اخبار لبنان – وطن نيوز
اخبار لبنان 24 – اخبار لبنان مباشر
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-07-26 22:00:00
At a time when Lebanon is still facing one of its most complex economic, financial, and political crises, the book by former Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Saada Al-Shami, “Bound by Design: Public Service in a Broken System,” was an occasion to reopen the debate about reform, the reasons for its faltering, and the role of public institutions in crisis management. From the National Library, Minister of Culture Ghassan Salama opened a symposium to discuss the book, in the presence of political, economic, diplomatic and media figures, in a meeting that brought together a number of officials and experts who experienced various stages of managing public affairs and public money in Lebanon. The discussion turned into a space to approach the Lebanese crisis from its economic, political and institutional aspects, and to ask basic questions about the obstacles to reform, and the role of the political system and centers of influence in protecting the status quo. As for Al-Shami, he presented his book as an attempt to document an experience in public work, not as a biography, but rather as an examination of how institutions work or fail, and the reasons why reform succeeds sometimes and fails at other times. Between the ongoing financial crisis since 2019, the complexities of the political system, and the decline in confidence in the state, a call emerged during the symposium to restore the role of competent people in public life, and to adhere to integrity and transparency as a necessary input to any viable reform path. What does Al-Shami tell Lebanon 24 about his new book and his experience in President Najib Mikati’s government? Al-Shami confirmed to Lebanon 24 that the aim of his book “Bound by Design: Public Service in a Broken System” was not to present a technical economic study as much as it was to document a personal experience in public work, hoping that it would constitute material for discussion and benefit among current and future officials. He said that the idea of the book originally came to him, and he was encouraged by some friends who saw that the experience he lived during the management of the financial crisis deserved to be documented, because it might help whoever assumes responsibility in the future. He added that he completed the book within five or six months, but war conditions continued and delayed the book’s publication. After he felt that the time had come to record this experience and not wait for circumstances to change, he decided to release it on the 10th of July, amid remarkable attendance and interest. Al-Shami explained that the basic message of the book is to open a serious discussion about the causes of the Lebanese crisis, the obstacles facing reform, and possible ways out of it, stressing that experience in public work does not belong to the official, but rather to society. He pointed out that the book reflects a personal experience during which he often experienced a feeling of isolation, as he found himself leading reform battles without sufficient political support, while, on many occasions, he was held personally responsible for the reform program, even though it was a program approved by the entire government, and not a project of his own, or as some went on to call it, “Saada Al-Shami’s project.” He stressed that reform in Lebanon is not a technical crisis, but rather, above all, a decision and political will, stressing that the best economic plans cannot succeed if the political will to make and implement decisions is absent. He said: You may have the best solutions and expertise, but without a political decision, the reform process will fail. Therefore, the problem in Lebanon is a system problem, while the solution does not seem available yet, because real reform collides with a political structure that hinders any fundamental change. Regarding negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, Al-Shami explained that the previous government succeeded in reaching an agreement at the staff level, and also obtained for the first time written letters confirming the commitment of the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Prime Minister to the reform plan, which was necessary to restore the confidence of international institutions. Although the support of the government as a whole was not sufficient, he believed that the main obstacle was in the House of Representatives, where the draft laws collided with populist discussions and denial, in addition to the influence of the various pressure groups affected by the reform process, which have a clear influence on the influential political forces. He pointed out that the negotiating team tried, as much as possible, to reconcile the requirements of the IMF with the Lebanese reality, and succeeded in mitigating some conditions, including, but not limited to, reducing the level of debt in relation to the gross domestic product, which was low compared to what we thought, and increasing the state’s contribution to addressing the crisis, while maintaining social spending in the health, education and social protection sectors, stressing that the Fund was not imposing measures aimed at impoverishing the Lebanese as was rumored. Al-Shami added that the negotiating team was aware from the beginning of the necessity of taking into account political and social conditions, and therefore it engaged in long discussions with the IMF to reach workable solutions, considering that the agreement reached was the best that could be achieved at that stage. Regarding the current government, he said that a large number of the draft laws presented today were prepared during the era of the previous government, but introducing amendments to them led to the IMF recording new observations, which brought part of the negotiations back to the point of discussion again. Regarding the deposits file, Al-Shami stressed that the first goal of the discussion about the government’s economic recovery program was to protect depositors to the maximum extent, and that he always called for moving forward with reform, because time was not in the interest of depositors and the Lebanese in general. However, he chose to tell the truth and be frank with the Lebanese, stressing that he was one of the few who clearly said that recovering deposits would take many years, and that the actual value of the money was declining over time. He considered that officials are required to have courage in telling the truth to people, even if it is painful, because clarity is better than making unimplementable promises. He stressed that depositors, for six years, have been bearing losses and gradually withdrawing their money at its declining value, meaning that they are losing a large portion of the value of their actual deposits. What is happening today practically means a continuous deduction from their money. He added: Therefore, what is required is clarity, courage and boldness in decision-making. The sooner we adopt solutions, the better, because postponing decisions will make them more difficult and costly. Today we are talking about huge losses, and if the delay continues, the losses may become greater, and every day of delay increases their size and makes their treatment more complex and costly for everyone. Regarding the international position, Al-Shami said that during the negotiation period with the IMF, there was an unprecedented international consensus to support reforms in Lebanon, from the United States, France, Germany, Britain, the European Union, and other international institutions. Everyone supported the reform program, and was not satisfied with statements, but rather made actual efforts to help Lebanon. Al-Shami recalls that the European Union ambassador at the time prepared a detailed memorandum on the required reforms, and then toured various Lebanese officials, from the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance to the Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives, and the political leaders, carrying the same message: the necessity of implementing reforms. But, unfortunately, no one was listening. This scene is being repeated now, and I hope it will be heard. He adds that external pressure was present, but the problem is that some political forces believe that the cost of reform to them is greater than the benefits they can reap from it, so they obstruct any change that affects their interests. In his opinion, external pressure will not be effective unless these forces feel that their interests are truly threatened. Al-Shami touched on the draft banking sector restructuring law that is currently being discussed in the Finance Committee, saying that there are some disagreements between the government and the Bank of Lebanon regarding details related to some of the provisions contained in the draft banking restructuring law, and related to the powers of the body that will supervise restructuring and the powers of the Central Bank, but I see that they are not fundamental differences, and I hope that they will not be an excuse to delay or disrupt the law or eliminate any hope of reaching an agreement soon with the International Monetary Fund. Al-Shami always repeats that the IMF does not impose itself on anyone, but rather sets conditions that the state can accept, discuss, or reject. But the real question is: Does Lebanon want to implement reforms or not? If we decide not to cooperate with the Fund, this is a possible option, but we must bear its consequences, because reforms will then be more difficult and costly. However, if we implement an integrated reform program in cooperation with the Fund, Lebanon will be able to attract additional financing and aid that may amount to about ten billion dollars, in addition to the Fund’s program, which provides at least three billion dollars. In the end, it is Lebanon that needs the IMF, not the other way around. More important than the funding itself is restoring confidence in Lebanon and its economy, and the reforms requested by the Fund are reforms that Lebanon already needs, and we must carry them out with or without the Fund, but, as I mentioned, the reform process will be easier with the Fund. The real question is: Is it better to implement reforms with financial support estimated at about 10 to 13 billion dollars, or to do them without any support? For me, the answer is clear. Al-Shami continues: It is not enough to reach an agreement with the IMF, the most important thing is implementation. The fund conducts periodic reviews every three or six months, and if the country does not commit to implementing reforms, the program stops and payments stop. Therefore, the point is not in signing the agreement, but in implementing the required reforms, and hence the necessity of being convinced of the program and owning it in order for the reform process to succeed. Al-Shami believes that the current conditions are better than before. There is clear Arab and international support for the government, something that was not available to the previous government. The government also includes competent ministers, but competence alone is not enough. Rather, bold and difficult decisions must be taken. Reform is not limited to approving projects in the Council of Ministers, but rather these projects must reach the House of Representatives and receive approval. It is not permissible for a minister affiliated with a specific party within the government to approve, and then representatives of the same party reject the project in Parliament. If this continues, the composition of the government must be reconsidered, because any reformist government needs real political cover that allows it to implement its program. He adds: Until now, Lebanon has not regained international confidence. Trust is not given with words, but with actions. When the international community sees that the government is taking serious and courageous reform decisions to address the economic crisis, then confidence returns and support increases. As for now, Lebanon is still at the beginning of the road. Trust returns only when Lebanon proves that it is on a real reform path. Also, it is important that Lebanon does not remain at risk of being listed on negative international regulations, because this will have serious repercussions on the economy and the financial sector. In the face of all this, Al-Shami says: I personally do not regret going through the ministerial experience, as it was rich on a personal level, because I saw how institutions work from within, or rather, do not work. But it was also often frustrating. However, I still encourage qualified people to enter public affairs, because reform requires people who believe in it, and we cannot leave the field empty because there is a system that obstructs change. We have to keep trying until results are achieved. In his book, Al-Shami also touched on the media, saying: “I am one of the people who strongly believes in the role of the media, especially in crises. The media must explain to people the nature of the crisis, what options are available, why some difficult decisions are being taken, and help build understanding about reforms, not incite people toward them without explanation. I have great respect for the message of the media when it fulfills its professional role. But what happened during the economic and financial crisis is that the fragility of the media situation made some media outlets more vulnerable to being influenced by those with influence and interests, so they began promoting agendas that had nothing to do with the public interest or economic reform. I was exposed to campaigns that targeted me personally, but I did not pay any attention to them and did not change my positions because of them. On the contrary, I became more convinced that what I was doing was right, because it began to threaten centers of influence and pressure groups and their special interests, and hence the personal attack on me in defense of these interests came. I believe that part of the media in Lebanon began to lose its credibility when clowning and outbidding became more important than serious debate. Of course, any person is affected when he is exposed to personal abuse or insult, but that did not prompt me to back down from my convictions. If there are objective criticisms, I welcome them. The book deals with Al-Shami’s relationship with President Najib Mikati, saying: The relationship was good and professional. I appreciate President Mikati’s political experience, calmness, and ability to deal with the most difficult circumstances, and I also appreciate his keenness to spare the country from further harm. Here Al-Shami points out that we may sometimes have different approaches to some topics. I tended toward clarity and frankness, while President Mikati took into account political balances and tried to reach workable solutions. But it is important to say that he never asked me to change my position or modify my convictions, while stressing that the main problem was that the government as a whole was not pursuing a single reform project, as a number of ministers did not actually believe in the reform path. Therefore, the book is not an attempt to absolve Al-Shami himself of mistakes, and he may have made a mistake, because there is no human being who works and does not make mistakes, as he says. Perhaps if time had gone back, he would have used different expressions in some situations, or chosen more precise words in the Arabic language in some texts, especially since some texts were translated from English to Arabic. But, in essence, Al-Shami does not regret telling the truth, because his conscience forced him to say it, and because he had no personal interest, and was not committed to the position. The book narrates Al-Shami’s experience within the government, and presents the conflict between principles and reform on the one hand, and political reality and compromises on the other, with the hope that it will open a serious discussion about how to achieve reforms in current and future governments. It also includes a personal aspect that deals with the stages that shaped his personality, including his upbringing in a non-sectarian environment, and his belief that diversity in Lebanon is a source of wealth if managed well, and that a person should be judged by his morals and principles, not by his sect or religion. He also talks about his experience traveling and working at an early age and self-reliance, an experience that strengthened his independence and his rejection of any dependency or compromise on his convictions. As for his experience at the International Monetary Fund, he considers it an essential milestone because it taught him the value of working within a team that includes people of different nationalities and cultures, and that diversity of opinions leads to better decisions when managed correctly. All of these experiences were reflected in his positions within the government, whether on economic files or on national issues, as he rejected bargains that he saw as harming Lebanon’s interests or the principle of statehood.
