فلسطين المحتلة – How do they rebuild their systems quickly?

اخبار فلسطين6 مارس 2026آخر تحديث :
فلسطين المحتلة – How do they rebuild their systems quickly?

وطن نيوز

As the first week of the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran approaches, its resolution remains elusive. The balance of power between the two parties was clear from the beginning in favor of the attacking party. The damage, losses, and strategic strikes that Iran has suffered this week far exceed what it has been able to inflict on its enemies, but while President Trump and Netanyahu are bombarding their citizens with enthusiastic messages about imminent victory, it is better to describe things as they are, at least at this stage: The opening of the war represented a major operational success. The control of Israeli and American intelligence over what is happening throughout Iran is still clear and is evident in the launching of precision bombs at vital sites. But as of yesterday evening, the regime in Iran showed no signs of surrender. It seems that Iran is determined to continue the war and activate all its agents throughout the Middle East, and expand the scope of its campaign to include the Gulf states and the outskirts of Europe (Azerbaijan and Cyprus). There is no doubt that the Americans are still hiding surprising moves. But over time, if no resolution is reached, Trump must look to an alternative path, which is to reach a compromise on a new nuclear agreement, which will impose more severe restrictions on the Iranian project. But it will not guarantee the collapse of the regime (on the contrary, lifting international sanctions on the regime will pump more money into its treasury and enhance its chances of survival). This is the path that the president abandoned last week when he decided to launch the attack after it became clear that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was not prepared to show any flexibility on Iran’s basic principles related to the nuclear project. Now that Ali Khamenei has passed away and his son Mojtaba has assumed power, the Americans will want to reconsider the possibility of negotiating with any party. Iranians understand that significant US power cannot be deployed forever in the Middle East and will not be easily deployed to redeploy if negotiations fail and, therefore, can only be used for a limited time. The Trump administration is waging wars like no other. The president himself speaks to the media every day. In Israel, by contrast, no one in the government bothers to speak to the civilians under attack except for the spokespersons of the Home Front Command. Trump currently seems to be relishing the spotlight and the opportunity to portray himself, at least in his own eyes, as a great leader. Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense (the Secretary of War, as Trump calls him), is not like the generals with whom Trump surrounded himself in his first term, and with whom he quickly fell out. The current minister, a retired major in the National Guard, impressed Trump when the latter saw him while he was a military commentator on the Fox News network. The Secretary of Defense made it clear in his speech on Tuesday that the United States does not seek a fair competition, but rather achieves an overwhelming victory and inflicts a complete defeat on its opponents. In an interview conducted with him at the beginning of the week, Trump spoke about four-five weeks to achieve the goals of the war. Meanwhile, a senior Israeli security official said in a press conference Tuesday that the IDF will need at least two weeks of fighting. The Israeli official’s statement was not liked by those close to Trump and they blamed him. What is completely ignored are the goals of the war: Do they include overthrowing the regime in Iran? The issue of regime change was not mentioned in the White House statements this week. Danny Stronovitch, a member of the Institute for National Security Studies and one of the most prominent and accurate commentators in analyzing Iran, wrote that winning the war means overthrowing the regime, but there is no guarantee that the White House is willing to invest the required time and resources. Israel is actively seeking to overthrow the regime as a goal, but the political level appears to be more optimistic than the security level about the opportunity to achieve this. Unlike before, there is currently no real tension between the government and the General Staff over how to use force. There are no longer so-called “hawks” and “doves” as there were in the dispute over attacking Iran 15 years ago. Since October 7, the army has supported the widespread use of force at almost any opportunity. Will the Israeli army, based on this new information, reach a stage where it informs the government and the Council of Ministers that the use of force is no longer effective and that another way out must be found? Iran’s recovery efforts also included harnessing Hezbollah, which coordinated with it to launch a simultaneous barrage of fire on Israel in an attempt to “confuse” the interception systems and make its mission difficult. Hezbollah’s entry into the war coincided with early Israeli intelligence assessments. Even Sheikh Naim Qassem, the cautious and accomplished Secretary-General who currently heads Hezbollah, could not pass by the assassination of Khamenei, the world’s supreme Shiite leader. Israel responded to the fire from Lebanon with a series of steps. The Israeli Air Force carried out raids in Beirut, the Bekaa and all parts of Lebanon, and the Israeli army is now deploying more sites in the narrow security zone it imposed on the northern border and threatening to occupy other areas. Yesterday, Israel asked residents of the southern suburbs and residents of southern Lebanon in the south of the Litani to evacuate their homes in preparation for the planned bombing. These will be large-scale attacks. It is clear that Hezbollah is working to activate units and formations that have been in a state of forced stagnation since the ceasefire with the Israeli army in Lebanon in November 2024. The Lebanese government, the army, and prominent politicians are competing in issuing statements condemning Hezbollah. The situation is changing throughout the Middle East. Israel’s dilemma Meanwhile, Shiite militias in Iraq launch marches, and Israel expects a possible response from the Houthis in Yemen, who have not intervened so far. This is a regional war even if not all parties are equally involved. It appears that Iran’s response is a deliberate decision to ignite conflict throughout the region. Thousands of rockets, missiles, and drones were launched at the same time at Israel and some Gulf states that host American bases, and at Cyprus and Azerbaijan as well. The main concern in the Gulf states is that they will run out of interceptor missiles before Iran’s offensive arsenal is exhausted. Perhaps the Iranians, finding themselves in a dilemma, believed that this would create Arab and international pressure on Trump to stop the attack. But at the moment, the opposite seems to be true; The Arab countries are enhancing cooperation with the Americans and hope to obtain new supplies of interceptor missiles due to the extent of the bombing they were subjected to. The bombing in European countries and the impossibility of separating American and Israeli movements this time mitigate the West’s criticism directed at the attack against Khamenei’s regime. Iran’s reaction this week was not the only one that revealed the determination. Rather, Iran appears to surprise Israeli intelligence time after time with the speed with which it rebuilds the damaged regimes and renews the military struggle against them. This also appears in the speed of restarting production lines, launch pads and missile depots, since the end of the previous war last June, and also in the preparation to launch a counterattack in coordination with Hezbollah, with their advance knowledge of the high cost. But here lies Israel’s dilemma; Because it is no longer possible to deny the regime’s desire to destroy Israel and its tendency to consider this as a practical goal. If the partial restoration is so rapid, eight months after the end of the previous war, can the policy of periodic rounds continue or is it better to try to persuade Trump to seek a real solution? Over time, Israel’s economy will find it difficult to withstand a long-term military campaign, at the rate of one or two rounds per year. Polls conducted in Israel and America indicate significant support for the war in Israel, and significant reservations in the United States (although there are early signs of a positive shift among Republicans due to Trump’s success in marketing his initial steps as an achievement). However, the limited range of missile launches associated with Iran’s efforts to plan the scope of use of its remaining weapon currently reduces the harsh impact of the war on public opinion in Israel. Despite the thunderous opening blow, this war seems a bit strange, lacking in momentum and less of a threat to the home front than we feared. The extent of the damage to the Iranians is still unknown. However, most Israelis accept the war and all its consequences as a fait accompli: another complete paralysis of the economy after eight months, the repeated threat to civilian lives, uncertainty about how it will all end, opening a reckoning with the Iranians, and indeed with all Shiites, in light of the extraordinary decision to assassinate the Supreme Leader. Yesterday, when concern increased about the escalation of shootings from Lebanon, the Finance Ministry announced the easing of restrictions on the economy, giving parents the freedom to go to work, while the children remain at home due to the closure of schools and kindergartens. All of this does not seem to bother Netanyahu. The prime minister has appeared arrogant this week, demanding that his supporters (rightly) take credit for the decision to go to war against Iran, but who are determined to hold him accountable for every ounce of responsibility for the failures that allowed October 7 to happen. His arrogance was evident in the middle of the week when his office was keen to spread the news that Netanyahu himself had launched remote bombs from a drone flying in the skies of Iran. The pilots and those operating the drones are nothing but numbers to him. At the present time, Netanyahu has many reasons to feel satisfied; His criminal trial has been halted, the government’s legal advisor is under new attack, the page has been turned on the debate over the draft exemption from conscription law, and he alone will decide the election date that suits him. Advance Planning Talks between Israel and the United States about a retaliatory strike against Iran began immediately after the end of the previous war at the end of June 2025. While Trump bragged about destroying the Iranian nuclear project, and Netanyahu declared victory, the generals in the two countries were more serious. At the end of last year, information began to accumulate about the resumption of the work of ballistic missile production lines, along with fears about the resumption of work on the nuclear project (although the stock of uranium enriched to the level of 60 percent, weighing 400 kg, is likely still present). Admiral Brad Cooper’s assumption of command of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) contributed to accelerating joint preparedness. Israel prepared to attack missile sites in the middle of this year, without knowing whether the United States would support this decision or join it. The demonstrators in Iran are the ones who decided the matter; The wave of protests in January and the regime’s brutal repression, which led to massacres of thousands of civilians, distracted Trump and encouraged him to pledge assistance to the demonstrators. Netanyahu’s visit to Washington at the beginning of February contributed to convincing Trump of the inevitability of war, and that Iran would launch attacks against Israeli targets in all cases. A number of American media outlets reported this week that the date of the attack, Saturday morning, February 28, was set in the middle of the previous week. It was Netanyahu who encouraged Trump to act when he presented him with information obtained by intelligence about Khamenei’s intention to remain exposed in his residence above ground at that time. The operational opportunity afforded to Trump accelerated the dropping of bombs. In addition, the president’s anger toward the Iranian negotiators stopped, as he got the impression that they were deliberately wasting his time. The last session of the talks was held in Geneva last Thursday in light of secret preparations that Israel and America were making to assassinate Khamenei and other prominent figures. Trump preferred that Israel carry out the assassination of Khamenei itself due to legal restrictions, but in light of the success of the operation, he was quick to take the credit for himself. He told reporters that he was the one who forced Netanyahu to implement this step. Given the repeated allegations of exaggeration, deception and lying by both parties, it is difficult to determine who is lying. But what is indisputable is the unprecedented operational and intelligence coordination between the two armies in the joint campaign against Iran. A high-ranking Israeli official told me this week that the attack goes hand in hand, and is discussed every day in dozens of meetings and talks between leaders of both sides. Here is what two veterans of the Pentagon and State Department, who held senior positions in them in previous administrations, said. Professor Elliot Cohen wrote in the Atlantic magazine that the attack this time included strikes identical in size and number by the two air forces. He added that this time Israel is a major partner, not a secondary partner. According to him, no European army could handle such complex missions. As for Dana Stroul, a researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies, she wrote: “It is difficult to exaggerate how pioneering this partnership is. The US army usually works within broad coalitions and undertakes most of the fighting. But in this war, the United States and Israel are equal partners, and cooperation is now more comprehensive than it was last June.” Amos Harel Haaretz 3/6/2026