وطن نيوز
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “No one should seek adventures, no one should follow in the footsteps of the Zionist massacre network… Israel, under the current government, no longer only poses a threat to the region, but has also become a source of danger to humanity.” With these words, Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan attacked yesterday in a speech he delivered to members of his party at a meeting of the Turkish Parliament. On the surface, this was another stream of familiar insults that have characterized most of Erdogan’s recent appearances. But these statements were merely a cover for the important political message he sought to send. “Turkey’s security does not begin in the Iskenderun region (the Turkish province bordering Syria), but rather in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut… We will not tolerate the imposition of a fait accompli in the countries of our brothers, and we will not turn a blind eye to any attack on them. Lebanon and Syria are sovereign states, but they are also part of the geography of Turkish sympathy and brotherhood.” “The geography of brotherhood” is not only an influential literary expression, as Erdogan uses similar expressions when describing Türkiye’s relations with The “Turkish peoples” countries are in the Caucasus, and the intention is to describe the political and security alliance as being based on historical and cultural foundations that go beyond considerations of cold interests. As the military and political sponsor of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Turkey sees itself as concerned with consolidating his rule and securing his country’s borders. It also sees itself6 as securing its political cover, and here the Lebanese dimension appears. When negotiations began between Israel and Lebanon, Syria’s concern increased about the possibility that an agreement between Israel and Lebanon, sponsored by the United States, would lead to the Israeli army remaining in Lebanon, or in part of it, which might establish a precedent that would push the United States to agree to an Israeli military presence in Syria as well. Damascus also fears the possibility that a diplomatic agreement between Lebanon and Israel would lead the United States to seek to pressure Syria to sign a similar agreement with Israel on terms that Syria would not accept, which would enable the demarcation of the borders between Israel and Lebanon – the process stipulated in the ceasefire agreement. The fire, which is expected to be discussed in the next round of talks – may force Syria to give up lands it claims, especially the Shebaa Farms. Sharaa sent sharp and clear messages to Lebanon and asked it to “consult” with Syria before signing any agreement. It also attempts to establish the principle of “unity of channels,” according to which no country takes a separate political initiative. In practice, this is a request from Lebanon to subject its movements to the dictates of Syria. When Erdogan stands to the right of Sharaa and places with him the “red lines” that are supposed to guide the negotiations between Syria and Lebanon, and prevents the “fait accompli,” he is putting himself on the front line, not only against Israel, which he sees as a threat to Turkey, but rather a message to Trump stating that any agreement between Israel and Lebanon will not be limited to a bilateral framework and ignore Syrian interests. Meanwhile, Lebanon was not affected by either Syria’s position or Erdogan’s position. As the “independence of decision” with Iran shows, Lebanon has made it clear to Sharaa, and indirectly to Turkey, that it alone will determine its foreign policy. But the Turkish umbrella of protection in Syria, and Turkey’s endeavor to use it to guide Lebanon’s policy, is only part of a more ambitious Turkish strategy. While the region is anxiously awaiting Trump’s decisions on the Gulf front, Turkey is already trying to shape the features of “the next day,” although Erdogan is working secretly to prevent the resumption of the war, but at the same time he is paving the way for a new regional order in which Turkey has a leadership role. According to the doctrine set by Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, Ankara seeks to establish a regional defense alliance, “based on trust and cooperation and not on external alliances or patronage. We want to establish a platform for regional solidarity,” Fidan said in an interview with “Al Jazeera” last January, that is, two months before the outbreak of war with Iran, following the 12-day war that took place last year. Iran’s unprecedented attack on the Gulf states, especially the absence of a direct response from the United States to the attacks that are still continuing, has increased the intensity of the urgent need, in his opinion, to establish such an alliance, known as “regional sovereignty over security.” Turkey emerged almost unscathed from the Iranian attack on the countries of the region. On the three occasions when missiles were fired at American military bases on its territory, NATO defense systems intercepted them. Türkiye was angry, condemned Iran and warned it. But like the other Gulf states, it did not sever its relations with Iran, did not describe it as an enemy state, and did not work to activate the joint defense clause on which NATO is based. A prominent researcher at a government research institute in Ankara told Haaretz: “There is still a strategic vacuum in the region after the Gulf states discovered for the second time that their security dependence on one superpower, the United States, does not provide them with the required security.” He added that these countries’ close relationship with Trump and their commitment to investing trillions of dollars in the United States and huge military purchases did not stand the test of America’s commitment, and they are now “at a loss and looking for a new strategy, which is a situation that is in Erdogan’s interest.” Erdogan hopes to exploit this opportunity when the NATO Council meets in Ankara at the beginning of next month. The last NATO meeting was in Turkey in 2024, when the cooperation framework in this organization was expanded, and since then Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have become part of what is known as the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” At that time, Erdogan had only been in office as prime minister for about one year (and he was not elected president until more than a decade later). This was perhaps the most challenging year of his long rule. Türkiye was just beginning to emerge from a deep economic crisis. A year before that, the war broke out in Iraq, and the Turkish Parliament had prevented the United States from using its territory to open a northern front against Iraq. This decision led to tense relations with the United States to the maximum extent. The Turkish army was still looking at Erdogan and his party with suspicion, watching them, and perhaps planning to eliminate them, and the struggle against the Kurdish resistance reached its peak. Since then, Turkey has come a long way, and is no longer just a military power with the second largest army in NATO, but has now become a major strategic partner with the countries of the Middle East and a dual ally of Russia and Ukraine, and it presents itself as a solution to the problem of Europe’s security independence. Erdogan is now seeking to expand the scope of NATO, trying to include Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, and exploiting Trump’s dissatisfaction with the alliance to formulate new working principles for security cooperation between the region and NATO member states. Erdogan confirms that he does not seek to withdraw from the alliance, but at the same time he will try to convince people that he is able to present an alternative that will free the countries of the region from complete dependence on the United States, and successfully confront “Israel’s hegemonic ambitions.” Zvi Bri Haaretz 11/6/2026
