وطن نيوز
In recent months, and especially since the end of the war with Iran, a widely unanimous opinion has taken root in Israel (expressed by both Netanyahu and Bennett) that “Türkiye is the new Iran.” According to this view, Erdogan seeks to destroy Israel, and is emerging as a regional Sunni axis competing with the Shiite axis, which in turn aims to establish a ring of fire around Israel. This is actually a natural reaction for a country that has been in a post-traumatic state since October 7, a country that has never undergone a comprehensive investigation, accepts war as a permanent state, and constantly seeks to identify enemies and prepare to confront them. However, another key lesson from October 7 is that public opinion must question and often challenge the strict rulings imposed on it as if they were scientific facts. In the Turkish context, it is necessary to ask to what extent Ankara, which still maintains diplomatic relations with Israel despite the severe crisis between them, is motivated towards its destruction and the pursuit of confrontation, and if this is indeed the conclusion, then how should Israel behave militarily (does it show initiative towards “emerging threats” as Katz recently claimed?), and how does it strengthen its power in the face of a major ally of Washington, which has the second largest army in NATO? If we rely on rhetoric alone, the two countries are on the brink of war. In recent weeks, Erdogan has added to his usual accusations that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, with statements that Turkey’s struggle is against all of Zionism and is being waged in the name of the Islamic nation, along with strongly worded warnings that Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Syria pose a threat to Turkish national security. The Turkish Minister of the Interior even went further, declaring: “Just as we witnessed the liberation of Damascus and Aleppo, we will one day witness the liberation of Jerusalem, and these places will be ours again,” and even expressed his hope of assuming the position of governor of Jerusalem one day. For his part, Netanyahu has stated that anyone talking about Israel’s demise should be taken seriously, while the rest of the government ministers compete in launching attacks on Ankara: Katz, who two years ago warned that “Erdogan is following in the footsteps of Saddam Hussein, and threatens to attack Israel,” quipped that “the Ottoman Empire collapsed and will never return,” and that “Erdogan is returning Türkiye to an age of darkness and backwardness”; Shikli explained that the Turkish threat is greater than the Iranian threat. Mickey Zohar even threatened, saying: “If Erdogan dares to test us, his fate will be worse than the fate of the dying Iranian regime.” The government’s decision this week to recognize the Armenian Genocide has heightened tensions. Strong Turkish condemnation was expected, but it seems that Israel, where not every step is based on systematic thinking, had difficulty predicting the chain of reactions to the move. Azerbaijan, an important ally of Israel from which it receives military aid used in its war against Armenia (which is of importance to Israel given its proximity to Iran), claimed that “this is a disturbing decision that mixes complex historical processes with political issues,” and called on Israel to reconsider the decision; Even Armenia responded coldly, as its Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, harshly criticized Israel when he said: “For the sake of Armenia, it is not right to turn the Armenian genocide into a political tool,” prompting Gideon Sa’ar to clarify that “this step stems from moral motives, and is not motivated by revenge against Erdogan.” Efforts to provide F-35 aircraft Going beyond official rhetoric, we identify three main challenges currently emerging from Turkey: The first and most important of them at the present time is Turkey’s continued consolidation of its presence in Syria, which began immediately after Ahmed al-Sharaa, an ally of Ankara, took control of the country in late 2024. Within the framework of close relations between the two countries and the increasing Turkish intervention in Syria, efforts are being made to return millions of refugees who fled to Turkish territory during the Syrian civil war, as well as cooperation against the Kurds in Syria, And the clear military presence in the country. Added to this is Türkiye’s recent attempt to prevent Trump from sending Sharaa to Lebanon to fight Hezbollah, for fear of undermining the position of its ally in Damascus. This week, Katz publicly expressed concern about the Turkish threat from Syria, saying: “Erdogan says he is concerned about the agreement with Lebanon and Israel’s achievements. The potential for friction with Turkey is centered in Syria, but it is clear that the IDF will not withdraw from the security zone there. Israel is monitoring the possibility that Turkey will deepen its presence in Syria, establish military bases, or try to limit Israel’s freedom of action in this arena. At the moment, this does not represent a realistic practical threat, but we are on alert.” Maximum, we are monitoring the situation and preparing for it.” Dr. Galia Lindenstrauss, a specialist in contemporary Turkish foreign policy, tries to clarify the picture, saying: “Despite Turkey’s deep influence in Syria, Ankara shows great caution in its behavior in this arena, for fear of friction with Israel. Therefore, it maintains a security hotline to prevent any unplanned and controlled escalation.” The second challenge is Türkiye’s efforts to conclude a deal to purchase F-35 aircraft from the United States, which may threaten Israel’s air superiority in the region. Vice President Trump, J. D. Vance, in this context, said that the administration is considering how to circumvent the 2019 directives to exclude Turkey from the F-35 aircraft development project, after it purchased S-400 air defense systems from Russia. Meanwhile, Türkiye is striving to complete the deal that has reached its final stages, which is a $700 million deal to purchase American engines for the advanced Kan fighter aircraft manufactured in Türkiye. This is a crucial element of a project to which Erdogan attaches great importance to consolidating Türkiye’s regional position and enhancing its image as a strategic asset to NATO. Turkish researcher Gonul Tol explains that although Ankara produces its own engines, the pace of production is relatively slow. The third challenge is Turkey’s continued support for the Hamas movement’s headquarters in charge of the West Bank, which runs its operations from its territory. In this context, many terrorist infrastructures in the West Bank, which are managed by Hamas in Istanbul, are constantly unfolding, and it is likely that the movement’s members are not only receiving sponsorship, but also logistical, financial, and even military support from Turkish security officials, in light of the existence of a deep ideological alliance between Erdogan and Hamas. Thus, the Israeli army and the General Security Service (Shin Bet) announced last week that they had carried out dozens of attacks over the past year, which were carried out by Hamas members residing in Turkey and belonging to the “West Bank headquarters” led by Zaher Jabarin, who is responsible for Hamas activities in the West Bank, and who replaced Saleh Al-Arouri, who was assassinated in January 2024. A new challenge looms on the horizon. In the midst of this, a fourth challenge emerges, centered on the civil dimension and infrastructure, but it carries in It has strategic implications for Israel. Ankara views with concern the “Great Sea Connection” project promoted by Israel, Greece and Cyprus, which aims to connect the three countries to the European electricity grid via a 1,200-kilometre-long submarine cable, which could provide Israel with backup power in the event of a power outage. For its part, Turkey is promoting the “Blue Homeland Law,” which aims to expand the scope of its maritime control, which constitutes a threatening signal to Greece, whose submarine cable will be laid in its territorial waters. Dr. Hai Eitan Cohen-Janrojek, from the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, explains: “We must take seriously the speech that Erdogan gave on June 10, in which he warned Cyprus and Greece against cooperating with Israel, in a move that he said would undermine Turkey’s rights, and warned that it would respond harshly if it was faced with any challenge.” Another challenge is the commercial and energy transport axis extending from Saudi Arabia to Turkey via Syria, which has accelerated in light of the Strait of Hormuz crisis, and aims to compete with Israel’s vision of creating a transverse axis extending from the strait to the Gulf states and India. In this context, Türkiye stands out as one of the biggest winners from the ongoing wars in the region since October 7. Given the sharp confrontation between its opponents, Turkey is seeking to expand its influence in multiple arenas: Libya, Somalia – where the largest Turkish military base is located outside its borders – and Iraq, in addition to its control of Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, where it cannot deploy military forces, but supports civilian projects. Ankara is also involved in an attempt to form a quadripartite Islamist alliance, which includes Pakistan (a rising power in the region), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, with which its tense relations have recently witnessed a marked improvement (given Erdogan’s rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood, the arch-enemy of the regime in Cairo). Manifestations of this rapprochement are evident in the visit of the Turkish Chief of Staff to Egypt, in the joint air maneuver between the two countries, and in Ankara’s involvement in the mediation efforts with Hamas underway in Cairo, seeking to strengthen a proposal to consolidate the situation in Gaza. Thus, fear of the shocks caused by Israel in the region became a fundamental focus of Egyptian-Turkish cooperation, indicating a new regional structure that is completely different from the New East that Israel longed for. On the question of how far Erdogan is willing to go so far in his dealings with Israel, Cohen Janrojek explains: “Erdogan is waging a sustained campaign to delegitimize Israel, not only through harsh rhetoric, but also in his active participation in the legal proceedings brought by South Africa before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, in imposing economic sanctions, and issuing arrest warrants for high-ranking Israeli officials. However, Ankara appears unwilling to escalate the situation to the point of severing ties, which could It obstructs its access to the Palestinian arena, especially to Al-Aqsa Mosque.” Lindenstrauss confirms this claim, saying: “Since October 7, Erdogan has escalated his rhetoric against Israel to the point of using phrases that undermine the legitimacy of its existence. However, he is careful not to bend the rules, and is adopting a dual approach. This week, for example, he claimed that the two-state solution is the solution that will contribute to stability in the region.” Turkish researcher Elkim Buka-Ukyar adds: “Turkey’s behavior toward Israel stems from its understanding of its close relations with Washington,” and therefore, it must take this limitation into account. Like the messages directed against Egypt, Trump, for his part, seems embarrassed by the escalation of tension between his two allies, and sends, as usual, ambiguous messages. He recently claimed that during the “Lion’s Roar” campaign, he prevented Erdogan from joining it “perhaps on the side of Iran,” but at the same time he made it clear that the Turkish president is a great leader whom he loves, and that as long as he remains in the White House, there will be no conflict between “Jerusalem” and Ankara. “The current friendly relationship between Washington and Ankara represents a real challenge for Israel, and it appears to have thwarted even the moves that were planned during the escalation of tension with Iran, which were primarily aimed at encouraging Kurdish militias to move against the regime in Tehran, which Erdogan strongly opposed, and Trump has explicitly hinted at,” Professor Udi Somer explained in an interview this week. Attention is turning to the thirty-seventh NATO summit at the level of heads of state, scheduled to be held next week in Ankara, with Trump’s participation, where many strategic issues are likely to be discussed, but it may also be accompanied by an American attempt to calm tensions with Israel. Trump already raised questions when he publicly hinted that he would please Erdogan a lot during the conference, apparently by making progress on the F-35 deal. Ankara is eagerly awaiting this meeting, which is seen as extremely important, and hopes that it will produce news regarding the military supply deals that the Turks are seeking to strengthen. There is no doubt that Türkiye under Erdogan’s leadership represents a strategic challenge to Israel. Israel shows hostility towards it, but it is not an enemy working according to a plan to destroy it, as is the case with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Despite the decisive statements issued by Israel, the confrontation with Ankara is not a settled matter. In this context, it is worth recalling the suspicious messages that circulated in Israel about a year ago regarding Egypt, which claimed that it was preparing attacks against Israel. In light of the complex challenges that Israel faces in Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza, the crisis in its relations with the United States, the stagnation in its relations with the Arab world, and the deterioration of its international image to its lowest levels ever, the belief is strengthened that there is no need at the present time for more friction, let alone a broad confrontation with a regional power like Turkey. It is advisable to postpone focusing on this challenge until it is certain that the Iranian nuclear threats and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon are neutralized, and Hamas returns to the power it enjoyed until October 7. In several ongoing crises since the massacre, Trump has forced Israel to take political steps that have proven that the confrontation cannot be resolved by military means alone. In the case of Turkey, it may be appropriate to strengthen this position, preferably without US coercion, before a military conflict erupts, thus effectively preventing it. D. Michael Milstein Yedioth Ahronoth 7/3/2026
