcomes is the question of legitimacy in the post-war period. In the absence of elections and an existing state, how is the legitimacy of authority built? Here comes the concept of anabolic legitimacy, which we presented in our articles on the Sudanile platform, and our study issued by the Dirayah Center for Strategic Studies, as: temporary legitimacy. Derived from a national consensus on the goals of the December Revolution. And restricted to specific tasks. That is, it is not the legitimacy of a permanent rule, but rather: the legitimacy of leading the process of rebuilding the state in the name of society, not in its place. Tenth: The National Covenant and the Social Contract – The Missing Framework To reset the compass of civil debate, two central concepts that are often absent must be maximized: 1. The National Covenant is the agreement between the Sudanese components on: the unity of the state. End the war. Rules of coexistence and the political system. That is, it regulates the horizontal relationship between: Sudanese ↔ each other. It is, in essence: the charter that prevents the disintegration of Sudan 2. The Social Contract, which is the agreement between the state and the citizen regarding: rights. Duties. Meaning of legitimacy. Limits of authority. That is, it regulates the vertical relationship between: the state ↕ the citizen. In essence, it is: re-establishing citizenship after the state of kidnapping and war. Eleventh: Why is the “national bloc” not enough even after crossing the “critical mass” threshold? The concept of “national bloc,” even after defining it terminologically, despite its precedence over “critical mass,” remains incomplete if it is not linked to: a national covenant that prevents disintegration. A social contract that establishes legitimacy. A constructive project that determines the direction of the country. Without this, the “National Bloc” may turn into a temporary political alliance. Or a negotiating interface. Or delayed fragility. Or just a number in an external equation. Twelfth: The correct anabolic sequence. One of the most important contributions that must be restored to this civil debate is the anabolic sequence: a national covenant that stops war and prevents division. Transitional anabolic authority: based on charter and mandate. Social contract: re-establishes the relationship between the state and the citizen. Primary elections: These foundations translate into democratic legitimacy. This sequence is not theoretical, but rather a practical condition: because the social contract assumes a state, while the national covenant assumes the survival of the homeland itself. Thirteenth: The role of constructive civil forces – from representation to leadership. In light of this, the role of civil forces is not limited to: representation. Or share. Rather, it extends to: the production of the National Testament. Protecting the social contract. Transition control. Preventing apostasy to military rule or chaos. It is the only actor capable of transforming “Building Sudan” into a community project, not a government project. Conclusion: Correcting the question before searching for the answer. The discussion about “critical mass” and “national bloc” is important, but it remains incomplete unless the question itself is corrected. The question is not: How many forces can be combined? Rather: What project can bring them together? The answer that imposes itself is: What is required is not a bloc… but rather an anabolism front. What is required is not an alliance… but a pact. What is required is not authority… but legitimacy. Otherwise, Sudan will remain in a cycle: alliances are forming. Then it falls apart. While the war continues…or is reproduced. Sudan does not need a larger bloc, but rather a clearer project, nor a broader alliance, but rather a front that knows what to accept and what to reject. Everything else is: recycling the crisis with new names. melshibly@hotmail.com
