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Analytical paper – Hadhramaut events reshaped security and political balances in southern Yemen Yafa News – South24 – Zurich. A recent analytical paper issued by the South24 Center for News and Studies said that the events of Hadhramaut 2025-2026 represented a watershed moment in the course of the conflict in southern Yemen, after it exceeded the limits of local military development to turn into a station that reshaped the balance of security and political power, and opened a new phase of regional competition and internal confusion. The analytical paper by researchers Farida Ahmed and Iyad Qasim presents one of the most comprehensive readings of the events that followed the transformations of Hadhramaut at the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026. It distinguishes itself from many previous approaches in that it does not stop at describing the clashes or recounting the facts, but rather poses a deeper question: How did the events of Hadhramaut, in late 2025, reshape the balance of security and political power in southern Yemen? In the background of the crisis, the paper links the escalation of tension in Hadhramaut to the movements of the Hadhramaut tribal alliance led by Amr bin Habrish, supported by Saudi Arabia, and to the attempt to extend control over strategic areas that include oil fields, in light of the presence of the forces of the First Military Region linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in the valley and the desert, and the forces of the Hadhrami elite in the coast. It concludes that disputes over oil, energy and local control were an early indicator of a broader struggle that Saudi Arabia is pushing to reshape the security and political landscape in the governorate. From a local event to a strategic test, the paper dealt with the sequence of events that followed with the southern armed forces, supported by the Southern Transitional Council, taking control of the valley and desert of Hadhramaut, before the operations extended to Al-Mahra Governorate within a military operation known as “The Promising Future.” The paper considered that these developments “were not just a passing field movement,” but rather reflected a shift in the balance of control that had remained for decades in the hands of the forces of the First Military District, linked to the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen. It considered that that moment seemed, to a wide sector of southerners, to be a gradual restoration of the geographic space that formed the borders of the former state of the south before 1990. But the paper explained that this transformation suffered a major setback due to the Saudi military intervention, which was embodied in a series of intense air strikes targeting the positions of the southern forces in Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra, after it rejected Riyadh’s request to withdraw. According to the paper, these strikes led to large human losses, including deaths, injuries, prisoners, and civilian victims, before the southern forces retreated under disproportionate military pressure. According to the paper, the crisis reached its peak with increasing local demands to remove the northern forces from the valley and desert of Hadhramaut, especially during what was known as the “Sayun Million,” which declared its support for the Hadrami elite forces and the southern armed forces, and demanded that the people of the governorate be empowered to manage their affairs and restore the security and military decisions. The paper said that the “Promising Future” operation was launched with the aim of securing cities and urban areas from terrorist organizations, and cutting off arms smuggling routes linked to the Houthi group’s support networks. She added that the southern forces were able, in their first phase, to expand their influence and secure economic facilities, after confrontations with armed formations affiliated with Ben Habrish, and the withdrawal of the forces of the First Military District from areas that had been under their control for more than three decades. The paper focused on the Saudi role in the escalation of the crisis, noting the arrival of a Saudi military and security delegation to Mukalla on December 3, coinciding with the announcement of the southern operation. It pointed out that Riyadh demanded that the Transitional Council withdraw from the sites it had controlled and hand them over to the “Homeland Shield” forces, in parallel with what the paper described as a counter-media policy characterized by offensive rhetoric against the Council and its forces. The paper considered that the first direct Saudi response was the bombing of the port of Mukalla at dawn on December 30, a strike that it said carried “shocking connotations,” not only because of its sudden nature, but because it targeted a vital facility that represents an economic and humanitarian artery for Hadramaut, Al-Mahra, and Shabwa, and it was not subjected to similar targeting even during the battles to liberate it from Al-Qaeda in 2016. Weakening the transitional government does not mean producing stability, and in the security axis, the paper concluded that what followed was The withdrawal of southern forces was not just a redeployment, but rather a “systematic dismantling of the military influence of the Southern Transitional Council,” and a shift from a “coalition of parties” to a “central management” of the security scene in the south under Saudi cover. She said that security in the south was now being managed under a “Saudi contract” without adequate consideration of the concerns of the local residents in Hadramaut, Al-Mahra, and Aden, especially after the introduction of northern Salafist forces into the governorates of Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra, supported by Riyadh. The paper warned that the security vacuum that followed these transformations created opportunities for the return of extremist groups and cross-border cells, pointing to acts of looting and chaos that affected camps and weapons stores in Mukalla and the vicinity of Al-Rayyan Airport, and to recordings attributed to members of Al-Qaeda that incited the targeting of southern forces. Politically, the paper saw that the events in Hadhramaut weakened the position of the Southern Transitional Council within the official equation, and opened the door to restructuring political representation in the south. She said that the announcement of the dissolution of the Council under Saudi pressure in Riyadh was met with widespread rejection from the street and from leaders and members of the Council outside Riyadh, coinciding with the closure of its headquarters in Aden more than once and the outbreak of widespread protests. The paper confirmed that the exclusion of the official southern partner from the existing power structure violated, in practice, the political arrangements approved by the Riyadh Agreement and the outcomes of the Gulf Cooperation Council consultations. It considered that the presence of some southern figures in the government or the Presidential Leadership Council does not express actual political representation, but rather limited individual participation that lacks institutional weight and the ability to influence. Saudi calculations and the soft crack. In its reading of the Saudi role, the paper placed Hadramaut at the heart of Riyadh’s strategic calculations, as a governorate with a maritime location on the Arabian Sea, a geographical extension towards the Saudi border, and economic and oil weight. She believed that the Saudi move to more decisive options can be understood as part of an attempt to reset the balance of influence in eastern south Yemen, and prevent the formation of a political or military reality that is not consistent with Saudi interests in the region. The paper also linked Saudi interest in Hadramaut to the Kingdom’s efforts to obtain an alternative sea outlet to the open oceans, thus reducing dependence on sensitive passages such as the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. She pointed to visions of a strategic maritime project linking the Arabian Gulf to the Arabian Sea through a canal extending about 950 kilometers, including 320 kilometers within the territory of southern Yemen. The paper presents the Saudi role as an attempt to reset the south, not through a balanced political settlement, but rather through the introduction of security arrangements and northern local and military forces more closely aligned with Riyadh’s calculations, even if this comes at the expense of the sensitivity of local communities and their aspirations to manage their affairs independently. Regarding Gulf balances, the paper said that the events in Hadramaut revealed a deeper discrepancy between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen. While Riyadh focused on the Houthis and the security of its southern borders, Abu Dhabi focused on combating Islamic and extremist groups and supporting local southern actors. The paper considered that re-engineering influence in Hadramaut and Al-Mahra practically led to reducing the Emirati role and removing it from the equation of direct influence in the southern scene. Popular rejection and socially expected scenarios. The paper considered that the widespread protests in Aden, Hadramaut, and the rest of the southern governorates reflected the extent of popular rejection of the measures that followed the Hadhramaut events. She pointed out that the demonstrations in Aden, Mukalla, and Sayun, especially the event of June 20, 2026 under the slogan “Rejecting Saudi guardianship and opposing the occupation,” were an indication of a radical shift in the southern popular mood after years of field partnership with Riyadh. The paper concluded with three possible scenarios. The first is to contain the crisis through a conditional southern settlement under Saudi auspices, based on a south-south dialogue that does not re-recognize the Transitional Council as a sole representative, but does not completely exclude it for fear of deepening tension. However, the success of this scenario remains dependent on political and security guarantees, easing the security grip, stopping media campaigns, and addressing service and economic files. As for the second scenario, it is the fragmentation of southern representation and the continuation of fragile stability, as Saudi Arabia does not succeed in producing a convincing settlement, and the Transitional Council is unable to restore its previous position, so the south turns into an arena of influence that is managed security-wise from abroad, but it lacks a clear political center capable of representation, negotiation, and controlling the street. The third scenario is to restore southern cohesion and impose a more balanced settlement, through the success of the southern powers in transforming the state of anger into an organized political path that rebuilds a comprehensive southern bloc, more institutionalized and open to negotiation. The paper considered that this scenario is the most difficult in practice, but it is the most capable of producing sustainable stability if its internal and external conditions are met. The most prominent recommendations: In its recommendations, the paper called on the Southern Transitional Council to strengthen its internal cohesion, restructure its organizational structure, rotate the leadership elites, form a permanent political-strategic room for crisis management, and develop a clear negotiating vision for any southern dialogue or comprehensive Yemeni settlement. It also stressed adherence to the principle of “independent southern decision-making” while adopting a balanced political discourse towards regional and international parties. It also recommended that Saudi Arabia provide clear guarantees for any southern dialogue it sponsors, deal with the Transitional Council as one of the most prominent political and social actors in the south, review the policy of sending northern forces to sensitive governorates such as Hadramaut and Al-Mahra, and open a human rights and humanitarian path to address the issue of victims, wounded, prisoners and detainees. The paper called on the UAE to strengthen coordination with Saudi Arabia in managing the southern file, and to support a more comprehensive approach that is not limited to the Transitional Council alone, but rather is open to the active local forces in Hadhramaut, Al-Mahra, Shabwa, and Aden. It also urged local authorities to improve services and avoid violent security approaches, and called on the international community to recognize the dangers of the emerging vacuum in southern Yemen, especially in the east, and the opportunity it may provide to reposition terrorist groups in a way that threatens waterways and international security. You can download and browse the entire analytical paper below: https://south24.org/news/docs/Hadramout_Events_2025_Ar.pdf
