اخبار السودان – وطن نيوز
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W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-03-14 12:12:00
The war on Iran… between regional conflict and internal exclusion! A reading of the use of war and international classifications in the Sudanese political conflict. Al-Wathiq Kameir kameir@yahoo.cpm Toronto, March 12, 2026 In the midst of the American-Israeli war on Iran, the echoes of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East reverberate even in the political debates inside Sudan. Regardless of the nature of the political system in Iran, any war launched by an external force against a sovereign state remains, in essence, a violation of a basic principle of the international system: the sovereignty of states and the inadmissibility of using force to change regimes or reshape political balances by military force. The position on the American-Israeli war on Iran should not be measured by the position on the Iranian regime, but rather by the broader principle related to the rules of international relations. What makes this war even more dangerous is that it is taking place in the context of a broader conflict over the balance of power and influence in the Middle East. The issue is not only related to the nature of the Iranian regime, but also to attempts to reshape the regional balance in the region. The Israeli Prime Minister himself clearly expressed this goal when he recently spoke about, “The current military operations are part of a strategy aimed at changing the balance of power in the region. We have turned Israel into a regional power” (press conference, Thursday, March 12, 2026). However, what is striking in the Sudanese political debate surrounding this war is not only the difference in positions on it, but the way it is being used in the internal conflict between the Sudanese forces. A discourse has emerged that sees this war as an opportunity to weaken political opponents inside Sudan, based on a circulated hypothesis that there is an organic relationship between Sudanese Islamists and Iran based on drawing inspiration from the Iranian experience and taking the “mullahs” regime as a political model, despite the sectarian distance between Sunnis and Shiites. At first glance, this reading seems convincing, but it severely reduces the history of the relationship between Sudan and Iran, and ignores the transformations that have occurred in the policies of the Sudanese state itself over the past decades. In the first years of the Salvation regime in the 1990s, Sudanese-Iranian relations witnessed a phase of remarkable political and security rapprochement. This rapprochement was evident early in the visit made by former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani to Khartoum at the end of 1991, that is, less than two years after the National Islamic Front seized power through its coup against the elected government in 1989. This rapprochement came in the context of international isolation and regional pressures faced by the new regime in Khartoum, which prompted it to search for partners outside the system of traditional alliances in the region. At that stage, political and military relations developed between the two countries, and many estimates indicate that cooperation with Iran contributed, to varying degrees, to the establishment or development of the Sudanese military industries system. But this rapprochement did not necessarily mean the transfer of the Iranian ideological model to Sudan or its adoption within Sudanese society. Over time, the ideological connection was practically cut off, even if some channels of political or military communication continued. In fact, the Iranian intellectual or sectarian influence in Sudanese society remained very limited, and in fact the influence of other foreign cultural centers – Russian, German or French – was for long periods much greater than the influence of the Iranian Cultural Center. It is true that some Sudanese Islamic leaders at that stage showed interest in the Iranian experience as a model for the success of an Islamic revolution in reaching power, and some of them also participated in visits or training programs in Iran. However, this interest remained within the framework of intellectual discussions within political Islam trends at that stage, and did not necessarily mean a complete adoption of the Iranian model or the transformation of the Sudanese Islamic movement into an extension of it. Indeed, the course of Sudanese politics itself was heading in a different direction. In the second half of the 1990s, the internal political map began to witness important transformations, with the return of some political forces to the interior, such as the accession of Sharif Zain al-Abidin al-Hindi to the regime in 1996, then the signing of the Djibouti Agreement in 1999 and the return of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi to the country. Other traditional political forces also participated in political life to varying degrees, while some forces, such as the Democratic Unionist Party, preferred to continue opposition political work under the umbrella of the National Democratic Rally. Then came the stage of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, the Cairo Peace Agreement between the National Democratic Rally and the Salvation Army in June 2005, and the elections that followed in 2010 and 2015. The country was preparing for new elections in 2020 before the revolution occurred and the political situation changed later. During these years, the majority of Sudanese political forces, including the armed movements, were engaged to varying degrees in negotiations or political settlements with the Salvation regime until the outbreak of the December 2018 protests and the fall of the regime after that. In the midst of these transformations, the biggest change occurred in the relationship with Iran. In 2015, Sudan severed its relations with Tehran, joined the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia, and participated with military forces in Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen against the Houthis, who are considered one of Iran’s most prominent allies in the region. This step represented a clear shift in Sudan’s position within the regional map, and confirmed that its foreign relations were moving within the framework of changing political calculations, not according to a fixed ideological connection. Diplomatic relations between Sudan and Iran were not resumed until after the outbreak of war in Sudan, when in mid-2024 relations were restored and diplomatic representation was exchanged again after a rupture that lasted about eight years, with the appointment of a professional Sudanese ambassador, even if he had Islamic leanings. In essence, this is something that does not deviate from the logic of relations between countries, as it is natural for countries to maintain mutual diplomatic representation even with countries with which they differ politically or ideologically. Pointing out this path does not aim to defend the rescue experience or exonerate its political record, a record that is still widely debated within Sudan, but rather to correct the simplistic reading of the relationship with Iran that is used today to interpret the internal political conflict in ways that may be misleading. Here a simple question arises: Where was Iran, and what is its true position in the overall Sudanese political conflict during these decades? The truth is that its influence remained limited in this conflict, which was mainly formed by internal Sudanese interactions rather than regional extensions. Pointing out these facts does not mean denying the existence of old relations between Sudanese Islamists and Iran dating back to the years following the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s and early 1980s, nor does it mean denying the existence of Islamic groups or figures that still look with admiration at the Iranian experience. This is normal in the broader context of the political Islam movements that emerged in the Islamic world, which were influenced by the ideas of what was known as the “Awakening” movement, which is based on the idea of the nation or Islamic university that transcends sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Shiites. However, the influence of these currents remained limited on the social bases of the Sudanese Islamic movement and on Sudanese society in general. Therefore, portraying the relationship between Sudanese Islamists and Iran as if it were a fixed, organic relationship ignores this long path of political transformations. However, the most important issue in the current Sudanese debate is not the history of the relationship itself, but rather the way it is being used in the internal political conflict. Instead of viewing the ongoing war in the region as a dangerous development that threatens the stability of the region and undermines the principle of state sovereignty, it is sometimes treated as if it is a direct extension of the conflict between the Sudanese forces. Here a phenomenon appears that can be described as “mutual political schadenfreude.” Some anti-Islamist forces and the government showed a degree of gloating when the UAE was subjected to missile strikes, as it is a party that is seen as close to the government or some of its components. On the other hand, some forces opposing the government also expressed a degree of gloating, based on the belief that the war on Iran ultimately targets the government’s allies or Islamists in the region. Then came the decision to classify the Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization, adding a new dimension to this scene, as the decision was received by some parties as a political victory in the internal conflict. At the same time, many are also calling for the Rapid Support Forces to be classified as a terrorist organization due to the grave violations committed during the war in Sudan, a demand that finds an echo even in some discussions within decision-making circles in the United States. In both cases, the same logic is repeated: transferring the political conflict from the national sphere to the international sphere in the hope of achieving what domestic politics could not achieve, once by betting on a regional war that might weaken the opponent, and once by relying on an international classification decision intended to delegitimize it. However, the Sudanese experience, as well as many experiences in the region, indicates the limitations of this bet. Regional wars do not resolve political conflicts within countries, just as international classifications do not eliminate the presence of political forces in their societies. Rejecting the US-Israeli war on Iran does not mean exonerating the Iranian regime from its policies or from its interventions in other regional conflicts. But the basic principle remains clear: the use of military force against a sovereign state is an act of aggression, regardless of the nature of that state’s political system. Disagreement with Iran’s policies, or with the policies of any other country, does not justify turning it into a target for a foreign war. Reducing this war to a mere confrontation with a particular political regime ignores the fact that it is part of a broader struggle to reshape the balance of power and influence in the Middle East. Therefore, turning the ongoing war in the region into an occasion for political gloating or settling internal scores does not only reflect a simplified reading of the regional reality, but also reveals the continuation of the logic of exclusion that has characterized Sudanese political life for decades. The way out of the Sudanese crisis will not come from the results of a war in the region, nor from classification decisions issued in distant capitals, but rather from building national rules for managing pluralism and disagreement within Sudan itself. Conclusion: In this context, it becomes useful to recall a broader discussion about the phenomenon of resorting to terrorist classifications as a tool in the Sudanese political conflict. In a “discussion paper” that I published in December 2025, entitled “Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Exclusionary Classification Instead of Politics” (Sudanile, December 21, 2025), I posed a number of questions to political and societal leaders: Does the terrorist classification represent a realistic tool for ending the conflict, or does it contribute to prolonging it? What is the impact of this approach on the chances of building a comprehensive political settlement in Sudan? Does internationalizing the conflict through classifications lead to protecting the state, or to weakening it? This paper did not dispute the legitimacy of accountability or justice, but it distinguished between justice as a comprehensive political and legal path, and classification as a circumstantial tool of exclusion. It concluded that Sudan’s crisis does not lie in the absence or abundance of classifications, but rather in the entrenchment of the logic of exclusion as a method for managing political conflict, and in the absence of an institutional political project capable of managing diversity and conflict outside the logic of elimination. Today, with the escalation of war in the region and increasing calls for the use of classification tools in the Sudanese conflict, these questions seem more urgent than ever. It is not unlikely that the political and societal division will deepen further if another American decision comes to classify the Rapid Support Forces as a terrorist organization, which is a demand that many have already raised, even within America, even if it has been postponed for a while according to the administration’s estimates. Then the country may enter a new round of mutual “political gloating” between the Sudanese parties. But the most important question remains: How long will the political conflict in Sudan continue in this vicious circle – from exclusion to counter-exclusion, and from relying on external actors to summoning them to resolve internal conflicts? Breaking this cycle cannot be achieved through regional wars nor through classification decisions issued from abroad, but rather through building a national political project capable of managing pluralism and disagreement within Sudan itself. Neither war in the region, nor classification decision abroad, can solve a problem that the Sudanese themselves have not solved among themselves.
