اخبار فلسطين – وطن نيوز
فلسطين اليوم – اخبار فلسطين اليوم
W6nnews.com ==== وطن === تاريخ النشر – 2026-03-05 15:34:00
Palestinian Information Center While the ruins of destroyed homes in the Gaza Strip still bear witness to one of the most destructive wars in modern history, a parallel debate is escalating in Israeli and Western think tanks that is no less important than the military battle itself: How will Gaza be reshaped politically and socially after the genocide? While Gazans are preoccupied with the repercussions of the humanitarian catastrophe and searching for ways to survive, there is a broader strategic discussion regarding how to reshape the political and social reality, and reformulate the intellectual structure within which the concept of resistance was formed. Within this context, a study emerged issued by the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, attempting to draw an integrated vision for what it calls “the next day” in Gaza, through an approach that combines security, reconstruction, and social engineering tools. The study, prepared by researchers Ofir Guterman and Tara Feldman, goes beyond examining governance arrangements or rebuilding institutions, by presenting a vision for reshaping political and social awareness in the Gaza Strip, through what it calls “removing enthusiasm,” referring to the dismantling of the intellectual structure that made resistance an embedded part of the Gaza social fabric. The study presents a vision that goes beyond the military approach, to propose a multi-dimensional program that includes security, politics, economic reconstruction, and the restructuring of religious, cultural, educational, and media discourse, in an attempt to bring about a profound transformation in Gazan society. However, this vision, which is based on Western and Arab models of what it calls “countering extremism,” in turn raises major questions about the limits of the Israeli bet on changing the social and political structure of the Strip in the post-war period. This approach, in essence, reveals a broader vision on the part of Israeli decision-making circles and their allies, as they see that the ongoing war is not just a military confrontation with the Hamas movement, but rather a long-term conflict with the environment in which resistance arose inside the Gaza Strip, which was historically formed under the influence of occupation, siege, and displacement that has continued for decades. A society formed under shock. The study finds that the Gaza Strip today represents one of the most complex environments in the world in terms of the intersection between political and religious extremism, a situation formed through long decades of conflict, occupation, and displacement. Since the 1950s, a special social and political structure has crystallized in the Gaza Strip as a result of several accumulated factors, including the mass asylum of Palestinians after the 1948 Nakba, Israel’s control of the Gaza Strip after 1967, and then the transformations that followed Hamas’s control of power in 2007. According to the study, these factors combined led to the formation of what it describes as an “extremist religious nationalist environment,” where the discourse of resistance became part of public consciousness and an essential component of identity. Social and political population of Gaza. The study indicates that the recent Israeli war of annihilation on the Gaza Strip caused almost complete destruction of civilian infrastructure, tens of thousands of casualties, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents. But this destruction – according to the researchers’ analysis – raises a strategic question that goes beyond the issue of reconstruction: How can a new political and civil system be built in Gaza that separates society from Hamas’ ideology? The importance of the study lies in that it attempts to combine different experiences in combating extremism, as it links the Western models that emerged after World War II for rebuilding defeated countries, with recent Arab experiences in confronting armed Islamic movements. Through this integration, the study provides a conceptual framework for decision-makers that includes a set of security, political and social mechanisms for post-war management in Gaza. Why did Gaza become a resistance volcano? The study confirms that understanding the nature of Gazan society cannot be done in isolation from the long historical experience of trauma, displacement, and political and economic isolation. The majority of the Gaza Strip’s population, which exceeds two million people, are refugees or children of refugees who grew up in an overcrowded environment with limited resources, and have been living under strict restrictions on movement and work since the imposition of the Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip in 2007. The study believes that extremism – as it describes it – in Gaza is not a phenomenon separate from its political context, but rather is a direct product of the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The continuing military occupation, economic decline, and the absence of a political horizon have contributed to creating a social environment dominated by feelings of injustice and deprivation. In this context, the Hamas movement – according to the study – succeeded in consolidating its ideology through a long process of social engineering, as it invested in educational, religious and media institutions to promote the discourse of resistance and confrontation with the occupation. The study indicates that this process made the idea of armed resistance a part of daily life in Gaza, such that it was no longer limited to military organizations or political elites, but rather became present in schools, mosques, the media space, and even in social relations within society. De-radicalization of Gaza Instead of using the term “de-radicalization,” the study prefers to use the term “de-radicalization,” in an attempt to indicate the specificity of the Gaza situation. The problem – from the researchers’ point of view – is not limited to the existence of an armed organization such as Hamas, but rather extends to a broad intellectual and social system formed over long years of conflict. The researchers define the process of “countering extremism” in this context as a process during which individuals and societies shift away from ideologies that justify violence, towards adopting peaceful political means to achieve national goals. However, the study stresses at the same time the need not to deny Palestinian national aspirations, because ignoring them – according to the analysis – will make any project to combat extremism lose credibility and legitimacy. Therefore, you believe that the success of this process requires allowing space for peaceful political struggle, so that the Palestinians feel that there are real alternatives to armed resistance. The study is based on a common theory in the field of “counter-extremism” that is based on distinguishing between two types of factors that affect the behavior of individuals and societies: push factors and pull factors. Push factors in the fight against Hamas refer to negative experiences that push individuals away from extremist organizations, such as corruption, repression, military failures, or ideological contradictions. In the case of Gaza, the study believes that the extent of the destruction caused by the war may undermine the image of Hamas as a movement capable of achieving political or military achievements. The attraction factors are represented by offering political, social and economic alternatives that can offer people a new horizon, such as education, reconstruction, institutional reform, political integration and economic opportunities. The study warns against relying on push factors alone, as this may lead to a state of frustration or apathy, while pull factors cannot be convincing unless they are accompanied by a decline in the movement’s influence in the political and military sphere. “Combating extremism.” The Western model. The study considers that the Gaza Strip represents a complex case of what it calls “rooted extremism,” which has accumulated over long decades of difficult structural conditions. Therefore, any attempt to change this situation cannot be limited to returning the situation to what it was before the war. At the same time, the study acknowledges that the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza makes this task extremely difficult. Gazan society is experiencing a state of collective trauma as a result of massive destruction and great human losses, which may make the process of social reconstruction more complex. However, the two researchers believe that this disaster may also create a rare opportunity to bring about radical change, as it may push some segments of society to rethink the feasibility of continuing armed conflict if a convincing political and economic alternative is presented. In this context, the study reviews different models for “countering extremism,” including the Western model that was based on experiences in rebuilding countries after major wars, such as the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II. This model is based on several basic elements, including defeating the opponent militarily, rebuilding economic and political institutions, reforming education and media, and strengthening the rule of law. But the study indicates that applying this model in the Arab world faced great difficulties, as happened in Afghanistan and Iraq, where Western projects failed to achieve long-term stability. The study believes that applying this model in Gaza requires adapting it to the local cultural and religious reality, while giving a greater role to the Palestinian and Arab leadership in managing the process. Three Arab Models The study also reviews the experiences of several Arab countries in confronting armed Islamic movements, and concludes that there are three main models. The first model is the security containment model adopted by countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, and it relies mainly on security measures and oversight. The second model is the social transformation model that has emerged in some Gulf countries, and relies on broad economic and cultural reforms aimed at changing the structure of society. The third model, which is applied by some Arab monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan, depends on the religious legitimacy of political authority, and it is a model that the study believes is less appropriate for the Palestinian situation. In both the Western and Arab models, many courses of action are similar, although the methods for implementing them differ: the use of coercive security and enforcement measures and monitoring; Establishing a national discourse that elevates the state’s identity and law above all other identities and normative frameworks. Promoting a form of “official legitimacy” formulated under the name “moderate Islam” to reshape public consciousness in various areas of social life, with the aim of undermining “extremist discourse” and consolidating the discourse favored by the regime. The study suggests that the Gulf model, especially the Emirati model, may be the most suitable for its application in Gaza, because it relies on a comprehensive approach that combines economic development, social reform, and moderate religious discourse. However, the study acknowledges that this model requires a large amount of institutional resources and capabilities, which may make its application difficult in light of the complex circumstances in which the sector is experiencing. Therefore, the study suggests the possibility of combining the Gulf and Egyptian models, starting with strong security measures, and then gradually moving to broader social and economic reform programs. Mechanisms for uprooting Hamas The study presents a wide range of mechanisms that it believes are necessary to uproot or weaken Hamas in the post-war period, and to reshape the political environment in Gaza. This perception is based on a combination of security, political, social and cultural measures aimed at undermining the influence of the Hamas movement within Gaza society, and reshaping the political and intellectual environment in which the movement arose. The study believes that deradicalization should not be understood as a subsequent stage of defeating the movement militarily, but rather as a process concurrent with it, as weakening Hamas strategically requires providing a political and ideological alternative capable of competing with the discourse of armed resistance in Palestinian public consciousness. In the absence of this alternative, the armed resistance model will remain present as the most realistic option for large sectors of society. The study confirms that continued security pressure on Hamas and the rest of the armed factions represents a basic condition for the success of any political or social change process in Gaza. It assumes that Israel will maintain comprehensive security responsibility in the Strip to ensure preventing the rebuilding of the movement’s military capabilities, or the return of armed organizations to control the security scene. In addition, the study emphasizes that rapid civilian reconstruction is a pivotal element in stabilizing society. Rebuilding infrastructure, providing job opportunities, and restarting public services, along with psychosocial support programs, can contribute to alleviating the effects of the collective trauma left by the war, and reducing the environment of frustration and anger that may fuel extremism. The study believes that delaying reconstruction or linking it to complex political conditions may undermine the chances of success of these efforts. The study also highlights the importance of finding a reliable political horizon for the Palestinians, which allows a gradual path towards a political settlement or some form of independence, even if it is limited in its early stages. The existence of a believable political horizon is, according to the study, a basic condition for convincing society of the feasibility of abandoning political violence, as the absence of this horizon will leave armed resistance a legitimate option in the eyes of many. In this context, the study calls for the deep involvement of Arab countries in the reconstruction process and the restructuring of institutions, considering that Arab models in combating extremism may be more applicable in the cultural and social environment of Gaza compared to Western models. This participation includes supporting institutional reform, rehabilitating educational and religious bodies, and promoting a religious discourse described as moderate. The study also proposes a package of long-term measures, such as reforming educational curricula, media, and public culture, establishing rehabilitation and social integration programs for individuals associated with armed movements, in addition to building institutional immunity within government institutions to prevent the return of Hamas’ influence. This immunity includes establishing legal frameworks for oversight, enhancing transparency in appointments, and monitoring extremist speech in the public and digital spaces. In general, the study believes that the success of this process requires broad coordination between security, political and community actors, and achieving tangible and rapid results in the lives of the population, because the long vacuum or slow reform may give the armed forces an opportunity to re-establish their influence within society.
