اخبار السودان – وطن نيوز
اخر اخبار السودان اليوم – اخبار السودان العاجلة
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-05-10 08:22:00
Agencies: Bag News Every flood season, the Blue Nile rushes to pour its waters into the body of the Great Nile, carrying silt and life to its extended valley. However, throughout Sudan’s modern history, this land has also been a frequent source of conflicts. From its border borders came marginal questions, on its mountains maps of politics and weapons overlapped, and in its villages the story of tension between the capital and the peripheries was repeated. Blue Nile State is located in southeastern Sudan, and has transformed from a marginal conflict into a strategic front in the ongoing war. During his visit to Uganda and his meeting with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni last February, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, noted that “the brothers in the Blue Nile are doing well.” The phrase was not just a passing compliment to his fighters in the field who have been facing the Sudanese army since April 2023; Rather, it is an affirmation of the importance of this pivotal front in the Sudanese scene today, and even the entire regional scene. The name Blue Nile was never far from Sudan’s conflicts, including the civil war that ended with the 2005 agreement that paved the way for South Sudan’s independence. In recent months, he has returned to the forefront of the scene with the expansion of the raging war in Sudan, and the diversity of the spaces through which Hemedti moves, from the deserts of the West to the borders of Ethiopia in the south. However, the return of the Blue Nile Front here cannot be read as an internal event, but rather as part of broader regional and geopolitical intersections that enabled the Rapid Support to open a new window, after the pressures on it increased on other war fronts. From this angle, Blue Nile State today appears to be more than just a battlefield; It is a mirror that reflects the transformation in the course of the Sudanese war, from a battle over the capital to a conflict that revolves primarily around the distant geographical peripheries. The Blue Nile War in the Eye of the Storm When the Sudanese war broke out in April 2023, it seemed clear that the RSF’s first goal was to control the center of power in Khartoum. The decision there was not just a field victory, but it meant practically redefining who has the legitimacy of governance. The rush towards the heart of the state reflected a strategic vision based on paralyzing the army’s central command and stripping it of the ability to take initiative. At its beginning, the idea was closer to the model of a quick decision: a focused strike in the capital that would confuse the opponent and impose a new political reality. The Rapid Support Forces actually succeeded in establishing a large presence in parts of Khartoum for an extended period, before the army was able to gradually regain the initiative and regain control of the Sudanese capital. The faltering of rapid support in Khartoum revealed the limits of betting on the capital alone, and opened the door to redefining the tools of control and redistributing legitimacy. Instead of one decisive battle, the war began to tend toward a pattern closer to what military literature describes as the “encirclement strategy,” but in a modern, multi-pronged format. Here the goal is not traditional central control, but rather opening simultaneous fronts that force the opponent to distribute his strength, secure his parties, and fight in more than one direction at the same time. In this sense, multiple fronts become a tool to reshape the balance of power. The party that imposes the pace of proliferation does not necessarily seek a quick victory, but rather to prolong the conflict in a way that allows it to rearrange its political and military cards. The more the axes multiply, the more distracted the opponent becomes; As dispersion increases, the ability to decide decreases. At the same time, this type of deployment provides an opportunity to establish a de facto authority in the areas under its control, and to build networks of management and influence that may, over time, turn into a parallel political center, even if this is not officially announced. This is the model that the Rapid Support implemented after its failure in Khartoum. War However, a geographical arc of this size cannot be stabilized or continued with purely local capabilities. Opening simultaneous fronts along the sides requires logistical and political depth that goes beyond the boundaries of the direct battlefields. From here, a regional network of relations began to take shape, which played a role in supporting rapid support centers in those parties. Addis Ababa.. The geopolitical depth of the neighborhood Ethiopia constitutes the direct geographical extension of the Blue Nile, not only as a neighboring country, but as the source that gives the region its name and strategic location. It is a border neighbor that intersects with Sudan on sensitive issues, which places it at the heart of a complex regional balance network. The common border, extending through areas such as Al-Fashaga, has for decades been the scene of intermittent tensions between Khartoum and Addis Ababa, whether due to agricultural disputes or in the context of broader tensions related to the Renaissance Dam. This overlap between geographical proximity and regional alliances has made the south-east of Sudan a highly sensitive area that is quickly struck by conflicts. With the outbreak of the Sudanese war, Ethiopia adopted an official speech calling for calm and maintaining the stability of the state. However, the course of political movements reflected a more complex approach. In July 2023, during the IGAD summit, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed called for the imposition of a no-fly zone and the removal of heavy artillery from Sudan, a call that implied neutrality between the army and the Rapid Support, and was thus officially rejected by Khartoum. Later, Abiy Ahmed sought to restore his country’s position as a mediator by visiting Port Sudan in July 2024, where he met with Army Commander Al-Burhan there in an attempt to restore some balance in the position on the Sudanese file, even though his country remained an effective backer of the Rapid Support movements in the Blue Nile. On the other hand, the Sudanese army was keen to keep the channels of communication open, as Al-Burhan visited Addis Ababa in November 2023, with multiple visits by Malik Aqar, Vice President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, in an attempt to neutralize the Ethiopian role and reduce logistical facilities for rapid cross-border support. However, Addis Ababa received Hemedti in December 2023 with an official ceremony, in a move that was interpreted within Khartoum as implicit political recognition of the commander of the Rapid Support Forces. At the same time, the Ethiopian capital turned into a platform for anti-military political movements. In October 2023, it hosted the first meeting of the Taqaddam Coordination, a Sudanese political alliance established after the outbreak of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces on April 15, 2023, against which accusations of collusion against the state and collusion with the Rapid Support Forces were raised. Addis Ababa also hosted a meeting with Hamdok (the former Prime Minister of Sudan and the most prominent figure of progress) and Hemedti in early 2024, which some saw as an attempt to give political legitimacy to the Rapid Support. War In light of this fragile balance, investigation platforms monitored several remarkable developments at the Ethiopian Assa airport near the Sudanese border, which is believed to have turned into a launching station for marches against Sudan. This was followed by an extensive investigation published by Reuters, which indicated the existence of a secret training camp near the Sudanese-Ethiopian border in the Al-Fashqa area. Reuters quoted eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian official, that the camp is being used to train fighters from the Rapid Support Forces and factions allied with them. Thus, within the logic of multi-pronged encirclement, the regional environment surrounding the Blue Nile Front gained a direct role in drawing the map of the Sudanese conflict, whether through the logistical support it guaranteed to Hemedti, the geographical depth it provided to his forces, or the diplomatic maneuvering space it gave him through his good relations with Addis Ababa and Kampala (Uganda). Sand crossings… Chad, Libya and Darfur. The borders in western Sudan with Chad do not know the consistency of the lines drawn on the maps. It is a border extending across open desert spaces, intertwined with tribal extensions, and through which trade, weapons, and men have been moving for decades. In the context of the Sudanese war, this geographical fluidity turned into an essential element in the ongoing conflict. Chad was not just a neighboring country to Sudan, but rather a strategic depth in which mutual alliances and rebellions were formed since the 1980s. The two sides exchanged support for the other’s armed opposition, and tension reached its peak in 2008, before they turned to an unannounced security settlement that reset the relationship between the two countries. Since 2010, N’Djamena has tended to reduce its support for the armed movements in Darfur in exchange for understandings with Khartoum. With the outbreak of war in April 2023, N’Djamena maintained neutrality during a sensitive political transition during which Mohamed Kaka (Mohamed Idriss Déby) assumed power to succeed his father. However, the extension of the fighting to Darfur, the involvement of Chadian Arab fighters in the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces, the open nature of the borders, and the presence of airports close to the theater of operations made Chad the focus of attention of regional powers that wanted to strengthen their position in the ongoing conflict. International reports have already monitored war-related air and logistical routes passing through Chad, centered around supporting the Rapid Support Forces. Reports of the United Nations Committee of Experts indicated intense activity at the Am Jars and Abéché airports in eastern Chad since mid-2023, with reports of the unloading of shipments transported overland towards Darfur. In the same context, platforms monitored frequent cargo flights to eastern Chad between June and October 2023, likely carrying supplies for Hemedti and his forces. The New York Times also revealed in an investigation published in September 2023 that there was a field hospital in Am Jars operating under the guise of helping refugees, and that it was used as a point for logistical support for the Rapid Support Forces, including treating its wounded fighters. The war in Sudan reached its peak in February 2025, when Chad bought a Chinese air defense system, in a deal that appeared to be a military modernization. However, the system was not used inside the country, but rather disappeared from army warehouses to appear in Sudan, in what was considered a direct violation of the international arms embargo. These developments highlight the role that N’Djamena plays as part of a broader network of balances in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, where it is believed to enjoy support from regional powers with vested interests in the Sudanese conflict, in exchange for investments, financial aid, and political support for the Chadian government. The Libyan axis forms the northern ring in a geographical arc that encircles Sudan from its various sides, giving the Rapid Support areas through which it can breathe and dispersing the efforts of the Sudanese army. The Sudanese-Libyan border, which extends for more than 350 kilometers, meets the border triangle with Egypt, in a fiery desert area where regional security calculations intersect. This geography that links Darfur to southern Libya was never just a spatial extension, but rather a corridor for the movement of militias, smuggling routes, and the transit of refugees, within an environment that is difficult to subject to complete control. The current war has re-emphasized this region as a background depth in which the desert is transformed from a geographical vacuum into a geopolitical theater that affects the balance of power. Relations between Sudan and Libya over the decades of Muammar Gaddafi’s rule were characterized by sharp fluctuations between alliance and hostility. Gaddafi supported the regime of Jaafar Numeiri in the early 1970s, then turned against him, supported his opponents and supported the rebellions in the south and Darfur. In 2011, Khartoum sided with the Libyan revolution and contributed to the overthrow of Gaddafi by providing support to the revolutionaries, with the admission of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir himself, in a move that ended decades of a turbulent relationship but opened the door to a more complex regional phase. Since the fall of Gaddafi’s regime, Libya has entered into a deep division between two competing authorities (the National Unity Government in Tripoli and Haftar’s forces in Benghazi), which has opened wide scope for regional interventions. In this context, the presence of Rapid Support emerged within the scene of the Libyan conflict, as reports of the United Nations Committee of Experts documented the participation of Sudanese fighters, including elements of Rapid Support, in providing military support to Haftar’s forces. By late 2023, international suspicions had mounted about Haftar’s role in the Sudanese war, after frequent cargo flights to eastern Libya were seen as a logistical bridge for rapid support. UN and intelligence reports revealed the storage of weapons at the Al-Khadim base, in addition to the use of the Al-Khadim and Benina airstrips to pass weapons, fuel, and equipment indirectly. Investigations also indicated the involvement of networks affiliated with the Libyan National Army (affiliated with Haftar) in smuggling Libyan fuel to support rapid support operations in Darfur. This coordination reached its peak when the Rapid Support Forces launched an attack last year (2025) in the border triangle between Egypt, Libya and Sudan, taking advantage of the supply lines coming from Kufra (south-eastern Libya), and with the support of the “Paths of Peace” brigades loyal to Haftar. The Africa Intelligence website revealed that the regions of southern Libya have turned into a logistical artery feeding the conflict in Sudan, in light of diplomatic and military activity from the Rapid Support allies. This was confirmed by United Nations reports that indicated the existence of an air bridge to transport military equipment from Benina Airport in Benghazi to Kufra Airport, and then to the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur region across the common border. Hemedti breathes from the east and the south. The outbreak of Blue Nile State and the Rapid Support movements therein cannot be understood in isolation from what we can call a multi-pronged “encirclement strategy,” extending from the southeastern borders across the Ethiopian neighbourhood, to Darfur across the Chadian and Libyan borders to the west, within a geographical pressure network surrounding the center of the state, which Hemedti bet on at the beginning of the war, then lost it and withdrew from it towards the peripheries as an alternative fait accompli, which made it easier for him to form regional alliances. Multiple. The Blue Nile militia is not just a passing front, but rather a pivotal link in an arc that encircles Khartoum from afar, so that the military and political weight is redistributed away from the capital, and a step towards a new reality that claims to represent Sudan with a parallel authority and an alternative geography. If this pattern of expansion continues, the scenario will not be limited to a long exhaustion of the army, but rather a political restructuring of Sudan away from the center, through the imposition of de facto authority on the peripheries. This path intersects with an accelerating regional repositioning around the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. The developments on the Sudanese front prompted regional parties, including Cairo, to move from a cautious approach to a more engaged one, given that the eastern and western borders of Sudan represent a direct extension of Egypt’s national security in the Nile Valley and the Red Sea. With the escalation of tension, undeclared lines of alignment began to crystallize around Sudan between two axes: the first sees its interest in supporting the Rapid Support Forces and enabling them to control the parties, led by Addis Ababa with the support of regional powers, and the second sees the stability of the Sudanese central state as a strategic priority, and thus directs its efforts towards supporting the army, led by Egypt. Within this moving geometry of geopolitical axes, the Blue Nile Front and the Western Desert Front have become more than just two battlefields; They are a meeting point where geopolitics intersects with military calculations and regional stakes. Hemedti stands out as a major beneficiary of this competition, which gives him lungs to breathe in his frantic struggle to control Sudan. Source: Al Jazeera
