اخبار السودان – وطن نيوز
اخر اخبار السودان اليوم – اخبار السودان العاجلة
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-06-21 13:33:00
Secrets and mysteries of negotiations and self-determination agreements for South Sudan (22-29): The Regions End Agreement. Salman Muhammad Ahmed Salman1 In the previous article in this series of articles, we discussed the negotiation and signing of: the wealth-sharing agreement on January 7, 2994, and the power-sharing agreement on May 26, 2004. An agreement to resolve the conflict in the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile (or what was known as “the two regions”) was also signed on the same day – May 26, 2004. This is the fifth agreement in a series of comprehensive peace agreements that were signed on January 9, 2005.2 The SPLM has been demanding that these two states be included in the definition of South Sudan, and thus in the self-determination referendum, since the Torit Conference in 1991 due to the ethnic and cultural ties between these two states and South Sudan. Because of these ties, the relationship between the SPLM and the people of the two states was strengthened, and extended under the call and promises of the new Sudan. Thousands of fighters from these two states joined the SPLA, and Messrs. Malik Agar from Blue Nile State, and Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu from South Kordofan State, reached high ranks in the leadership of the SPLM.3 As we mentioned in the previous series of articles, the first Constitution Committee in Sudan was formed under the chairmanship of Judge Stanley Baker in March 1951. The task of the committee was to develop a draft A transitional constitution to govern Sudan during the transitional period ending with self-determination for Sudan – independence or union with Egypt? There was a lengthy discussion within the committee about the definition of the territory of South Sudan. Mr. Ibrahim Badri, a member of the committee (who was a member of the northern delegation to the Juba Conference in 1947), proposed that the definition of South Sudan include the Nuba Mountains region in South Kordofan, the Anqasna region in the Blue Nile District, and the South Darfur region. Mr. Ibrahim Badri reminded the rest of the committee members that the inhabitants of these regions are ethnically closer to the south, that they do not speak the Arabic language, do not practice Islam, and that there are no ties linking them to the north. But this proposal was not accepted by the rest of the members of the committee. 4 The Salvation Government continued to reject the demand for the right to self-determination for these two states, which was raised by the Popular Movement during the negotiations between the two parties, based on the principle of the sanctity of borders and the promise of the permissibility of changing them by force, which was issued by the Organization of African Unity in 1964. It must be recalled that the movement succeeded in including these two states in the right to self-determination in the Washington Declaration in October 1993, as we discussed before. However, she was not so lucky in her subsequent attempts. The Washington Declaration remained the only document that called for the right to self-determination for these two regions. The IGAD Principles of 1994 included a set of foundations for the Sudanese state, including that Sudan is a country of multiple races, peoples, religions, and societal cultures, and these differences must be affirmed and respected. The declaration also committed the parties to establishing a secular, democratic state in Sudan, guaranteeing full freedom of belief, worship and religious practices for all Sudanese citizens, and separating religion from the state. The declaration stressed that in the event of any violation of any of these principles, the peoples concerned will have the choice to determine their future, including independence through referendum. 5 The SPLM also did not succeed in including the right to self-determination for these two states in any of its agreements with the northern opposition parties in the National Democratic Rally. The most that the movement was able to extract from the National Democratic Rally parties was the sixth paragraph of the Asmara Declaration, which states: “With regard to the Nuba Mountains and Anqasna, the transitional government will seek to reach a political solution to correct the injustices suffered by the people of those regions, and will organize a referendum to find out their opinions about their political and administrative future during the transitional period.”6 As for the dissident factions from the mother Popular Movement, these two states were not among its interests. Because its fighters and leaders did not include any of the people of these two states, and because the focus of these factions was on the south around the borders of 1956. Therefore, the government’s agreements with these dissident movements (the Peace Charter of 1996, the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997, and the Fashoda Agreement of 1997) did not include any reference to these two regions.7 The negotiations between the government and the SPLM faltered over these two regions, and all they could manage was The negotiations secretariat extracted from the government the popular advice of the residents of these two states regarding the constitutional conditions included in the protocol. Accordingly, the popular movement was very hesitant to accept this offer. It has become clear to the Popular Movement that the demand to include these two regions in the right to self-determination is strongly rejected by the government, and that the mediators stand with the government in this rejection. It was also made clear to the movement that insisting on it would give the government an opportunity to withdraw from the Machakos Protocol in its entirety – and this is what the Salvation Government had been looking for since it signed the protocol on July 20, 2002. Explicit or implicit mention of the right to self-determination. Instead, the protocol included a lot of loose, bloated, constructive language. This constructive language included the two parties’ agreement to develop and protect the diverse cultural heritage and local languages of the citizens of the two states, and to develop human resources and infrastructure to meet humanitarian needs in accordance with the best known practices for sustainable development within a framework of transparency and accountability! 9 The protocol clarified the structure of the state government, which consists of a governor, a legislative council, and local councils who are directly elected by voters in the state. The governor appoints ministers and governors in the local government. In the period before the elections, the seats in the Legislative and Executive Councils are distributed 55% to the National Congress Party and 45% to the Popular Movement. There will be a rotation system in filling the position of governor in the two states, so that each party fills the position of governor for half of the pre-election period in each of the two states. No party holds the position of governor in both states at the same time. The position of Deputy Governor is allocated to the party that does not simultaneously hold the position of Governor in that state. The annex to the protocol specified the exclusive executive and legislative powers of the two states.10 The two parties also agreed that until the elections, and as part of positive discrimination, the states of South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile would be represented in national institutions in the appropriate manner, so that the percentage of their representation was not less than the percentage of their population size.11 The protocol referred to the formation of the National Fund for Reconstruction and Development, for the purpose of developing the areas affected by the war, and the less developed areas in Sudan, with the aim of raising the level of these areas to Average rate of national development level. The protocol adds that when allocating funds to areas affected by war and the least developed, the effects of war and the level of development are the main criteria applied by the Fund. The two parties agreed to allocate 75% of the total resources of the Fund to areas affected by war, especially to the states of South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, while the rest (25%) is allocated to the least developed areas. 12 The two parties agreed that the Commission for Allocation and Control of Financial Revenues will be allocated, as agreed in the Wealth Sharing Agreement, current transfers to South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and other war-affected areas, and less developed areas according to criteria that include population, minimum expenditure responsibilities, human development index/social indicators (social development factor and geographical area), disability factor cost and fiscal effort (internal revenue effort). In addition to budget allocations and the two states’ share of the National Fund for Reconstruction and Development, the President of the Republic allocates an amount of money to each state from The two states. The two parties agreed to appeal to the donor community to provide technical assistance to the Fiscal Revenue Allocation and Monitoring Commission, to set standards for comprehensive equality and balance.13 Article Three of the Protocol indicated that popular consultation is a democratic right and a mechanism to confirm the point of view of the citizens of the two states regarding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. The comprehensive agreement is subject to the popular will in the two states through their democratically elected representatives in the legislative councils. Each of the two state legislative councils shall establish a parliamentary committee to evaluate and measure the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in each state. The two committees shall submit their reports to the legislative councils of the two states by the fourth year of signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Presidency shall establish an independent committee to evaluate the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in each of the two states, and the committee shall submit its reports to the national government and the two state governments, which will use the reports to correct any action that needs to be corrected to ensure faithful implementation of the agreement. Article Three added that when the people adopt this agreement through the legislative council of either state and see that it achieves their aspirations, The agreement then becomes a final settlement of the political dispute in that state. If, after reviewing the Convention, either of the legislative authorities of the two States decides to correct, within the framework of the Convention, a shortcoming in the constitutional, political and administrative arrangements of the Convention, then the legislative authority will proceed to negotiate with the national government for the purpose of completing the deficiency. Most of them have implications that have practical consequences. Therefore, it was not strange that all parties ignored the provisions of this protocol a few months after the start of the transitional period. The fourth year of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement passed and these parties did not really know what they had to do. The tense situation in the two states became more tense. The situation remained as it was until two weeks before the official date of the secession of South Sudan on July 9, 2011, which meant to many that the problems and issues of the upcoming secession of South Sudan had overshadowed the problem of the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan.16 Ten days before the birth of South Sudan as an independent state, the Salvation Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North signed an agreement in English in Addis Ababa on June 28, 2011. The title was The agreement: “The framework agreement on the political partnership between the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, Northern Sector, and on political and security measures in the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan.” The Salvation Government recognized, in accordance with the texts of the agreement, the right of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, Northern Sector, to continue as a political party in the north. The two parties also agreed to establish a joint political committee between them, with a shared vision of peace, prosperity, democracy, and balanced development in Sudan. The agreement obligates the two parties to begin negotiations for constitutional reform and peace in Sudan, following the guidance of the Machakos Protocol and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, especially the power and wealth sharing agreements, and the Protocol to Resolve the Conflict in the States of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. 17The two parties also agreed to establish a joint security committee in each of the two states for the purpose of addressing the security situation there. The agreement was signed by Mr. Malik Agar on behalf of the SPLM, and Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie on behalf of the Government of Sudan and the National Congress Party, and witnessed by Mr. Thabo Mbeki, on behalf of the African Union Higher Committee in Sudan.18 It is noted that the agreement dealt with the Government of Sudan and the ruling National Congress Party in Khartoum as one body, with no legal, constitutional or political difference between the party and the government under it. We will see this fusion between the ruling party and the government more clearly in the Abyei Agreements, as we will discuss later.19 It seems that recognizing the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, Northern Sector, as a political party in Khartoum, and entering into a partnership with it, and in negotiations that may go the way of Naivasha, did not please many of the leaders of the ruling party in Khartoum. The agreement was signed on Wednesday, June 28, 2011, but the President of the Republic himself announced his categorical rejection of the agreement on Friday, June 30, 2011, less than forty-eight hours after it was signed, and even before the ink dried. This rejection of the agreement increased the war that had broken out in the two states metaphorically. The situation remained as it was for a period of time, and then became much worse at the time of writing these articles in the second quarter of 2026.20 We will move in the next article to presenting and discussing the Abyei Agreement, which was signed on the same day as the signing of the Two-Area Agreement – May 26, 2004. This agreement is the fifth and last of the agreements that were negotiated after the Machakos Protocol. These six agreements were collected and signed on January 9, 2005, under the name of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or the Naivasha Agreement, as we will discuss later. Salmanmasalman@gmail.com Writer
