وطن نيوز
Anna Persky The agreement between the United States and Iran has not yet been signed, nor has it been completely cancelled. He is now hovering in a gray area that interests diplomats, strategic advisors, Pakistani and Qatari mediators, and studio commentators: close enough to put pressure on “Jerusalem.” [تل أبيب]And far enough for each party to deny its position, tighten it, leak information, and repeat it. In Israel, the chances of reaching an interim agreement are still greater than the chances of a full-blown escalation. The Iranians have not shown surprising flexibility, and Trump has not become a brilliant architect of regional arrangements. The reason is much simpler: all parties currently have more to lose from continuing hostilities than from a partial freeze. An Israeli source familiar with the details says: “Everyone wants to get down from the tree. The only question is: Who will get a golden ladder and who will get a folding ladder from the warehouse?” Washington seeks to calm energy markets, while Tehran demands money and time, and the Gulf wants to open the Strait of Hormuz. The Israelis, although they do not say so publicly, see the current bad transitional situation as better than a bad final agreement or another regional war where no one knows where it will lead. Washington seeks to calm energy markets, while Tehran demands money and time, and the Gulf wants to open the Strait of Hormuz. The Israelis, although they do not say so publicly, see the current bad transition situation as better than a bad final agreement or another regional war. Israeli officials describe the emerging outlines as a framework agreement, not a decisive agreement. Opening the Strait of Hormuz, extending the ceasefire, limited relief in Iranian oil sales, some concessions on funds through regional mechanisms, and then back to the issue for which this entire campaign came about – the nuclear issue. In short: First, put out the fires, then argue about the matches. Trump is already seeking to establish an image of victory in this context. In the absence of Iran’s surrender, the collapse of its regime, or the complete dismantling of its nuclear project, the White House needs something tangible to show the public: not another vague clause, not another verbal pledge, but rather some solution to the issue of enriched uranium. For this reason, the controversy over 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium has become the focus of the battle. On Wednesday, at a Cabinet meeting, Trump himself tried to make that point, saying: “There will be no sanctions relief at all. They have to give up enriched uranium in exchange for that relief.” In other words, he is fully aware that without the uranium, he will not have an image of victory, but rather another document that is open to interpretation. Hence the Israeli concern stems. It is not a single clause that worries Jerusalem, but rather the entire logic. If Iran does receive concessions, money, and support, and the uranium issue is postponed to the next stage, it will enter the next negotiating room in a better position than Israel would have liked. Iran will emerge from it exhausted, but it will still be far from defeated. Israeli sources say the Iranians could still scuttle the deal, or “stumble over something” — uranium, the Strait of Hormuz, wording, respect, sovereignty, or whatever other term Tehran is good at turning into a sacred principle when it needs to extract more concessions. However, Trump and most of those close to him are likely to want an agreement. This is what the Islamic countries close to him, the markets, and the American political timetable are pushing. The Republican Nuclear Issue The answer to the question “Is the hardening of Iranian positions real or tactical?” It’s not entirely clear. In Israel, people look at it from both sides; The dispute over uranium and control of the Strait of Hormuz is real, not just hype. As for leaks, denials, and strong statements, they are part of the bargaining game: the Americans need to prove that they have not given up on the nuclear issue, and the Iranians need to prove that they have not given up. Each party now writes its own victory speech even before the document is signed. Of course, the way has not been paved yet. There is still a strong anti-Iran Republican base surrounding Trump. “In his party, they will explain to him that he won historically, but then they explain to him why it looks like a loss,” an Israeli official quipped. For Trump, form is no less important than content, and sometimes more so. So, perhaps a temporary document and official declaration that he had prevented a major war would suffice. At the same time, Trump is trying to change the stereotype. Instead of talking about a long-term war and unfulfilled threats, he seeks to talk about “regional peace” and expanding the Abraham Accords. This is not just wishful thinking, but an attempt to market the situation as well. If the war does not end in the dismantling of Iran, it may be marketed to the public as a prelude to a major regional settlement. The problem is, as always in this region, that reality is not affected by celebratory posts. In the absence of any clear horizon in the Palestinian arena, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and others will not rush to sign normalization agreements with Israel simply because Trump demands it “immediately.” There is something else that is understood in Israel: Trump must keep Netanyahu out of the process in almost all scenarios. If he signs an agreement, it should not be seen as an Israeli agreement. If he returns to war, it should not be seen as being dragged into it. Either way, in his view, the prime minister should be close enough to avoid an explosion, and far enough away to avoid infection. Therefore, publishing the details of the conversation between Trump and Netanyahu was very significant. The goal was not just to update information, but to clarify context. Reassuring the Republican right, conveying the message that Trump has not abandoned the nuclear file, and showing that Netanyahu is not at the forefront of opposition to the move. He is not an enemy of the agreement, but he is not necessarily a major partner in it. In the Middle East, even a centrist position is a status. Netanyahu is well aware of this gray area, having lived in it for years. However, this time it is not necessarily under his control. If Trump signs, the Prime Minister will find it very difficult to confront him. He will not attack Iran alone, he will not manage a public crisis with the US president, and he will not want to be portrayed as sabotaging a move that promises to open the Strait of Hormuz and ease pressure on the global economy. Those who used to whisper in America’s ear will now discover that America sometimes listens. For Netanyahu, the problem goes beyond the political sphere. It’s political, it’s almost personal. Over the years, he built his image as a lone leader who could communicate with Republicans, pressure the White House, understand Iran, and see the future. Trump’s signing of the agreement undermines this advantage. Trump may admire him and praise him in front of the cameras, but friendliness is not important in the moment of decision, but influence is. Netanyahu’s situation is more complicated than he wants to admit. Israel will not return to square one: The campaign against Iran has damaged its missile production capabilities and advanced its nuclear program. At the time, it harmed the economy and forced Tehran to sit at the negotiating table under pressure. These are real achievements, not just propaganda. Even the frozen funds, if partially released, will not rebuild destroyed infrastructure overnight. The problem is that Israeli public opinion in recent months has not heard lectures about “improving the strategic balance,” but rather hints of decisiveness, talk about regime change, a feeling of a historical moment, and explicit and inexplicit promises that the matter will end differently this time. In such a situation, it will be difficult to sell an interim agreement as a victory. The opposition will know in advance how to deal with this situation. After October 7, Iran will come. Another big promise, another partial result. Another campaign that started with huge headlines and ended with a mysterious document. Netanyahu will be able to respond, with some justification, that Israel’s situation would have been much worse without this campaign. But strategic justice is not always a winning card at the ballot box. Especially when the audience is tired, angry, and exhausted, and wants to know why they were promised a different ending and instead got another transition. Pressure on weaknesses Among the scenarios that emerged in the Israeli talks is Trump’s attempt to compensate Netanyahu in another arena. “Give me peace with Iran, and you will find space to work in Gaza or Lebanon.” Politically, this sounds tempting: if victory is not achieved in Tehran, perhaps an Iranian flag will be raised in Rafah or Beirut. But in reality, it can turn out to be a toxic gift. The Israeli people are tired of the war, of the reservists, of the victims, of the torn families, and of the exhausted economy. In contrast to the campaign against Iran, Gaza and Lebanon are wars full of mud, blood, names, funerals and atrocities. It is difficult to build an election campaign on them, and it is very easy to become overwhelmed by them. Therefore, Netanyahu finds himself in an almost complete dilemma: a bad agreement will harm him, a temporary agreement will give him a victory that is difficult to market, the collapse of the talks will bring back the risk of escalation, and compensation in another arena may burn his election campaign. All paths seem possible, but no path is guaranteed. Israeli sources indicate that the most likely scenario is neither a historic agreement nor a huge explosion, but rather a process of rearrangement. A temporary agreement, opening the Strait of Hormuz, some facilities, then explosions. The Iranians will take their time. Trump will declare that they have already won. Israel will warn against the presence of nuclear weapons. Each party will return to its position. The world would describe this as stability. As for “Jerusalem” [تل أبيب]You will consider it a postponed problem. This is a relatively comfortable scenario for Trump; It calms energy markets without getting into another war, allows him to announce that he forced Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, and gives him the image of a strong leader, without paying the price of a long war. Then, if the nuclear phase falters, you can always blame the Iranians, his predecessors, the Europeans, or even the weather. Wednesday, he was already rehearsing the hard-line version: “They thought they were going to make a fuss over me and say, ‘He has midterm elections.’ I don’t care about midterm elections.” This sentence is directed to the ears of Tehran, but it is no less important for the ears at home. It’s not bad for Iran either; It buys them time, some money, some comfort, and most importantly, it is proof that using the Strait of Hormuz as a trump card is working. Even if it removes the mines and opens the strait, it has proven to the world that it knows how to press where it hurts. A draft published on Iranian television even claimed that management of traffic in the strait would be in the hands of Iran and Oman, and that US forces would be kept out of Iran’s vicinity. The White House has strongly denied what it described as a “fabrication,” but the publication itself shows what Tehran wants to sell to its audience: not opening the Strait of Hormuz by force, but recognizing its place there. Next time you are threatened, everyone will remember this. As for Israel, the matter is different. Such a temporary agreement is not a disaster, but it is not the end either. This may turn the campaign’s achievements into a fleeting asset: unless they translate into clear arrangement, effective control, or decomposition of capabilities, they will fade over time. Iran will repair itself, rehabilitate itself, hide, and wait. That’s exactly what you’re good at. “They don’t need to beat us, they need to stay in the game. That’s the whole plan,” a former Israeli security official said. A blow towards the end and Lebanon will change as well. If the agreement includes a commitment to a ceasefire on all fronts, or a formula that obligates Israel to restrain itself towards Hezbollah, Netanyahu will find himself facing another minefield. Hezbollah is weak, but not disintegrated. Israel has already learned that grandiose statements about changing reality in the north quickly lose their luster. An agreement that does not dismantle the party’s rehabilitation mechanisms is likely to bring back the same problem, but with less legitimacy for action. One of the most difficult discussions about the agreement revolves around the Lebanese clause. From Iran’s perspective, the regional ceasefire is supposed to include Lebanon as well. In Netanyahu’s view, any such formula should leave Israel free to act against what is defined as a threat. This is, in fact, an attempt to export the model created in Gaza and Lebanon to the entire region: a ceasefire on paper, strikes when necessary, and flames at a level that allows the claim that there is no all-out war, but nevertheless, there is great pressure. The Iranians would find it very difficult to accept such a model with respect to themselves, and it is doubtful that they would agree to it with respect to Hezbollah. There remains another option that cannot be ruled out: limited military action before the end. Some commentators in the United States are talking about this possibility: a small strike to show firmness, and a return to the agreement. With Trump, that’s always a possibility. A short drama, a good picture, and a strong statement. On Wednesday, he expressed this in words that leave little room for interpretation: The Iranians “have not achieved their goal yet, but either we are satisfied with that or we will have to complete the mission.” From Israel’s perspective, this is a very dangerous scenario: it will not necessarily change the balance of power, but it could make it more vulnerable the next day, when the Americans declare it’s over. In the end, behind all the leaks and formulations, lies a deal that each party is trying to market in a different way: Trump will try to portray the freeze as a victory, Iran will portray the relief as a guarantee of survival, and Netanyahu needs a resolution that speaks to voters. The first two parties may get some of what they want. The third, as usual in recent years, will be forced to justify what happened, explaining why what happened was exactly what he wanted. Maariv 5/31/2026
