وطن نيوز
Ronen Bergman The use of force in Lebanon does not occur in a vacuum; It is happening at a time when Israel is frustrated with the US-Iranian agreement, at a time when prominent speakers on Al-Hakim’s channel are calling for its disruption, and at a time when Netanyahu is trying to broadcast attacks on Al-Qaeda, which rejects the idea that Washington is concluding an agreement with Tehran over Israel’s head. Here lies a serious danger: military action that is unrelated to events on the ground will turn into a tool for venting political frustration. When a Hezbollah drone launches a violent attack in the yellow zone, an attack on the suburb or northern Lebanon does not necessarily solve the operational problem. But it may express opposition to the agreement, anger Washington, and provide Iran with ammunition to claim that Israel is violating the new regional order. The price of this dynamic could be very high, greater than the price of another day of fighting in Lebanon. If Trump is convinced that Israel is endangering the agreement, which he considers a personal achievement, he may offer Iran additional concessions to save it, and then Israel will pay the price twice: losses and erosion in Lebanon, and a worse agreement with Iran. If Israel causes Trump to publicly fail in the negotiations, it could end up paying a heavy price in Jerusalem’s coffers: Gaza, the West Bank, arms supplies, freedom of action in Lebanon, and perhaps even relations with the friendliest government Israel can imagine. Israel has gone through this scenario before. Israel entered Lebanon in 1982 with the aim of deterring threats to the northern settlements, established a security zone, and remained there for 18 years. Initially, the area was presented as a defensive line, but over time, its meaning changed and it became important in its own right. At that moment, the security zone turned into a trap: every advanced site needed another site to secure it; Every high peak needs another hill above it; Every attack creates an excuse for a response, and every response increases tension. By the time of withdrawal in 2000, Israel was no longer merely pursuing a security policy in the north, but a war designed to justify its continued presence in Lebanon. Now, more than a quarter of a century after the withdrawal, Israel is returning to the same dangerous slope. But heads of government only compete with each other. Who would elaborate on the description of the reoccupation of Shaqif with great enthusiasm, as if it were the Jewish neighborhood after the Six-Day War, and not a cursed symbol of a government that imagined the possibility of changing power in a hostile country, and found itself drowned in a swamp of blood, and its price was high, stained with the blood of hundreds of soldiers that had been shed in vain? This time, it’s not the old security strip, but a new, yellow front line, wrapped in modern terms: defensive sphere, elimination of threats, underground infrastructure. But the old question comes back sharply: Does Israel retain the lands to protect its citizens, or does it expose its soldiers to danger to justify its retention of the lands? The first glimpse of the trap In recent days, we have had the first glimpses of how the agreement between the United States and Iran could restrict Israel, specifically in the Lebanese arena. The tank incident, in which four Israeli soldiers were killed, has not yet been clarified. If the incident that sparked the entire day of the battle was ambiguous, and if it had not been proven that Hezbollah was the one who attacked the tank, it would have been better to investigate, clarify the facts to the public, and then determine how to respond. Instead, the Israeli government was quick to threaten a harsh response. The Air Force launched an attack on Lebanon. Hezbollah responded. Israel launched another attack. Then Iran, which read the map faster than some decision-makers in Jerusalem, claimed that Israel was violating the agreement, and began threatening again with the Hormuz card. Thus, a new and dangerous connection was created: between a burning tank in southern Lebanon and the most important shipping lane for the global economy. Between the village of Tabnit and Hormuz. Between a mysterious tactical event and American-Iranian negotiations in which Israel does not participate at all, but it may pay the price. A key part of the complexity is the timeline. A senior security source says: “Because of the elections, Netanyahu cannot withdraw. Because Trump is managing us, obstructing us, and not allowing us to fight there. A dangerous complication.” After the agreement between the United States and Iran, Israel published a map with a new yellow line in southern Lebanon. The area of the area between the international border and this line is estimated at more than 600 square kilometers, and includes about 60 villages. From Israel’s perspective, this is an advanced defense zone. From the point of view of Hezbollah, Lebanon, Iran, and the entire world, it looks like an Israeli occupation of an area where Hezbollah members are stationed. Here lies the problem. It is impossible to establish a real ceasefire in such an area unless its status and what each party is allowed to do within it are agreed upon in advance. The Israeli army is participating, with limited forces, in clearing the area. While Hezbollah continues its operations there; Any local clash could turn into a regional, if not global, crisis. This is a conditional ceasefire, within an area where no ceasefire conditions have been set. When a Hezbollah unit launches a drone or launches an attack on a force inside the yellow zone, Israel considers this a violation. But from the outside, and certainly from Tehran, the question arises as to why the Israeli action itself in that region is not considered a continuation of hostilities. Israel expects the world to accept the distinction it makes between operating within the defensive zone, an area it has defined and mapped, and operating outside it. This distinction makes sense in military briefings, but immediately collapses in the political arena. “The security zone occupied by the IDF in Lebanon, known as the ‘anti-tank defense line,’ which aims to prevent direct anti-tank bombardment of settlements, is a very partial solution, as Hezbollah can also launch missiles and drones from greater distances,” writes Gal Berel, head of the ground sector and editor-in-chief of the Israeli army magazine “Between the Poles,” a captain in the reserves with the “Fire Arrows” paratrooper formation. Beryl adds that if forces must remain in Lebanon, they must be limited to a narrow strip, within a strict and effective defense concept, to ensure that the events of October 7 are not repeated. Everything else is a waste of time, money and blood. The statements of the Israeli army spokesman on Friday evening made clear the seriousness of the problem. Brigadier General Yves Dafrin confirmed that the instructions directed to the forces on the ground have not changed. The Israeli army continues to kill terrorists in the defense zone and remove threats from the residents of the north. Militarily, this seems self-evident. Politically, these are instructions that may likely ignite the next confrontation. The Israeli army continues to fight within an area it has designated as a defensive zone, but it still does not have full control over it. IDF soldiers will continue to confront Hezbollah elements; Hezbollah members will continue to shoot, ambush, launch drones, or hide; Israel will continue to respond; Hezbollah will respond in kind. All of this will happen under the guise of a ceasefire, while the United States tries to convince Iran that the war in the region is over. This is the mechanism that could turn a local event into an Iranian pressure tool. A step here, a step there The operational problem is not new. After an operation in Lebanon in July 1981, when a paratrooper force raided a terrorist base, the claim was raised in the investigation that if you raid a hill, you also have to control the hills you control. Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, then chief of staff, jokingly reminded everyone who fought in Lebanon of what he had learned the hard way: for every hill you control, there are other hills you control. This is not a tactical observation, but rather the Lebanese ambush doctrine. In the age of drones, anti-tank missiles, missiles, and precision munitions, even extra depth does not guarantee security. It may buy time, improve attack conditions, and make an October 7-style ground raid more difficult, but it does not eliminate the threat. Therefore, the question is not whether it is right to maintain a security zone, but rather what happens when this zone expands to include dozens of villages and hundreds of square kilometers, and when the purpose for which all this is being done, for which a heavy price is being paid, fades, and it oscillates between defending the north and weakening Hezbollah in general, preparing future starting points, or exerting political pressure on the agreement with Iran. Here another weakness emerges: ground maneuver is supposed to be a decisive tool, but it must serve a realistic and clear purpose. What Israel is doing now seems like intermittent steps: one step towards consolidating an improved defensive line, and another towards operations that suggest a desire for resolution, without having the strength, time, legitimacy and freedom of action necessary to complete this. This creates a situation in which all the achievements of the tactic immediately fade away because they are not connected to a strategic vision. Strength is actually wasted in resilience, in reactions, and in partial expansion. When force is not enough to move forward, and no decision is made to withdraw, a new security zone is created. Senior officials in Israel view the situation with great concern. Part of this concern stems from the military’s failure to question what the point of all this is. The political leaders, as many at the top of the defense establishment believe, are eager to undermine the agreement between the United States and Iran, and are imposing or approving dangerous, illogical, and useless moves on the army, while the army is content to nod and proceed as a bombing contractor to carry out the tasks without raising any objection. After Chief of Staff Zamir stood tall in the face of the occupation of Gaza and the killing of hostages, and instead of devoting his time to the emissaries of the Supreme Leader (Hezbollah, Hamas, Jihad, the Houthis, and others), he turns the dilapidated Israeli army into tools for the emissaries of another ruler, into mouthpieces for the Supreme Commander, and kidnaps the hostages with poisoned slingshots. Netanyahu’s advisor calls him a withdrawn chief of staff, and holds him responsible for the prime minister’s inaction. In this situation, it is not surprising that the army is often afraid to express its opinion. This is not a question of stopping or reducing protection of the northern communities, quite the opposite. But serious defense is not an automatic reconstruction of the quagmire from which Israel emerged in 2000. The IDF must tell the political leadership what it refuses to hear: If the mission is to prevent incursion, it may be possible to maintain a narrower defensive line and radically improve the defense. But if the mission is to defeat Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, then what is required is a different process, a different goal, a different force, and a different political agreement. If the task is to continue to advance, respond, purify, endure, and wait, then this is neither a task nor progress, but rather stagnation. The biggest problem is that military language makes it possible to hide the absence of a decisive result, as was said previously in Lebanon. But in the end, any such formulation must be examined with one question: Does it bring closer the day when the residents of the north become safer and IDF soldiers are less at risk, or does it add another justification for remaining in the field? A security zone always begins with a promise to remove the threat. It continues as a geographical logic. It takes hold when soldiers begin to protect the line more than the line protects civilians. It ends, if not stopped in time, with years of erosion and losses, and a general question that arises too late. Between Hormuz and Nabatieh, and between an Iranian agreement and a tank in southern Lebanon, Israel is once again facing the same question: Is it waging a campaign that has a goal, purpose, and purpose, or is it returning to a situation in which every day creates a need for the next day? This question must be asked now, before the Yellow Line becomes the new security belt. Yedioth Ahronoth 6/21/2026
