اخبار السودان – وطن نيوز
اخر اخبار السودان اليوم – اخبار السودان العاجلة
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-06-26 13:09:00
Secrets and mysteries of negotiations and self-determination agreements for South Sudan (27-29): Referendum Law 2009d. Salman Muhammad Ahmed Salman1 In the previous article in this series of articles, we discussed the visit of the First Vice President of the Republic of Sudan, Mr. Salva Kiir, to Washington in November 2005, and the major symposium held by the SPLM during that visit. We explained how the talk and discussion in that symposium focused on the sharp differences between the Salvation Government and the SPLM, and we presented the movement’s views on those differences. We also explained that the symposium was a clear indication that the movement was on the path to secession as a result of the decisions of the Salvation Government to reject the decision of the Abyei Boundaries Committee, and its insistence on retaining the Ministries of Finance and Oil.2 The differences between the two partners continue to escalate after the return of Mr. Salva Kiir from that visit. The differences moved from the arena of the Abyei conflict and the report of the expert committee, and from the Rescue Group’s insistence on retaining the ministries of oil and finance, to the laws for the South Sudan referendum and the Abyei referendum, and to the formation of each of the referendum commissions, their presidency and their powers, as we will discuss in this article. 3 The two parties began the discussion about the South Sudan referendum law and the Abyei referendum law a few weeks after the issuance of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision on the Abyei dispute, which we discussed in some detail in the article. Previously, on December 31, 2009, that is, five months after the Arbitration Court’s decision in the Abyei dispute, and after push and pull, sharp disagreements, and a long delay, the two laws were issued. 4 The issuance of the South Sudan Referendum Law came two and a half years late from the date set by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and included in the 2005 Constitution. Article 220 of the Constitution obligated the national legislature to issue the South Sudan Referendum Law at the beginning of The third year of the transitional period (i.e. in July 2007). The same article of the Constitution also obligated the Presidency of the Republic, upon issuing the South Sudan Referendum Law, to establish the South Sudan Referendum Commission. But it was clear that the many outstanding problems and issues between the two parties had overshadowed the constitutional obligation, distracted the focus, and contributed greatly to the delay. 5 Fundamental disagreements over the content of the South Sudan Referendum Law itself also contributed to the delay. The two parties differed in the voting percentages of registered voters that make the referendum and its results legal. The National Congress Party insisted on 75% of registered voters in South Sudan voting for the referendum to be legal, and 60% of this percentage voting for secession so that the result is legally acceptable. On the other hand, the SPLM saw that a normal majority (50% plus one) is what is required in both cases. It was strange that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with all its annexes and minute details, was silent on these two fundamental issues. 6 After push and pull and discussion that lasted more than a month, the two parties agreed that 60% of registered voters should participate in voting for the referendum to be legal, and a normal majority (50% plus one) for its results to be legally acceptable. The law confirmed the date of the referendum as January 9, 2011, as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Constitution stipulated, provided that it would follow The referendum is a transitional period (called the “post-referendum period”) extending for a period of six months, ending on July 9, 2011, to resolve the outstanding issues between the North and the South, if the South chooses to secede.7 The law referred to the international observers who would be invited to monitor the referendum. The list of invitees enumerated by the law included: the Organization and the IGAD countries and IGAD partners, the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and other parties that witnessed the signing of the agreement. Comprehensive peace. The law also indicated the necessity of the participation of local, regional and international civil society organizations in monitoring the referendum.8 There was a sharp disagreement over the formation and presidency of the referendum commission, as each party insisted that its presidency be transferred to it. After push and pull and six months of disagreement and negotiation, the two parties agreed to form the commission of nine people, five from the south and four from the north, with its president being from the north. On June 28, 2010, the commission was formed by decision of the National Council. The presidency of the Commission was given to Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Khalil (one of the leaders in the Umma Party), and Mr. Shan Rith Madut was appointed as his deputy. The remaining three members from the north were Mrs. Souad Ibrahim Issa, Major General Maash Tariq Othman Al-Tahir, and Major General Maash Kamal Ali Muhammad Saleh. The four southern members were Messrs. Deng Owor Winin, Lual Shani Chol, Paulino Wanawel Onango, and Sabt Alli Abyei. The law indicated that the Commission would make its decisions by a regular majority, and this would have given the southern members the possibility of casting a weight even though the presidency of the Commission devolved to the North. In the event of a tie, the law gives the President of the Commission a casting vote. It is clear that this text regarding the casting vote is neither advanced nor delayed. It seems that its purpose was to save the face of the National Congress by giving its candidate for the presidency of the Commission powers that would not arise in the presence of the need to use it.9 It also appears that the selection of Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Khalil (from the leaders of the Umma Party, as we mentioned above) to head the Commission was intended to involve the political parties in the issue of the secession of South Sudan, if that happened, and to disperse responsibility for “the blood of secession” between all the political parties and “tribes” of Sudan. It also emerged, and finally, the urgent historical need for a moment of political honesty between the two parties, The play of political absurdity, in which some of the northern representatives in some negotiations and joint committees were southerners, and some of the southern representatives were northerners, ended. 10 The Referendum Commission began to carry out its duties, after completing the administrative procedures, in August 2010, and opened its main office in Khartoum, with a sub-office in Juba, consisting of a president and four members. As stipulated in the law, referendum offices were opened under the supervision of the Juba Office in each of the capitals of the ten southern states. The law required that the voter be: (a) born to parents both or one of whom belong to any of the indigenous groups settled in South Sudan on or before January 1, 1956, or whose origins go back to one of the ethnic origins in South Sudan, or (b) a permanent resident of continuous and uninterrupted residence, or either parent or Grandparents who have permanently and continuously resided in South Sudan since January 1, 1956, (c) and that the voter must have reached eighteen years of age. The law called for witnesses who had signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to observe the referendum. Expatriates from the people of South Sudan, in the procedures for registration, voting, sorting, counting, and announcing the results. The law also clarifies the tasks of the state offices, the Juba office, and the presidency of the commission in Khartoum. The law indicates that the head of each high committee in the state concerned collects the results from the heads of the subcommittees, announces them, and then submits them to the South Sudan Referendum Office. The South Sudan Referendum Office collects the results from the heads of the high committees in South Sudan and announces the results from Juba, and then submits them to the Commission. After receiving the results from the South Sudan Referendum Office, and from the referendum centers in other locations as the case may be, the Commission shall announce the preliminary results on the two options.12 The United Nations Office in Sudan played a major role in the preparations for the referendum process from its beginning until the announcement of the result. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, also appointed a tripartite team to monitor the South Sudan referendum, headed by Mr. Benjamin Makaba, former President of Tanzania. The mission of this team was to supervise and evaluate the conduct of the referendum, and to ensure its compliance with international standards and the South Sudan Referendum Law. The mission included preparing periodic reports on the referendum to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Accordingly, the role of the National Referendum Commission in Khartoum was limited, despite the uproar and disagreements over its formation and leadership, the powers of its president, and the period of its stay after the announcement of the referendum result. 13 Article 67 of the Referendum Law enumerated ten issues to be resolved between the two parties, in the post-referendum period, in the event that the people of South Sudan vote for secession. These issues are: nationality, currency, civil service, status of consolidated joint units, international agreements, debts and assets, oil and its production, transfer and export, oil contracts and environmental issues, water resources, and property. In addition to these issues, there were the issues of border disputes between North and South, as well as of course the intractable problem of Abyei.14 As for the Abyei dispute, the Abyei Referendum Law was issued, as we mentioned, on December 31, 2009, the same date as the South Sudan Referendum Law. The law confirmed the definition of the Abyei Area as decided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. He also confirmed the holding of the Abyei referendum on the same date as the South Sudan referendum on January 9, 2011, and the establishment of the Abyei Referendum Commission consisting of nine people, like the South Sudan Referendum Commission. The law also confirmed the two options of the referendum: confirming the sustainability of the administrative status of the Abyei region in the north, or making the Abyei region part of Bahr al-Ghazal State in South Sudan. The law made clear that the option approved by the residents of the Abyei region by a simple majority (50% + 1) through the referendum is binding on all parties. Accordingly, the two parties did not enter into the debate over the percentages that they disputed during the negotiation of the South Sudan Referendum Law.15 The law required that the voter be a resident of the Abyei Area, and defined the residents of Abyei similar to the definition of the Abyei Conflict Resolution Agreement, where the population of Abyei consists of members of the Ngok Dinka community, and other Sudanese residing in the Abyei Area, according to the residency criteria determined by the Commission. The law added the last paragraph that gives the Commission the right to determine the criteria for residency in the Abyei Area to ensure Misseriya acceptance of the law. But the Misseriya leaders rejected this unclear reference, and demanded that their participation be included in the law in a clear way similar to the Ngok Dinka. On the other hand, the SPLM and the Ngok Dinka tribe rejected the Misseriya’s participation in the referendum, considering that they are not residents of the Abyei region, and that they do not have more than the right to graze in the region. The SPLM and the leaders of the Ngok Dinka tribe tried to rely in their opinion on the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. However, as we mentioned in the previous article, the Permanent Court of Arbitration did not address the issue of who is entitled to vote in the referendum because the referral agreement signed by the two parties did not include that issue, and was limited only to the request to define the Abyei Area. 16 Another disagreement emerged and related to the composition of the Abyei Commission and its presidency. The SPLM insisted that it obtain five of the nine seats in the commission and that the presidency of the commission be transferred to it, because the presidency of the South Sudan Referendum Commission had been won by one of the northerners nominated by the National Congress Party. The ruling National Congress Party rejected that demand, and made it clear that the north would obtain five seats, including the presidency, out of the nine seats in the commission. The Congress Party relied on the precedent of the presidency of the South Sudan Referendum Commission that had devolved upon it. The dispute escalated over these two issues, especially the issue of the participation of a tribe. The Misseriya in the referendum, and all the attempts of the mediators did not succeed in narrowing the gap between the positions of both parties, and preparations for the Abyei referendum stopped. 17 It was clear that the SPLM wanted to focus on the southern Sudan referendum, and that it had decided not to allow the differences and outstanding issues with the National Congress, including the issue of the Abyei referendum, to influence in any way the establishment or delay of the southern Sudan referendum. In fact, some of the leaders of the SPLM believed We firmly believe that the ruling National Congress Party and the Salvation Government are creating these problems and insisting on them so that the referendum in South Sudan will not be held, and that the SPLM must not fall into this trap. However, the SPLM did not fall into the trap. In fact, the movement was also prepared to temporarily turn a blind eye even to the border problems between north and south, which would clearly determine who had the right to participate in the referendum in those border areas.18 The joint committee between the ruling National Congress Party and the People’s Movement announced that there was a dispute over the demarcation of the borders in several areas, including the Kafi Kanji and Hafrat al-Nahhas area between the Darfur and Bahr al-Ghazal districts, which the movement claims were annexed to the north in the early 1960s by the government of Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud, after The discovery of copper there. The disputed areas also included the commercial city of Kaka, the areas of Gouda, Dabbat al-Fakhar, Jabal al-Muqaynis, and Mile 14. The SPLM later added to them the oil-rich Heglig region, which the Permanent Court of Arbitration had left outside the borders of Abyei. Following the court decision, the movement stated that it would claim Heglig in border negotiations with the ruling party. Southern government forces occupied the area for several days in April 2012, before Sudanese government forces retook it a few weeks later. 19 Clearly, and ironically, the April 2023 war opened the door to the dispute over Heglig wide open. After the escalation of fighting during December 2025 in the region between government forces and the Rapid Support Forces, a tripartite agreement was reached between the South Sudanese Armed Forces, the Sudanese Armed Forces, and the Rapid Support Forces. The agreement signed on December 11, 2025 gave the armed forces of South Sudan primary security responsibility for the Heglig oil field. Thus, the Heglig conflict that began with the Abyei conflict returned to the forefront, and Heglig became under the administration of the government of South Sudan, but for how long? Will the forces of the Government of South Sudan withdraw from it one day? However, the sad and big question that resulted from this situation in Heglig is: Why was it possible to reach an agreement on oil and its revenues in Heglig between the Khartoum government and the Rapid Support with such ease and speed, while at the same time the Khartoum government refuses to negotiate with the Rapid Support about a truce and stopping the bloodshed, war and death? Is oil more valuable and more important than blood?20For these reasons discussed above, the skies of Sudan were filled with clouds of major disagreements between the Rescue Group and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement when the countdown to the South Sudan referendum began with the holding of general elections in 2010, in the country, which will precede the South Sudan referendum, as we will discuss in the next article in this series of articles.Salmanmasalman@gmail.com Author
