اخبار سوريا اليوم – وطن نيوز
سوريا اليوم – اخبار سوريا عاجل
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-03-25 18:50:00
During the years 2025 and 2026, a wave of attacks emerged that targeted shrines and shrines associated with religious minorities in Syria. In a context characterized by a sharp escalation in tensions and attacks of a sectarian nature that preceded and followed the massacres on the coast and Suwayda. This increasing pace of targeting cannot be isolated from the local Syrian context, which is witnessing a security failure to protect religious and ethnic minorities, a growth in hate speech against them, and a shift in the nature of violence from traditional military confrontations to patterns of attacks targeting the religious symbols associated with them. Although tracking these attacks through posts by local Facebook accounts and various materials reveals a clear field pattern, repeated within a specific geography and with similar methods, primarily targeting the Alawite sect, over the past two years, these attacks are still outside official media coverage in Syria. Vandalizing the shrine of Sheikh Muhammad al-Maghribi. The most recent of these attacks was the attack on the shrine of Sheikh Muhammad al-Maghribi in the village of Asilah in the Masyaf countryside. The video clips that were circulated during the period between March 18 and 22, 2026, document the entry of a group of individuals into the shrine and the implementation of a systematic sabotage operation. The shrine appears to be in a clearly damaged state, as it appears to be open or partially broken, with internal exposure indicating direct tampering with it. The fabrics that were covering the shrine appeared to be thrown on the ground, while the belongings were scattered inside the place in a way that suggests a process of deliberate emptying and desecration. There are also signs of cracking in the wooden boxes and surrounding contents, in addition to damage to the interior walls, including cracks and obvious signs of impact. Some local accounts indicated the possibility of using a limited explosive device inside the shrine, based on the appearance of the destruction in some corners, but this fact remains undecided. While the nature of the attack indicates a symbolic dimension that goes beyond physical vandalism. The Syrian coast is a center for attacks in Latakia. The picture is repeated, with differences in details. On March 11, local publications documented an incident of exhuming and vandalizing an Alawite religious shrine, with pictures showing the opening of the grave inside the shrine directly, with the cover removed and the contents tampered with. This type of attack, which includes exhumation, has a more sensitive connotation, as it targets the site and the person buried there at the same time, reflecting a clear symbolic dimension that goes beyond the physical structure of the place. These incidents show that the Syrian coast, especially the areas of Masyaf, Tartous, and Latakia, constitute a primary focus for this type of attacks. These incidents often occur in rural or semi-isolated areas, which contributes to reducing opportunities for immediate documentation and makes their media spread limited. This reality explains why most of these facts first appear on local pages or individual accounts, and often disappear without turning into a full-fledged news item. Attacks in 2025 When returning to the year 2025, it becomes clear that this pattern was not the result of recent months, but rather extends in time with diversity in geography and methods. In the town of Alaqin in the Daraa countryside, where a small Alawite minority lives, an incident of exhuming and vandalizing the shrine of Muhammad bin Hudhayfah was documented on May 4, 2025. The video clips showed the opening of the shrine directly, with the cover removed and parts of the surrounding building dismantled, all the way to revealing the contents of the shrine itself, and not just external vandalism. A snapshot from a video showing the vandalism of a shrine in the city of Alaqin, Daraa (Facebook) In the Salamiyah countryside of Hama Governorate, video materials documented a similar incident that affected the shrine of Faraj Abu Hayya, which has religious symbolism for the Ismaili sect, during the same year, when it was completely destroyed, the shrine was opened, and its internal structure was vandalized. This pattern, which combines excavation and vandalism, is repeated as one of the most prominent patterns of attacks on shrines and shrines. In March of the same year, the shrine of Sheikh Nasser Asaad, one of the shrines of the Alawite sect in Syria, was subjected to a bombing claimed by the Ansar al-Sunna Brigades, which resulted in its complete demolition. The shrine of “Sheikh Nasser Asaad” before it was bombed (Syrian Archive) The shrine of Sheikh Muhammad al-Ajmi, with Alawite religious symbolism, in the village of al-Fan al-Wastani on January 9, 2025, was bombed by two people on a motorcycle, who were likely from the neighboring village of al-Fan al-Qibli. They documented the bombing they carried out and published it without any concern for the consequences. In December of the same year, local reports indicated that several shrines in Tartous were targeted, including the shrines of Hamid Zaghbour and Ahmed Al-Shaabani, which were burned and vandalized to varying degrees, including partial or complete destruction of the sites. Patterns of attacks In parallel with these attacks, after the fall of the Syrian regime, Syria witnessed more organized attacks that directly targeted places of worship. On June 22, a bombing occurred targeting Saint Elias Church in Damascus, causing major damage to the internal structure and causing casualties. On December 26, the city of Homs witnessed a bombing targeting the Imam Ali Mosque in a neighborhood with an Alawite majority, resulting in extensive human and material damage. On January 11 of the same year, it was announced that an attempt to target the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab in the Damascus countryside had been thwarted, indicating the presence of continuing threats targeting highly symbolic religious sites. Effects of destruction in the “Imam Ali” Mosque in Homs after its bombing. (Internet) These incidents can be read within recurring patterns that include direct vandalism of shrines, digging up graves, arson, and planned bombings, in addition to targeting attempts that were not implemented. However, the common denominator between them is targeting the symbolic and religious dimension of the sites, and not just their physical structure. In terms of frequency, shrines associated with the Alawite sect remain the most exposed to attacks, especially on the Syrian coast. Lack of documentation and media blackout: One of the most prominent challenges in this file is the documentation gap and the dominance of unofficial sources. Most of the incidents that were monitored did not pass through traditional media channels, but rather appeared mainly in Facebook posts, often in the form of short videos or photos accompanied by brief comments. In many cases, basic information such as the exact date, full name of the site, or details of the implementing agency are absent. This style of documentation makes verification difficult, and limits the possibility of constructing an accurate and integrated narrative. On the other hand, there is a clear deficiency in the media coverage of these incidents. With the exception of major attacks such as bombings, attacks on shrines do not receive systematic coverage, whether in local or international media. This absence does not necessarily mean the scarcity of incidents, but rather indicates a defect in the mechanisms of monitoring and editorial attention, as these incidents are left in the limited local circulation without turning into a public issue. The nature of these incidents, which often occur in rural or marginal areas, contributes to reducing their media visibility, which contributes to obscuring the phenomenon despite its recurrence. Effects of destruction in the Maralias Church in Damascus after its bombing (Internet) This reality imposes a double challenge: on the one hand, there is a field phenomenon characterized by repetition and similarity, and on the other hand, there is an almost complete absence of organized archiving, media coverage, and professional investigation. As a result, the available picture appears fragmented, and depends largely on individual or local efforts to communicate what is happening. In conclusion, these facts reveal an ongoing pattern of attacks on religious shrines in Syria, intersecting with a broader context of violence and media and societal bias of a sectarian nature. Which requires a double effort of auditing, systematic documentation, and serious media follow-up. The ideological dimension of the targeting The pattern of attacks on religious shrines presents an ideological dimension that cannot be separated from the political and security context that was formed in Syria following the collapse of the authority of the former regime on December 8, 2024, and the subsequent rise of forces with former jihadi backgrounds to a position of power. In light of this transformation, and with the documented sectarian massacres that accompanied it, most notably those that targeted Alawites in the coast according to international reports, and the widespread incidents of violence against the Druze in Suwayda, an environment emerged that was more susceptible to activating an exclusionary religious discourse targeting symbols and practices associated with religious minorities. During an interview conducted by Al Jazeera with Abu Muhammad al-Julani, or Ahmed al-Sharaa, the interim president of Syria, he said, “We have a vendetta with the Nusayris,” with a reference to residents of the Alawite sect (YouTube). Within this context, attacks on shrines acquire a significance that goes beyond physical vandalism, to fall within an ideological perception that sees these sites as “manifestations of polytheism” or “heresy” that must be removed. This proposal is reinforced by relying on historical jurisprudential references that have been used in modern contexts, most notably the fatwas of Ibn Taymiyyah, which address the Alawite sect as “Nusayri” and “apostates from Islam.” Despite the difference in the historical context, the invocation of these fatwas does not take place in a vacuum, but rather intersects with the reality of the ideological backgrounds of some of the armed factions that have become part of the current power structure, and which descend from Salafi-jihadi movements that, during their presence in Syria, adopted similar approaches in defining opponents, most notably the Al-Nusra Front, the Army of Islam, and the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement, all of which joined the Syrian Arab Army. This overlap is clearly evident in the language used within some circulating discourses, where there is an insistence on using the description “Nusayris” instead of “Alawites,” in an attempt to reframe them within a narrative that considers them outside Islam. This shift in naming has a direct ideological function, as it is used to justify symbolic and physical targeting, including attacks on shrines and shrines. The erosion of religious freedoms. Although there is no declared or central policy behind every incident, the continuation of these attacks indicates a general climate that allows this type of behavior to expand, whether through organized groups or individuals who adopt this discourse. In light of the absence of accountability and weak media coverage, this ideological dimension turns into a factor that multiplies the danger of the phenomenon, as it gives it continuity beyond the immediate security situation, and makes the targeting of shrines part of a deeper struggle over religious identity and the form of the public sphere in the new Syria. The increasing targeting of shrines and shrines associated with religious minorities in Syria reflects the findings of the United States Commission for International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), in its annual report for the year 2026, where it documented a sharp deterioration in the conditions of religious freedom in Syria during the year 2025, stressing that religiously diverse population groups are still struggling to recover after nearly fourteen years of civil war. The report stated that the transitional authorities, who “proclaimed themselves to rule,” despite declaring their rejection of the sectarianism that characterized the regime they overthrew, “demonstrated systematic and persistent tolerance for extremely serious violations of religious freedom throughout the year,” and also failed to prevent mass murders, kidnappings, and other serious attacks targeting Alawites, Druze, Christians, and other religious minorities, many of which occurred at the hands of individuals allegedly loyal to the new administration.
