اخبار موريتانيا – وطن نيوز
اخر اخبار موريتانيا اليوم – اخبار موريتانيا العاجلة
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-04-11 20:56:00
In a symbolic moment laden with connotations, Ibrahim Ghali’s speech on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the declaration of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was not merely a restoration of a historical memory, but rather came closer to an integrated political statement that reformulates the equation of the conflict in Western Sahara and establishes a new phase entitled: internationalizing the conflict legally and escalating it diplomatically without sliding into open confrontation. What is striking in the speech is not only the ceiling of the demands, but the nature of the tools that were called for. When Ghali demands the cancellation of all agreements that include the Sahara lands, airspace, or territorial waters with Morocco, he is not addressing Rabat directly as much as he is directing his message to international actors, most notably the European Union, putting them before a clear legal equation: either respect the decisions of the European judiciary and the requirements of international law, or continue in partnerships that are described, from the point of view of the Polisario, as lacking legitimacy. If the reality of the Polisario Front at the moment of its founding is compared to its reality today, a profound shift in the nature of the role and tools becomes apparent. In its beginnings, the Front was born as an armed liberation movement in the context of decolonization, based primarily on military struggle and revolutionary legitimacy, and moving in a turbulent regional environment that redrew the boundaries of influence and sovereignty. Today, it has moved – at least in its discourse and institutional practice – to a more complex phase, where it is no longer content with describing itself as a resistance movement, but rather seeks to establish itself as a political entity with institutions, possessing the narrative of the “existing state” and the tools for diplomatic and legal work. From a parallel angle, this transformation cannot be understood without recalling the decline of its militarily supportive environment after the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Front lost one of the most important sources of indirect support in armaments and international balances, and the momentum of regimes that had provided it with political or logistical support declined, such as Libya in a previous stage, and Cuba, which is no longer in a position to play the same role. This structural shift in the balance of external support was necessarily reflected in the military capabilities of the Front, not in the sense of its end, but in terms of the decline in the margin of maneuver and superiority on which it relied in previous stages, which contributed to pushing it gradually towards redefining its tools. Understanding this path is not complete without considering the nature of its relationship with Algeria, which from the beginning constituted the most important strategic depth for the front, politically and militarily. During the era of Houari Boumediene, Algerian support was characterized by a clearly decisive and impulsive nature, in a regional and international context in which Algeria was adopting a revolutionary discourse in support of the liberation movements, and using its diplomatic and military capabilities with great weight to tip the balance in favor of the Polisario. Today, although Algeria continues to embrace and support the Front at multiple levels, the nature of this support seems more pragmatic and cautious, governed by complex regional considerations and different international balances, as well as internal, economic and security priorities that no longer allow the same margin of movement that was available in the 1970s and 1980s. This shift does not mean a decline in the principled position, as much as it reflects a repositioning of the tools of influence, as support has become more inclined towards diplomatic and political paths, rather than a direct military push, which in turn is reflected in the front’s options and strategies in managing the conflict. Another factor that contributed to reshaping the position of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic on the international scene cannot be overlooked, which is the decline in the momentum of diplomatic recognitions during recent decades. After the 1970s and 1980s, which witnessed a wide wave of recognition, especially from African and Latin American countries in the context of the Cold War and support for liberation movements, the subsequent years witnessed a number of countries freezing or withdrawing their recognition, or at least reconsidering their positions in line with shifts in the balance of regional and international power. This relative decline in recognitions does not eliminate the continued presence of the Sahrawi entity within the African Union, but it reflects a more complex reality, as international support is no longer measured only by the number of recognitions, but rather by the extent of the ability to influence the positions of the major powers and economic partners. This forces the Front to move from the logic of “numerical legitimacy” to the logic of “political effectiveness,” by targeting international decision-making centers instead of simply expanding the circle of formal recognitions. The internal scene of the Polisario Front is not devoid of structural tensions that reflect a silent struggle over the nature of leadership and conflict management options. This has become clearer with the rise of what is known as the Martyr’s Line Movement, which presents itself as a corrective movement that criticizes what it considers to be a deviation from the founding principles, whether at the level of internal governance or the way of dealing with the path of political settlement. This trend, although its influence remains limited organizationally, nevertheless reflects the existence of an unresolved internal debate between those pushing towards tightening the military option and accelerating the resolution, and those who prefer to continue the diplomatic approach, or at least rebalance it. The danger of these divisions lies not in their immediate size, but in their future implications, as they may affect the cohesion of the front and the image of “unity” that it seeks to market externally. It may also give its opponents additional cards to challenge its representation, especially if these differences develop into clearer alignments within its political and military structures. In the broader international context, the gradual shift in the UN Security Council’s approach to the Sahara file cannot be overlooked, as it moved from a discourse focusing almost exclusively on organizing a self-determination referendum, to adopting a more pragmatic approach based on the search for “a realistic, practical, and lasting political solution based on consensus.” In this context, increasing support has emerged for years for the autonomy initiative presented by Morocco, which the Council described in more than one resolution as “serious and credible.” This shift does not mean an explicit and final adoption of this proposal as much as it reflects a change in the balance of approaches within the international system, as political realism has come to take precedence over classical proposals, in light of the difficulties of implementing the referendum option and the complexities of determining the electoral body. However, this path puts the Front in front of a real strategic challenge, which is how to deal with an international environment that no longer gives the same impetus to proposing self-determination in its traditional form, which forces it to either develop its discourse and tools in line with these transformations, or risk a further decline in the balance of influence within international institutions. It is not possible to read the developments in this file without recalling the remarkable shift in Spain’s position, which moved from a complex historical position that combined legal responsibility and colonial legacy, to adopting a more pragmatic approach that tends to support the autonomy proposal proposed by Morocco as a “serious, realistic and credible” basis for resolving the conflict. This shift, which has clearly emerged in recent years, does not only reflect a Spanish reassessment of the regional balance of power, but is also linked to strategic calculations that include immigration, energy, and bilateral relations with Rabat. However, this new positioning puts Madrid in front of a sensitive equation, as it faces criticism related to its abandonment of its historical responsibility towards the path of decolonization, in exchange for engaging in a realistic approach that seeks regional stability, even at the expense of the traditional proposal of self-determination. This increases the complexity of the scene, and confirms that the conflict is no longer governed only by considerations of history and law, but also by calculations of changing interests and alliances. In parallel with these transformations, the American position emerges as one of the most influential factors in reshaping the balances of the file, as the United States moved from a traditional position calling for a negotiated solution without a clear weight, to adopting a more clear position that tends to support Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara, especially since the American recognition of the Moroccan Sahara in 2020. Although subsequent administrations did not cancel this decision, but rather maintained it implicitly, they tried to reinsert it within a broader international approach based on supporting the political path under the auspices of the United Nations. This position gives Rabat significant diplomatic support, not only for its political symbolism, but also because it affects the positions of a number of countries and international partners, and reinforces the proposal of autonomy as a “realistic” option. On the other hand, this American positioning places the front in front of a more complex equation, as it no longer faces only a regional opponent, but also an international environment that is gradually moving towards establishing an approach that intersects with the Moroccan vision, which forces it to re-evaluate its strategies in dealing with the international balance of power. In light of this complex interplay between the internal transformations of the Front and the changing balance of regional and international power, the outcome of the issue seems likely to be a scenario closer to a “deferred settlement” rather than a final resolution in the foreseeable future. Current data indicate the likelihood of the continuation of the international approach led by the UN Security Council, which is based on managing the conflict more than resolving it, while pushing the parties towards a consensual political solution without imposing a specific formula, in light of increasing support for the autonomy proposal proposed by Morocco from powerful powers such as the United States. On this basis, the realistic time horizon for the solution seems extended, as the issue is likely to move – in the long term, over a horizon that may reach 10-15 years – towards a political settlement in a consensual format that does not represent a complete victory for any party, but rather a complex solution that balances sovereign considerations and the requirements of autonomy, under the pressure of the accumulation of international transformations and the time exhaustion of the parties to the conflict. This move from the logic of the gun to the logic of legal and diplomatic accumulation does not eliminate the military dimension, but it rearranges it within a more comprehensive approach that recognizes that the battles of legitimacy in the present time are being fought to a great extent in international courts and within networks of economic interests, as much as they are being fought in the field. In this sense, the dispute turns from a mere regional dispute into a real test of the credibility of the international legal system, especially in light of the accumulation of previous European rulings touching on the issue of natural resources in the Sahara. It is a shift in political tactics that redistributes pressure cards from the military field to the space of courts and trade agreements, where the political cost to international partners may be higher and more embarrassing. On the other hand, the speech did not ignore the internal dimension, but rather clearly sought to reproduce the legitimacy of the Polisario Front as “the only legitimate representative,” with an explicit call to close ranks and prepare for all eventualities. This duality – between a legal discourse directed externally and a mobilizational discourse directed internally – reflects an awareness of the nature of the stage: there is no comprehensive war on the horizon, but there is no final peace either. Most importantly, Ghali tried to present a semblance of an integrated “state narrative,” by reviewing what he considered to be achievements in the areas of political organization, the judiciary, security, education, and health. Here it is not just a matter of reviewing achievements, but rather an attempt to establish the idea that the Sahrawi entity is no longer just a liberation movement, but rather a ready-made state project, just waiting for the completion of sovereignty. It is a message directed primarily to the international community: recognition is not an adventure, but rather an investment in an entity that has the potential to continue. Regionally, this discourse puts the region before a delicate equation. The legal escalation against the agreements may have an impact on the network of economic interests linked to the Sahara, and raising the level of political discourse remains capable of turning into field tension at any moment. In this context, neighboring countries, led by Mauritania, find themselves required more than ever to manage a delicate balance between positive neutrality and protecting their economic and security interests, especially in light of the link between their stability and the geography of Guerguerat and regional trade paths. However, the deeper question raised by the speech is not only related to the future of the Sahara, but rather to the future of the international system itself: To what extent can international law impose its logic in a conflict in which geopolitical and economic interests are intertwined? Is it enough to bet on legal legitimacy to make a breakthrough in a file that has been hostage to the balance of power for decades? Fifty years after the declaration of the Sahrawi state, it seems that the battle is no longer only over the land, but over the definition of legitimacy itself: is it resolved by force, or is it built through legal and diplomatic accumulation? Between this and that, the conflict remains open to all possibilities, waiting for a new moment of balance that may redraw the rules of the game in one of the region’s most complex issues.
