Public disagreements began to worsen within the ranks of the ruling coalition in Israel, between the political and military leaders, and within the “war cabinet”, as the Israeli war on Gaza entered its fourth month, regarding many issues. Most notable is the decision of Army Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy to form an investigation committee into the failures of the military establishment since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023, and Israeli policy towards the Gaza Strip in the post-war period. Personal conflicts also emerged within the Likud Party bloc, which leads the government coalition, between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Galant, which worsened when Netanyahu prevented Galant from meeting with the heads of the intelligence services “Mossad” and internal security “Shin Bet,” which are officially affiliated with the prime minister.

Consensus on continuing the war

Despite the growing differences and conflicts, which have their own backgrounds and causes, at the top of the political and military pyramid in Israel, the various components of the government coalition, the political opposition, and the military and security establishment still agree on continuing the war on Gaza, and achieving its goals of eliminating the rule and power of the Hamas movement. Military, in addition to the return of Israeli detainees. The Israeli leadership’s pursuit of these goals continues to enjoy broad popular support as well. One hundred days after the start of the war, no significant political, social or economic force has yet emerged in Israel that departs from this consensus and calls for an end to the war. It is true that some voices have appeared in Israel in recent weeks from families of Israeli detainees and their supporters calling for an end to the war, but they have remained weak and limited.

The ongoing disagreements and competition within the ranks of the Israeli leadership, especially between Netanyahu, Galant, Halevy, and War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz, are pushing in the direction of continuing the war. This is because none of them wants, in light of the conflict and competition between them, to be the first to raise questions about the difficulty of achieving the goals of the war and the prices that must be paid. This means that the war continues as it moves to the third stage.

Launching the third phase of the war

Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, the Israeli army launched its aggression against the Gaza Strip in three main stages. The first stage included bombing the Strip from the air, land and sea for three weeks. In the second phase, the Israeli army launched a large-scale ground attack on the northern Gaza Strip with the aim of controlling the land and dismantling the military structure of Hamas. The third phase, which is being prepared, requires reducing the size of the Israeli military force participating in the operations, withdrawing it from within cities and towns, and repositioning it at strategic points inside the Gaza Strip and on its borders. Meanwhile, the Israeli army is carrying out focused and specific military operations against resistance targets using special military units, drones and aircraft, based on intelligence information about these targets.

The third phase of the war is in line with the US administration’s demand to reduce the frequency of bombing and limit the targeting of civilians, and with the requirements of the economy and the demand of society in Israel to demobilize a large portion of the reserve forces in the army and return them to their work in various economic activities. There is agreement among the Israeli political and military leadership that this stage may last many months, or even up to a year.

The Israeli army began implementing the third phase of its military operation on January 6, 2024 in the northern Gaza Strip. As for the central and southern Gaza Strip, it is still trying to control the land in the face of fierce resistance from the Palestinian resistance factions. The second phase in these two areas is likely to last several weeks, and this depends mainly on the conduct of military operations in them, the extent of the American administration’s pressure on Israel, and the extent of Israel’s response to this pressure.

It has not yet been decided whether Israel will move its military operations towards Rafah to the south, where more than a million Palestinians have taken refuge from different areas of the Gaza Strip, and in light of the presence of this large number of refugees, it will be very difficult for the Israeli army to attack and occupy Rafah, and this is what Washington also opposes it for fear of significant civilian casualties. In any case, if he decides to attack Rafah, this will require an understanding with the American administration and Egypt, and this will not happen until after the return of the displaced Palestinians from the Rafah area to the northern Gaza Strip, something that Israel has opposed so far.

Netanyahu’s agenda and the day after the war

Although the popularity of Netanyahu, his party, and his government coalition has declined in public opinion polls since the start of the war, he still controls the decision-making process related to the war strategy, and the definition of Israel’s various policies in general. He strongly opposes the US administration’s vision for the Gaza Strip the day after the war, which calls for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Strip after achieving the war’s goals, the return of the “renewed” Palestinian Authority to it, and the confirmation of political unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the context of a future vision for establishing a Palestinian state in them. Netanyahu also has strong reservations about the plan presented by Gallant for the day after the war, in coordination with the American administration. In his rejection of the American administration’s vision, he agrees with his government coalition, which is based on 64 members of the Knesset. Netanyahu attaches utmost importance to maintaining his far-right government coalition for as long as possible after the end of the war. In this context, he is keen to take into account the positions of the two fascist parties in his government, the “Jewish Power” party led by Internal Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, and the “Religious Zionism” party led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. He realizes that the accession of the “Official Camp” party led by Gantz to the emergency government, whose formation was announced after the start of the war on Gaza, is a temporary matter, as Gantz himself announced, and that there is no possibility of him remaining in the government after the end of the war, or as soon as Gantz decides to leave. When he sees that he has exhausted his role in the government coalition and that remaining in it will harm him electorally.

Netanyahu believes that he can significantly improve his popularity and the popularity of his party and government coalition if he is able, during the war period, to attract large segments of the right-wing and extreme right-wing public, both religious and secular, and mobilize them behind his agenda, especially since the public opinion polls in Israel that were conducted in the period The war confirms the shift of Israeli society as a whole towards the values ​​and positions of the right and the extreme right. In this context, Netanyahu is focusing on issues that help him mobilize broad sectors of the right and extreme right, which are:

1- Adhering to the goal of eliminating Hamas and its rule in the Gaza Strip, and emphasizing not to retreat from this goal no matter how long the war lasts.

2- Continued Israeli security control over the Gaza Strip.

3- Not allowing the return of the Palestinian Authority, whether under its current leadership and composition, or with a renewed leadership and composition, as requested by the US administration, to the Gaza Strip, and maintaining the division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, regardless of the nature and composition of the authority in each.

4- Rejecting the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

5- His party and camp’s continued call for the displacement of Palestinians, implicitly and explicitly, from the Gaza Strip to Sinai and other countries in the world.

6- The continued oppression of the Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the strengthening of Jewish settlement there.

Investigation committees

About three months after the start of the war, Halevy formed an investigation committee composed of former military commanders, headed by the Minister of Defense and former Army Chief of Staff, Shaul Mofaz, to investigate the series of military and intelligence failures on the eve of last October 7, as well as the conduct of military operations in The war on Gaza. Halevy did not coordinate the formation of this committee with Netanyahu and Gallant; This aroused the anger of Netanyahu and his supporters, who strongly criticized Halevy during the political-security cabinet meeting, without Netanyahu saying a word in his defense, while Gallant rose to the occasion to defend Halevy. The dissatisfaction of Netanyahu and his supporters with the formation of this committee is due to two main reasons: The first is the composition of the committee headed by Mofaz, who is known for his strong opposition to Netanyahu, and the second is the opposition of Netanyahu and his supporters to the formation of investigation committees into the negligence and failure that occurred on October 7, before the end of the war on Gaza, as this reinforces the demand for the formation of an official investigation committee before the end of the war on the Gaza Strip. . At this stage, Netanyahu is content with the investigation that the State Comptroller, who is close to him, began conducting into the various aspects of the negligence on October 7.

Netanyahu is well aware of the risks to his political future of establishing a formal investigative committee; It is likely that the committee will place responsibility for the negligence and failure that occurred on it and on the leaders of the military and security establishment and call for their dismissal. Therefore, it is expected that he will strongly oppose the formation of an official investigation committee, and he may replace it with the formation of a government investigation committee whose tasks the government will determine and appoint its members. According to the law, it is the government that decides to form official investigation committees, and it is also the one that determines their tasks, areas of work, and topics of investigation. There is also, according to this law, the authority of the State Oversight Committee of the Knesset to take the decision to form an official investigation committee, after the State Comptroller submits his report to the Knesset on a specific case.

Accordingly, Netanyahu identifies his positions with the extreme right represented in his government by Ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich. It is expected that he will make every effort to keep the specter of the Knesset elections at bay for as long as possible, so that he can regain his and his party’s electoral popularity. It is not unlikely that the opposition will fail to advance the date of the Knesset elections, after the “Official Camp” party led by Gantz leaves the government coalition or after the end of the war, if Netanyahu maintains the cohesion of his government coalition. In any case, it is not certain that the anti-Netanyahu camp, led by Gantz and the head of the Yesh Atid Party, Yair Lapid, who public opinion polls have given him a clear majority in the Knesset since October 7, will be able to obtain a majority in the Knesset. The same public opinion polls also show that the Gantz camp will not be able to do so if the former Mossad chief, Yossi Cohen, runs in the upcoming Knesset elections in a new party, and if the former prime minister, Naftali Bennett, runs in these elections alone with his party or in a new coalition that he establishes to run. The election. In addition, Netanyahu is making an effort to split the ranks of the “official camp,” including his efforts to attract former Minister Gideon Sa’ar, a defector from the Likud Party, who adopts extreme right-wing positions, and return him to the ranks of his party. Which weakens the “official camp” party led by Gantz.

Conclusion

The components of the government coalition, the political opposition, and the Israeli military and security establishment still agree to move forward to achieve the goals of the war on Gaza. So far, no agreement has been reached in the Israeli government, nor in the war cabinet or the political-security cabinet regarding Israel’s policy towards the Gaza Strip on the day following the war, due to Netanyahu’s refusal to raise this issue before the government or the political-security cabinet.

In light of the existence of an Israeli consensus on the necessity of returning the Israeli detainees, the anti-Netanyahu camp gives the issue of the Israeli detainees greater importance than the Netanyahu camp, and shows greater willingness to return them by reaching a compromise with Hamas on this issue. As the war continues and the danger to the lives of Israeli detainees increases, the importance of this issue to Israeli public opinion increases.