وطن نيوز
Dr. Eli Rettig Israeli gas exports to Syria are an existing reality, but they are currently carried out indirectly, through barter deals and resale agreements with Jordan and Egypt, rather than a formal contract between Israel and Syria. This poses a strategic dilemma for both sides. On the one hand, a direct gas contract between Israel and Syria could provide clearer accountability, stronger guarantees against any interruptions, and a basis for future energy cooperation that might also include Lebanon. On the other hand, direct gas trading may be politically premature, exposing both sides to internal criticism: in Israel, due to fears of diminishing domestic gas reserves after the large export agreement with Egypt in 2025; And in Syria, due to fears that Israel will politicize gas supplies or use them as pressure cards. Indirect contracts through Jordan and Egypt may be easier to implement and reject, but they blur responsibility and reduce both sides’ control over terms of supply. Israel should approach this issue not as a binary choice between formal normalization and continued ambiguity, but rather as a practical debate about the most appropriate contracting model that serves its interests in stability, influence, deniability, and long-term regional integration. In January 2026, Jordan signed an agreement to supply gas to Syria, providing for it to be supplied with approximately 1.45 billion cubic meters annually via the Arab Gas Pipeline. Although the agreement does not specify the source of the gas, it is clear that Syria is actually receiving Israeli gas. Jordan only has a small local gas field, and imports 85 percent of its gas from Israel, while the rest comes through liquefied natural gas imports from Aqaba. Although regional officials initially claimed that the gas coming from Jordan to Syria came from Qatari LNG, the design of the current pipeline makes this claim unlikely. Israeli gas flows south through the system itself, and gas that enters through Aqaba cannot travel north beyond Amman to reach Syria. This means that the gas supplied to Syria via Jordan is in fact Israeli gas that is politically repackaged as “Jordanian” or “Qatari” through barter deals and resale arrangements. Jordan has only a small local gas field, and imports 85 percent of its gas from Israel, while the rest comes through liquefied natural gas imports from Aqaba. Although Israel and Syria have not signed a direct gas export contract, there is already an actual path to export Israeli gas to Syria, and this ambiguity represents a political mechanism that enables this arrangement for both parties. This hidden trade route allows Damascus to receive gas without acknowledging its dependence on Israel, and also allows Israel to contribute to Syria’s energy recovery without formally entering into a normalization agreement with it. In addition to Jordan, Egypt also signed a memorandum of understanding with Syria to supply it with gas, and in May 2026, Lebanon joined the gas exchange framework with Jordan and Syria. This network of agreements allows any gas supplies sent to Syria or Lebanon to be represented as Jordanian, Egyptian, LNG-based or as part of a regional exchange agreement, even if they originate from Israel. In doing so, political deniability is maintained for all parties. This unexpected gas arrangement is a result of Syria’s dire need for gas. Syria’s domestic gas production fell from about 8.7 billion cubic meters in 2011 to about 3 billion cubic meters during the long civil war. Syria’s energy sector remains one of the most important challenges facing rebuilding the country. Türkiye has begun transporting Azerbaijani gas to northern Syria via the Kilis-Aleppo pipeline, with Qatar participating in financing it. This project is expected to save about 1.2 billion cubic meters annually and support the provision of electricity for several additional hours in the affected areas, but this is only a partial solution. Jordan’s supply via the Arab Gas Pipeline joins a broader competition over who will determine the course of Syria’s post-war energy sector recovery. Israel may not be strongly present in this competition, but it is present within the regional gas system. So, the pressing political question is not whether Israeli gas will reach Syria (because it already is), but whether Israel and Syria should consider a direct gas contract, or maintain the current indirect supply arrangement. The answer is not clear. Each model offers different combinations of deniability, reliability, leverage, accountability, and political risk for both parties. For Syria, the indirect route has clear advantages, as it reduces the political cost of receiving Israeli gas. The Syrian government, seeking to rebuild its electricity grid, may prefer to describe the gas as coming from Jordan, Egypt or Qatar rather than defend a direct agreement with Israel. This matter becomes particularly important as the new political regime in Damascus seeks to consolidate its legitimacy. Indirect supply also allows Syria to benefit from existing infrastructure without turning a technical energy need into an overt diplomatic concession. But this denial comes at a price. If Syria receives gas through Jordan and Egypt, its energy security depends on their decisions. Both Jordan and Egypt may choose to prioritize their domestic markets and freeze trade agreements with Syria during periods of shortage, or even use their transit status as leverage against Syria during political disputes. Consequently, Syria may find itself dependent on Israeli gas without a direct contract with Israel to fall back on in the event of a supply interruption. The indirect route also makes Syria dependent on Jordanian and Egyptian infrastructure without full control over supply conditions. For Damascus, indirect gas is politically expedient in the short term, but contractually weak during crises. For Israel, too, indirect supply has advantages and disadvantages. One of its advantages is that it allows Israeli gas to contribute to the stability of the region without forcing an early political breakthrough with Syria. It also gives Jordan and Egypt an effective mediation role, reduces the visibility of Israeli interference, and allows cooperation in the field of energy to gradually emerge. Israel can test whether Syria’s reliance on regional infrastructure will lead to pragmatic behavior over time, while avoiding the internal and diplomatic exposure that a formal gas deal with Damascus would entail. But the indirect route also reduces Israel’s influence. If Israel does not officially sell gas to Syria, it has less control over end-use restrictions, crisis clauses, payment mechanisms, and liability for supply disruptions. You may not know which Syrian power plants are benefiting, or whether gas is reaching politically sensitive areas, or whether hostile parties are indirectly benefiting from improved energy supplies. Israel may also receive little diplomatic appreciation for its contribution to the stability of Syria, while being blamed if supplies are interrupted due to war, a technical malfunction, or a decision by Jordan to give priority to local supplies. Israel may end up supporting part of Syria’s recovery without a clear vision, guarantees or recognition. A direct contract would bring benefits to both parties; It clarifies quantities and prices, provides payment guarantees and arbitration mechanisms in the event of supply disruptions, reduces the ability of middlemen to manipulate supplies, and enables the parties to place energy cooperation within a broader regional framework with the support of the United States. If managed carefully, a direct contract may become a limited technical form of cooperation rather than a radical normalization step. The direct model could also support gas supplies to Lebanon. The electricity crisis in Lebanon is still one of the most important causes of its economic and political collapse. Previous attempts to supply Lebanon with gas via Egypt, Jordan and Syria have been delayed due to financing, sanctions and infrastructure problems. A more stable Syrian gas corridor would eventually allow Lebanon to access gas or electricity through a more reliable regional arrangement. However, despite these benefits, a direct contract also has significant internal political costs for both parties. On the Israeli side, a formal agreement with Syria would reopen the internal debate over gas exports in light of dwindling domestic gas reserves. The signing of the main gas agreement between the Leviathan partners and Egypt in August 2025 escalated this controversy, as Egypt promised to supply it with an additional 130 billion cubic meters of Israeli gas until 2040. Although this agreement is commercially important, it has raised fears that Israel’s domestic gas reserves may run out by 2045 if additional reserves are not discovered and domestic demand remains high. Final approval of the agreement with Egypt took several months from the Israeli government, partly due to these concerns, and was granted only after guarantees were added to protect the domestic market in the event of a domestic shortage. This public debate has cooled the Israeli government’s interest in concluding another major gas agreement with Syria or Lebanon. Israeli decision makers will need to justify the necessity of an additional export channel, how it fits into the export cap, and what safeguards are in place to protect Israeli consumers from any future shortages. They will also need to explain why Israeli gas was sold directly to a country that does not recognize Israel, whose future political orientation remains unclear, and whose territory may include actors hostile to Israeli interests. A direct contract may provide clarity, but that clarity will make evading political responsibility more difficult. Therefore, the Israeli government may prefer to consider the new 130 billion cubic meters agreement with Egypt as an agreement that already includes any future gas deal with Syria. For Syria, concluding a direct contract with Israel may be more difficult. The Damascus government wants reliable access to gas, but it may fear being accused of legitimizing Israel before any broader political settlement, including the question of the fate of the Golan Heights. It may be concerned that Israel will use gas as a political tool in future crises, and may prefer to maintain a negotiating margin with Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states rather than clearly positioning itself within an energy framework linked to Israel and the United States. In other words, a direct agreement may give Syria more stable supplies, but it may expose Damascus to accusations that Syria’s reconstruction is influenced by Israeli influence. Therefore, the choice between direct and indirect exports should be viewed as an arrangement dilemma. Indirect supply may be more feasible in the short term because it allows gas to flow without requiring either party to make a symbolic concession. Direct contracting may become more attractive later if indirect arrangements prove too vague, if intermediaries exploit their positions to exert pressure, if interruptions become frequent, or if both parties decide they want clearer rules. The crux of the matter is not which model is best, but which model best suits the political conditions and infrastructure needs at each stage. Israel should prepare for both possibilities. Regarding indirect exports, it must clarify whether current export licenses to Egypt and Jordan allow the supply of gas to Syria and Lebanon, or whether this supply requires prior notification. They should also ensure that contracts include clauses to protect domestic supplies, crisis clauses, and basic transparency regarding onward flows. It should also coordinate with Egypt and Jordan so that Israeli officials are not surprised by public announcements repackaging Israeli gas within a broader regional supply plan. As for a potential direct contract, Israel should define the minimum conditions that would make such a deal acceptable. These conditions may include restrictions on the end use of civilian electricity generation, arrangements for monitoring, infrastructure protection, payment guarantees, and international support. As for Syria, it must decide whether the benefits of predictability and clarity of the contract’s terms outweigh the political costs of overt cooperation. Europe and the United States can help by providing political cover, technical assistance, and financial guarantees that reduce risks on both sides. Therefore, the Syrian gas issue is not just an energy issue, but rather a test of the ability of regional infrastructure to become an instrument of stability without the burden of politics. Indirect supply provides deniability and speed, while direct supply provides clarity and accountability. Both models have strategic value, and both involve risks. The most important step for Israel is to realize that this issue may have already begun, even before an official Israeli decision is taken. If Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon develop gas agreements based on a regional system supported in part by Israeli gas, Israel will be involved whether it declares it or not. Therefore, it should treat the issue as a strategic planning issue and not as an indirect business impact. The first Israeli gas agreement with Syria may not be called an “Israeli-Syrian gas agreement,” but Israel should define its goals for this agreement. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies BESA 7/5/2026
