اخبار السودان – وطن نيوز
اخر اخبار السودان اليوم – اخبار السودان العاجلة
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-04-15 11:27:00
Al-Wathiq Kemeir kameir@yahoo.com Toronto, April 14, 2026 Introduction For the third time since the outbreak of war in Sudan, a European capital will return to host on April 15 this year an international conference dedicated to the Sudanese crisis, after Paris and then London, in April 2024 and 2025, respectively. Despite the difference in location and the change in some procedural details, the general framework remains almost the same: a political ministerial track, a humanitarian track to mobilize support, and a third track that includes a spectrum of Sudanese political and civil forces. Therefore, the real question that imposes itself this time is not related to good intentions, nor to the strength of the language in which the final statements may be formulated, but rather to the added value: What can the Berlin Conference add, after two years of conferences, calls and pledges, to a reality that has not witnessed a qualitative transformation in either the humanitarian track or the political track? On the surface, the Berlin conference appears to be a direct continuation of the same approach that governed the Paris and London conferences. The most prominent difference in this version is the clearer presence of the “Five-Year Committee, which includes the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, IGAD, and the League of Arab States. This committee was not created in a vacuum, but rather was an extension and development of the path that emerged from the “Extended Mechanism” regarding the Sudanese crisis, in the context of the movements led by the African Union through its extraordinary ministerial meetings, in June 2024, before it later crystallized in a more five-party format. Specifically, during the past period, this mechanism undertook a series of consultations and communications with Sudanese political and civil forces, some of which took place through direct meetings in Addis Ababa and Cairo, and others through virtual meetings and various preliminary communications. However, what is striking is that these efforts did not succeed in building a reasonable amount of consensus, and in fact, the parties themselves did not accept, in previous stages, to sit together at one table. Therefore, highlighting the role of the quintet in the Berlin conference alone is not enough to say that we are facing A real development in the approach, as we may be facing the re-presentation of the same tools in a new form. Here the first problem of the Berlin conference emerges: the lack of evaluation. Many do not seriously consider the outcome of the two previous conferences, nor do they actually achieve a breakthrough in the issue of humanitarian aid? Did they close the gap between the various Sudanese forces? Did they contribute to pushing for a ceasefire, or in producing a weighty mechanism to impose or monitor it, or did the outcome remain, at best, limited, while the same language continued to be repeated? The humanitarian catastrophe and the need for urgent action, without this being reflected in a tangible change on the ground? If the previous two editions did not lead to a qualitative impact, it is natural to ask before the third edition an obvious and legitimate question: Where is the newness and where is the added value? It is true that there are those who cling to the importance of the conference from an understandable humanitarian perspective, and believe that any international effort that could contribute to mobilizing resources, improving humanitarian access, or keeping Sudan present on the agenda of international attention is an effort that should not be made. Reducing it. This is an argument that has moral and political weight, especially in light of the widespread humanitarian suffering, the worsening conditions of civilians, and the continued displacement and collapse of services. However, acknowledging the legitimacy of this humanitarian dimension should not lead to exaggerating the burden on the conference more than it can bear. There is a difference between a platform whose goal is mobilization, support and advocacy, and a path intended to advance a complex political process in a country where political and societal polarization has reached a wide and deep extent. Hence, the essence of reservation The Berlin conference does not lie in rejecting any international effort in principle, but rather in mixing two different levels: the level of humanitarian support and general political pressure, and the level of the comprehensive Sudanese political process. The conference, in its third edition, is not limited to the ministerial track and the humanitarian track, but also includes a civil political track. But this track is not completely new, as the previous two conferences in turn carried similar political ambitions, without any of them succeeding in producing a minimum level of consensus or coming up with a joint statement of real political value The point is not the existence of the political track itself, but rather the amount of direct involvement of the quintet in its preparation, in managing its agenda, and in presenting a comprehensive document or call to the participants in advance. This point is not a simple procedural detail, but rather carries a clear political significance. The presence of a document prepared in advance, or a call presented in advance to the participating forces, suggests that what is required, at a minimum, is to extract a political outcome that will give the conference a marketable outcome, and allow the organizing and sponsoring parties to say that they did not. It is satisfied with the humanitarian mobilization, but it also took a step forward in the political path, as if it was intended to create a “political and moral impact”: that is, to produce a symbolic, diplomatic and media gain, which shows the conference as a platform that succeeded in bringing together Sudanese civilians around a common formula, or at least around a comprehensive call, even if the actual impact of this solution remains limited in the reality of the crisis and its complexities, and this is not separated from a broader context related to the position of the European countries and the European Union in the Sudan file. There is an impression that the European parties feel, to some extent Varying, with relative isolation in this file, after the United States took control of more influential paths, especially through the Quartet, in a context that weakened the British presence in particular. In this context, European engagement through the Five-Year Committee gains additional significance, especially since the European Union is not only a member of it, but is also the main financier of its activities and movements. From this angle, it is possible to understand the European keenness to employ the platform of the Berlin conference, as well as the Paris and London conferences before it, not only to mobilize humanitarian support, but also to demonstrate its presence. political in the Sudanese file, and registering an apparent diplomatic role through the quintet and its outcomes, regardless of the limited impact and impact. However, the deeper problem than that is that this approach seems, once again, to “go beyond” the root of the problem instead of “approaching” it. The Sudanese dilemma does not lie in the absence of an additional statement, or in the lack of public appeals, but rather in the presence of fundamental and deep differences between the political and civil forces on critical issues that cannot be overcome with compromise formulations. In general, there is a clear divergence in positions on the Rapid Support, on the army leadership, on the Islamists, and on the role of the regional and international communities. These are not marginal differences, but rather they are the main nodes that hinder reaching a reasonable degree of understanding. In fact, the divergence extends, in many cases, to defining the war itself, describing its parties, and determining the nature of the solution required for it. Therefore, betting on achieving a consensus on stopping the war or ending it without going through these nodes, or without discussing them frankly, seems like an unfair bet. Realistic. What is striking here is that the mediators, including the quintet, often deal with these disagreements as if they are issues that can be temporarily overcome in order to produce a general formula, while experience suggests that the opposite is true: whenever the real sources of disagreement are circumvented, failure returns in a new form. The most useful approach is not to jump to ready-made consensual outcomes, but rather to dismantle the areas of political conflict, put them on the table, and work on them with patience and clarity, even if that is slower and less attractive in terms of image. Diplomacy. As for the rush to search for a “comprehensive call” or a “joint document” in light of this degree of divergence, it is closer to managing appearance than addressing and addressing the substance. This dilemma is further confirmed if we look at the differences that surrounded the conference itself. The objections to the Berlin conference did not come from a single political party or a homogeneous camp, but rather came from different forces in their positions, assessments, and positions regarding the war. This in itself is an important indicator, because it means that reservations about the conference are not limited to A narrow alignment, but also related to the nature of the conference itself, its approach, and the question of representation in it, as one of the most complex points of disagreement is not only related to attendance or boycott, but rather to determine who participates, in what capacity, and in what percentage of representation, and who is excluded, and who has the claim to represent this or that sector. Also, in many cases, the anti-Rapid Support forces do not accept sitting with those they consider close to the government or the Islamists, while these parties, in turn, refuse to sit with those they see as part of the opposing camp or a political cover for it. In light of this sharp division, simply bringing these parties together in one place becomes a limited achievement, and not a natural introduction to a political consensus. This conclusion becomes stronger if the experience of the Cairo conference of Sudanese political and civil forces, on July 6, 2024, is recalled. That meeting was, in principle, more relevant to the Sudanese context, and more likely to open a first window in the wall of division, due to the acceptance by a wide spectrum of parties of the call for it by the Egyptian government. However, it did not succeed In issuing a joint statement. If this happened in a less tense context than what exists today, then where does the belief come from that the Berlin meeting, in light of more polarization and a more complex political environment, could achieve what was not achieved in Cairo or elsewhere? Most likely, the ceiling of expectations here is higher than the facts, and that the bet on the external “community” to produce a minimum level of Sudanese agreement remains a hasty bet. As for the humanitarian level, the issue, in turn, requires a degree of frankness The lack of conferences or the weakness of the language used to describe the tragedy, rather in the continuing gap between pledges and needs, and in the absence of mechanisms capable of ensuring the arrival of aid away from the accounts of the warring parties, and in the weakness of follow-up and implementation. Therefore, the legitimate question still remains: If the previous conferences have all confirmed the scale of the disaster, why has this declared awareness not turned into a greater impact on funding, on humanitarian access, and on actual pressure on those obstructing relief? Repeated recognition of the tragedy is not enough, unless it is accompanied by a real change in the tools for dealing with it, as the petition to object to The conference does not start only from the perspective of sovereignty or from reservations about the absence of the government from its arrangements, despite the importance of this point, but also from doubt about the feasibility of solutions brought from outside unless they come from within and are based on a broader Sudanese political will. This is a point around which very different forces almost converge, despite their different motives and assessments. Some of them believe that bypassing state institutions does not serve the solution efforts, some of them fundamentally reject the logic of external settlements imposed from above, some of them have reservations about the nature of the calls and the representation of the participants, and some of them look at the solution. The entire conference is considered a reproduction of a path that has proven to be ineffective. Among all these positions, the common denominator remains the doubt that the conference will achieve a real breakthrough in the absence of political foundations that make any process meaningful. Accordingly, the most important significance of the Berlin conference does not lie in the fact that it carries a new breakthrough, but rather in that it reveals once again the limits of the prevailing international approach towards Sudan. After three years of war, the international community is still, in an important part, dealing with the crisis as if its complexity could be contained by repeating the same platforms. The same language, and the same bet on an immature consensus, while the facts indicate that the war will not come to an end unless the causes of the Sudanese division itself are dealt with, not just its symptoms, and if a comprehensive Sudanese dialogue is available that does not exclude anyone except those who have committed crimes and corruption, by creating a favorable political environment, without rushing the results, and in which the role of the mediators is to facilitate and facilitate, not to produce unrealistic alternatives. Conclusion: The limits of the international approach may not be meaningless at all, but it is certainly less Many expectations are placed on it, and less than the hype that accompanies it. It may have value in keeping the Sudanese tragedy within the scope of international attention, or in renewing pressure for humanitarian aid and protection, but this is one thing, and claiming that it is a gateway to a political breakthrough is quite another. In the end, the conference cannot compensate for the lack of Sudanese consensus, nor go beyond the basic dispute between the political and civil forces, nor replace a serious dialogue that confronts these differences instead of circumventing them. Therefore, the most that can be said about Berlin is that it reflects the continuing international impotence On moving from managing the crisis to decisively influencing its course. As for true peace, it will not be achieved by seasonal conferences, but rather by a serious, comprehensive, and politically paved Sudanese path that will find someone from the outside to facilitate and support it, not someone who imagines that he can make it on behalf of his companions.
