وطن نيوز
Almost from the first moment, the current conflict has not been a focused campaign between Israel, the United States, and Iran, but rather a regional war involving many countries and threatening to extend beyond the borders of the Middle East. The campaign that has been ongoing for nearly two and a half years, since October 7, also had a regional and global dimension, but the current situation goes beyond that: it is not limited to Israel only, and is characterized by greater military force. The focus over the past week has been on the assassination of Khamenei. This is the most severe shock that the Islamic regime has received in its history, even surpassing Operation “Rising Lion” and the recent wave of protests. The assassination struck a fundamental pillar of the regime, and made it appear helpless before the internal arena – most of which was hostile to it – and before the world, which had always been deterred by this regime, and which now legitimized its attack. All this without his old allies, led by Russia and China, providing him assistance, which traps him in severe isolation internally and externally. Iran’s inability is evident at the military level. After Tehran’s air defense systems were removed in previous conflicts, the damage is compounded: a large-scale assassination campaign is once again being carried out at the highest levels, including the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards, in addition to destroying the fleet and causing severe damage to the internal security system. The Iranian response focuses on launching rockets, missiles and drones, albeit with less effectiveness than before (an 80% decrease in the volume of attacks since Saturday), but it nevertheless shows practical continuity and follows a strategy of attrition against all of Tehran’s enemies. The Israeli-American attack is not limited only to the military, nuclear and leadership systems, but is accompanied by a desire for regime change. It is hoped that these ferocious attacks will create the conditions to undermine the regime through a popular revolution. The idea of overthrowing the regime is heard mainly from Israel, and to a lesser extent from the United States, but it is rarely raised in other Middle Eastern countries. The only historical precedent is the year 1999 in Kosovo, when NATO launched an attack that led to political unrest in the former Yugoslavia. In a related context, there are reports of arming Kurdish militias in an attempt to undermine the regime, which raises many questions. Encouraging minorities (especially Kurds) is met with concern in the Middle East, and raises fears of causing chaos in Iran whose effects could spread to the entire region, amid suspicions of a hidden “conspiracy” to pressure Israel, similar to sponsoring militias in Gaza, which could lead to the disintegration or weakening of Arab states. “It is not clear how recruiting minorities from marginalized areas will contribute,” explains Professor Meir Litvak, head of the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. In overthrowing the government in Tehran, which is far from the Kurdish regions, Persian public opinion may even view this as a threat to the cohesion of the Iranian state.” He adds: “Moreover, the various minorities in Iran (which make up about half of the country’s population) are at odds with each other. For example, the Kurds and the Azerbaijanis. It is not clear whether the Kurds fully trust the Americans, who recently abandoned them when they faced the Shara regime in Syria.” Collectively, there are no mass protests led by an organized opposition with agreed-upon leadership. In an attempt to demonstrate stability and the ability to work despite severe beatings and humiliation, officials were appointed to replace those who were liquidated, led by the successor of the leader Khamenei al-Zahir – his 56-year-old son Mojtaba. Like his father, Mojtaba also adopts an extremist line and has the support of the Revolutionary Guards. As for Trump, he sees the attack as an essential element in his attempt to form a new world order. The undermining of norms demonstrated in the operation in Venezuela deepens the conflict with Iran. Washington supports the assassination of a state leader (an unprecedented move for Israel) and seeks militarily to undermine its regime, labeling it a terrorist organization, and systematically persecuting its leadership and institutions, pushing the leadership in Tehran to act as a secret persecuting force. All this, while Washington enjoys relatively broad international support, especially in light of the regime’s repressive and bloody image at home, and its encouragement of global terrorism. In the midst of this, Trump is settling scores with those who stand in his way: he announced the cessation of trade relations with Spain, which refused to allow American forces to use its territory, while the British Prime Minister, who was reluctant to provide assistance to Washington, was criticized for being “not Churchill.” As expected, Hezbollah could not resist crossing the red line of eliminating Khamenei, He joined the campaign, despite his weakness and the intense internal pressure to which he was exposed, which was evident in Lebanese Prime Minister Salam Nawaf’s announcement this week that the party was no longer able to work on the security front. Hezbollah quickly fell into a long-running, elaborate Israeli ambush intended to target it, particularly in Lebanon’s reconstruction efforts and its presence south of the Litani River. In an attempt to justify once again implicating Lebanon in an adventure destined to cause destruction in the service of Iran, Hezbollah explained that it had exercised restraint for fifteen months despite the continuous Israeli attacks, and that “its activity this time was aimed at defending Lebanon.” Danny Citrinovic, an expert on Iranian affairs and the Axis of Resistance, explains: “Hezbollah faces a difficult dilemma: It was clear that Israel would respond forcefully to any attack on its part, but it believes that inaction poses a greater danger to its image.” And its relations with Tehran. Despite its entry into this campaign, the party is acting with relative caution, and it seems that it hopes that it will not develop into a large-scale campaign, and that the war against Iran will end quickly without the collapse of the regime.” In fact, the organization is a partner in the attrition operation promoted by Iran, and is coordinating with it militarily – as evidenced by the simultaneous bombing carried out this week – and is on alert for the possibility of launching a large-scale Israeli ground operation in southern Lebanon. All this without facing – at least for the time being – any serious attempt to impose the law on the part of the Beirut government. This week, Elissa, the most famous Lebanese star in the Arab world, expressed her frustration in a tweet: “The role of the government is to make the decision to protect the lives of citizens from a party that is no longer a resistance movement, but has become a terrorist organization.” Although the Arab countries made clear before the attack – secretly and publicly – their opposition to action against Tehran, the attack came in an unprecedented manner, under the flimsy pretext of “an attempt to specifically target American targets.” The attacks damaged US property (such as the US Embassy in Saudi Arabia and its bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar), as well as residential buildings, civilian airports, and energy infrastructure, particularly Saudi Aramco facilities and Qatari gas production sites (as a result, gas prices in Europe rose by 90 percent, crude oil prices by 17 percent, and stock prices fell worldwide). The attacks also targeted the Sultanate of Oman, which was an intermediary between Iran and the United States, and Qatar, which had friendly relations with Tehran. The Iranian endeavor appears to stem from the assumption that the Arab countries, if they are subjected to strong blows, will pressure the Americans to end the war quickly. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi explained in an interview this week: “We expect the Arab countries to express their dissatisfaction to the Americans, but we have instructed our forces to be cautious in the context of attacks on their territory.” The response of the Arab countries reflects a state of confusion and conflict of interests: although they condemned Iran, they did not attack it nor assassinate Khamenei. Bahraini researcher Dr. Ahmed Al-Khuzaie explains that the Gulf states face a double challenge: intercepting missile barrages and protecting internal stability in the face of Iranian efforts to mobilize forces loyal to it, indicating that the Iranian threat is not limited to military threats only, but also includes the possibility of it resorting to inciting the large Shiite minorities in the Gulf states (which in the case of Bahrain constitute between 60 and 70 percent of the Kingdom’s population), or to promoting terrorism on its lands, as it did in the past. At this stage, the Gulf states are boasting. With high interception rates for drones and missiles (the UAE has the highest rate), it focuses its efforts on identifying the locations of Iranian spy and terrorism cells, but warns against any announcement of effective participation in the fighting. Even if that happens, it will be only a symbolic step, as these countries cannot significantly influence the campaign led exclusively by the United States and Israel. This week, the Arab world witnessed events that are familiar in Israel, but which worry the people of the region: a state of panic among citizens in entertainment venues in the Gulf that are subject to missile attacks; Cancellation of flights to destinations in the region; Funerals for victims of attacks (such as members of the Kuwaiti army); Daily statements from heads of security services including instructions on protection; Widely publicized tours by leaders to encourage the people, such as an iftar held by senior Emirati officials in one of the country’s shopping malls; And even displays of biting sarcasm, as in Jordan, where they sarcastically praise the creation of markets dedicated to huge quantities of missile and drone fragments. The complex feeling in the Gulf states is evident in my conversation with the Saudi journalist Abdulaziz Khamis: “The people of the Gulf feel great anger towards Tehran, but at the same time they are very cautious. They want deterrence, but they fear the expansion of the war and the resulting massive damage to the national infrastructure. “They are not sure of the possibility of overthrowing the regime in Iran.” Although Israel and the Arab countries find themselves in the same trench facing a common enemy, there is no talk in the Arab world about a unity of destiny that requires cooperation, alliances, or a breakthrough in normalization, as Netanyahu claimed this week regarding Saudi Arabia. Despite this turmoil, many in the Arab world remain skeptical that the attack on Iran is intended to give Israel regional hegemony (with an underlying frustration that Netanyahu’s influence over Trump exceeds that of regional leaders). The cartoons in the Arab press this week reflected the prevailing narrative, which some parties in the Arab world seem to be trying to establish in the West: Netanyahu is controlling Trump and motivating him to ignite wars around the world. The Saudi Condition Last week witnessed a new record in the series of accelerating events that the world has witnessed over the past two and a half years. This is a historic development that indicates an improvement in Israel’s strategic position, but it is still shrouded in heavy fog. Since October 7, Israel has achieved impressive military achievements on the global level, reflecting its technological and intelligence superiority, and the current conflict heralds a reversal in the balance: the war that initially appeared to be the fulfillment of the vision of the axis of resistance aimed at annihilating Israel, is now becoming the beginning of its collapse. However, the need for a systematic strategy and a sober approach is increasing, a requirement that has often been described as “bitter” and “depressing joy,” but which is necessary for everyone who has learned since October 7 to beware of euphoria. And slogans, and what price is paid when relying on these weak foundations. In this context, it is advisable to address three dilemmas: 1) The ultimate goal must be the elimination of missile and nuclear threats, while regime change may be a complex and long-term task in a vast country of 93 million people, with the potential to survive but be weakened, and perhaps later toppled by protests. 2) Neutralization of nuclear weapons – particularly enriched uranium buried in the ground and infrastructure not yet damaged – may require an agreement, even if on improved terms or Under a firm American dictate (a goal alluded to by Trump). 3) The Arab world is committed (at least so far) to the principle that normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia will not be possible without discussing the Palestinian issue, which is what Israel is keen to avoid. Khamis explains in this context: “It is likely that security relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia will be strengthened secretly, but public normalization will remain an unlikely scenario unless the Palestinian issue is discussed.” Added to all of this is a fundamental question related to the concept of Israeli national security after October 7, a question that has not been formulated (like the investigations that have not been conducted): Are absolute decisions and victories, destroying the enemy, and suppressing the consciousness of the peoples of the region achievable goals? Israel’s arch enemies, led by Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, have been dealt severe blows, but they have not disappeared yet. This scenario depends primarily on internal shocks, with some external influences: in Syria, this led to the collapse of the Assad regime, and in Gaza and Lebanon (the devastation), signs of any internal relief are still absent, while hope still exists in Iran. Decision makers, some of whom mock the illusion of the new Middle East promoted by the architects of Oslo, must heed the warning against the dangerous confusion between wishful thinking and an accurate assessment of reality. D. Michael Milstein Yedioth Ahronoth 3/6/2026
