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Gold Bank or War Bank? A critical reading of the “Sudanese Gold Bank” project and an alternative proposal under legitimate governance Omar Sayed Ahmed | Researcher in Sudanese political economy | Independent banking and financial expert Email:o.sidahmed09@gmail.com July 2026 Introduction Social media platforms and WhatsApp groups recently circulated a proposal entitled “Sudanese Gold Bank SGB,” which was widely welcomed by followers who considered it a “beautiful idea that can be implemented.” This article provides a critical reading of that proposal in particular, as the proposal presents itself as a sovereign tool to save the Sudanese economy from the collapse of the currency and stop the bleeding of gold smuggling. In its developmental essence, the idea is reasonable: floating a currency covered in gold, and involving traditional miners as shareholders instead of leaving them prey to smuggling. But when the proposed organizational structure is examined with a critical eye, serious structural flaws emerge that make the project, as formulated, closer to conferring institutional legitimacy on the already existing war economy than to reforming it. This article provides a detailed critique of the proposal, supported by actual precedents from Sudan’s own experience during the ongoing war, and then proposes an alternative vision for a similar institution built on the foundations of constitutional legitimacy and good governance. First: The structural dangers in the current proposal: Establishment by a sovereign decree, not by a parliamentary law. The proposal explicitly states that the entity “is established by a sovereign decree and registered in accordance with the Companies Law of 2015.” In the absence of an elected parliament, the “sovereign decree” in the current Sudanese context is practically issued by the Sovereignty Council, which is dominated by military commanders. This means that the entity that creates the entity and determines its powers is the same entity that is supposed to monitor the entity later – a fundamental contradiction that empties the idea of “oversight” of its content before it even begins. The law that creates a monetary institution of this size (it issues a parallel currency, manages a sovereign reserve, and owns shares in 18 state companies) must pass through full parliamentary legislation subject to public debate and accountability, and not be imposed by a decree above. The Army as a Direct Capital ContributorThe most dangerous item in the proposal is allocating 10% of the founding capital (a full ton of gold) to the Ministry of Defense “in exchange for securing mines and logistical corridors.” This does not give the military a limited security role, but rather permanent capital ownership in a sovereign monetary institution. This arrangement replicates exactly the pattern that produced Sudan’s gold crisis in the first place. According to the report of the British Chatham House Institute on gold and war in Sudan, the involvement of the security services (the intelligence service, the army, and the Rapid Support Forces) in gold smuggling was not a passing incident that went unpunished due to the absence of evidence, but rather the result of an accumulation that lasted thirty years: a gradual merger between security interests and commercial interests within the state, until what the report describes as “a military-industrial complex that controls most of Sudan’s economy, including the gold sector, and diverts resources away from the public budget and state institutions.” In other words: the problem. It was never the absence of legal frameworks or formal partnerships between the military and the economy—rather, these partnerships were themselves a mechanism for escaping accountability. Granting the Ministry of Defense an official ownership stake (10%) in the New Gold Bank is not a technical detail that can be modified later, but rather a literal repetition of the same pattern described in the report: a military institution gaining a declared capitalist foothold within a sovereign economic sector. The only difference is that the matter will be documented in an official statute instead of happening unannounced as has happened over the past three decades – which will make it more difficult to challenge or dismantle in the future, not easier. The absence of separation between those who own weapons, those who own gold, and those who monitor both. The proposal mentions an “audited quarterly report” without specifying the auditing party. Is it an independent audit office? An international body specialized in tracking metal supply chains? Or an internal audit from the bank’s management itself? In the absence of an explicit definition, the declared “transparency” remains a slogan, not a mechanism. Repeating an already existing failed experience. Sudan already owns a government mining company (Sudamin), yet this official institution did not prevent the collapse of oversight of the sector. With the outbreak of war, the company stopped performing its basic functions, and “the government company Sudamin stopped distributing the chemicals needed for miners, and the resulting vacuum was filled by smuggling from Libya, Egypt, and Chad.” This shows that the existence of an “official” institution in itself guarantees nothing if it is not fortified by truly independent governance. In contrast, the most successful model in Sudan — from the perspective of those who ran it — is a completely informal model: Hemedti’s business network, which covered mining, logistics, ports, import and export, and even private security companies, and formed a structure resembling a “state within a state,” where the Aljunied family company controlled strategic gold mines. This is exactly the scenario that must be avoided in a new “institutional” guise. The numbers reveal the extent of the failure, even in the presence of a declared regulatory structure. Even with the presence of declared government oversight bodies, the numbers reveal the extent of the actual collapse in oversight of the sector:• Of the 74.6 tons produced by Sudan in 2025, only 20 tons were exported through official channels, according to a statement by the Minister of Finance in the government allied with the army itself – meaning that the largest part leaks outside any declared regulatory system.• Estimates indicate that the value of gold smuggled from areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces exceeded $850 million during 2024 and early 2025. Reports indicate that about 90% of smuggled Sudanese gold eventually reaches the Emirates, via direct routes or transit countries such as Chad and Libya. These numbers demonstrate that the problem is not the absence of legal frameworks or supervisory slogans – Sudan has tried these slogans before – but rather the absence of the actual independence of the supervisory authority from the armed parties that benefit from the continued chaos. Second: Why is “good governance” not a luxury in this particular file? Any institution that manages a sovereign gold reserve and issues a parallel currency inherently possesses enormous economic and political power. Attributing this power to an entity that lacks electoral legitimacy or parliamentary oversight practically means replacing an informal “shadow economy” with a formal “shadow economy” — more dangerous because it carries a legal cover that is difficult to challenge later. The first condition for any serious monetary or institutional reform in a sector of this sensitivity is: whoever has the right to establish and control the institution must not be a party to directly benefiting from its resources. Third: The alternative scenario – a sovereign gold institution under legitimate governance. The alternative proposal maintains the core economic idea (mobilizing gold as a monetary stabilization tool and integrating traditional miners) but rebuilds the institutional structure on a radically different basis. Temporal and political precondition: No institution before civil transformation. This entity may not be established except after: • Completion of a real civilian transformation that ends the dominance of any military party over political and economic decisions, and not a formal transformation that leaves the army or any militia as a party to the structure of executive or economic authority. • Election of a legislative parliament with full powers, through an internationally monitored competitive electoral process, not an appointed or formal transitional legislative council. • Adoption of a permanent constitution or a consensual constitutional document that clearly defines the separation of executive and legislative powers. And the judiciary, and explicitly prohibits any direct economic role for the military institution outside the general budget subject to parliamentary oversight. Any attempt to establish a sovereign monetary institution before these conditions are met, even if it bears the name “The People” or “National Partnership,” will remain vulnerable to hijacking by the stronger party on the ground – as Sudan’s own experience repeatedly shows. Legal basis: Act of Parliament, not sovereign decree• The entity is established by a special law passed by the elected parliament after public debate and hearings involving monetary economists, representatives of miners, anti-corruption organizations, and international financial supervisory bodies.• The law includes an amendment and repeal mechanism that also passes through Parliament, not through a unilateral executive decision.• The law is subject to review by the Constitutional Court to ensure its compliance with the principle of separation of powers. Organizational structure: Strict separation between ownership, management, and control. The entity has the role of guarantee. An independent board of directors. Managing daily operations. Appointment by competence through a parliamentary nomination committee, not by direct political appointment. Parliament (a permanent finance committee) Legislative oversight and annual accountability. Public hearings, the right to subpoena management. An independent public audit chamber + a certified international auditor. Financial and technical audits. Unobstructed, legally binding public reports. Mining sector oversight body (independent of the Ministry of Defense and Interior) Tracking supply chains and preventing purchases. From conflict areas Cooperation with approved international mineral traceability mechanisms (similar to OECD mechanisms for responsible supply chains) Representatives of miners and state governments Voting seats in state corporations Real ownership shares that are inheritable and tradable, not symbolic Key point: No military or security institution has a capital stake in the entity or its state companies. Any required security role (securing mining sites) is funded from the general budget subject to parliamentary oversight, through a fixed-term service contract and compensation, not through permanent ownership. Establishing a national commodities exchange linked to the entity to ensure the discovery of a fair and transparent price away from the bank’s monopoly on pricing gold purchased from miners:• A licensed Sudanese commodity exchange shall be established (similar to the regional metal exchanges) in which spot and futures gold contracts will be listed.• The new entity shall be obligated to buy and sell gold through public stock exchange mechanisms, not through unilateral internal pricing as stated in the original proposal (“stock exchange price – 3%” without specifying any existing actual reference stock exchange).• The stock exchange shall be subject to a commission An independent financial market, administratively separate from the Gold Bank itself, to prevent a conflict of interest between those who issue the monetary instrument and those who supervise its market. Tracking mechanisms subject to an external verification body• Blockchain recording of each transaction, as stated in the original proposal, but under joint supervision with an international body specialized in tracking the supply chains of precious metals, and not as an internal system managed by the bank alone.• Publication of gold source data and quantities publicly and subject to scrutiny by journalists and civil society organizations, not just a “quarterly report” issued by the same body subject to oversight. Fourth: Why is this vision more realistic, not less ambitious? It may be said that requiring a complete civil transformation and an elected parliament before establishing this entity means postponing it indefinitely in light of the ongoing war. This objection has merit, but the alternative — the establishment of a massive sovereign monetary institution by decree from above and with the direct capital participation of a military party — is not a “quick fix,” but a documented repetition of the pattern that produced the crisis itself. As the experience of “Al-Junaid” and the existing smuggling networks demonstrates, institutionally legitimizing the dominance of weapons over gold does not end the war economy, but rather legalizes it. The actual priority, then, is: a political path that leads to legitimate governance first, then building major monetary institutions on its basis – not the other way around. Conclusion: The Sudanese Gold Bank project reflects a real and urgent economic need: restoring monetary sovereignty and stopping the bleeding of national gold. But good faith in purpose does not justify an institutional structure that gives the same armed party fueling the smuggling crisis a formal capitalist foothold within the proposed solution. The lesson that Sudan’s clearly documented experience offers is that transparency is not built by slogans or technical tracking systems alone, but by a strict and institutional separation between those who possess military power, those who possess wealth, and those who monitor both – and this separation is only achieved under the umbrella of elected parliamentary governance and legitimate law, not an over-the-top sovereign decree. This article is an independent critical analysis, and does not represent an official position of any party. Sources used include reports by Chatham House, The Soufan Centre, ISPI, Africa Defense Forum, and Sudan Tribune on the Sudanese war gold economy. o.sidahmed09@gmail.com Author
